



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND**  
**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE**  
**FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995**

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

February 7, 2002

Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young  
CRYPTOME  
251 West 89th Street  
Suite 6E  
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

Reference:

a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning Hungary Intelligence Services, MO, ZF400214W. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.

b. Our letter dated April 20, 2001, stating we are unable to comply with the statutory 20-day time limit in processing your request.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized and 25 pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3), 3.4(b)(1) and 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. A brief description of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal the identity of confidential human sources, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States.

Section 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958 provides information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the US and foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States.

Since the release of the information would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).

Also, information has been sanitized from these records to protect the identity of confidential sources. The sanitized information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D). The protection of confidential sources is necessary for the maintenance of a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.


During the processing of your request, records under the purview of other government agencies were disclosed. The records have been forwarded to those agencies concerned, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

Additionally, during the processing of your request, equities and excerpts of information were disclosed which originated with other government agencies. We are coordinating with those agencies regarding the releasability of their information. We will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

The amount of \$1,608.75 for the professional review and reproduction of the first one hundred pages has been waived. The reproduction cost of \$78.00 remains due and should be forwarded by postal money order or certified check made payable to the Treasurer of the United States.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Armstead at (301) 677-4743. Please refer to case #817F-01.

Sincerely,

  
for Russell A. Nichols  
Chief, Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Enclosure



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND**  
**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE**  
**FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995**

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

August 12, 2002

Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young  
CRYPTOME  
251 West 89th Street, Suite 6E  
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

Reference is made to our letter of February 7, 2002, forwarding Army records to you in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning the Hungary Intelligence Services, MO, ZF400214W.

As noted in our letter, information originating with other government agencies was being coordinated to determine the releasability of their information contained in the Army records and we would inform you of their decisions upon completion of their actions.

Our coordination has been completed with one of the government agencies and they have returned the records to us for our review. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and 145 pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3), 3.4(b)(1) and 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.



Section 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of the source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States.

Section 3.4(b)(6) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States.

Since the release of the information deleted from these records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(C).

In addition, information has been withheld which would reveal the identity of confidential sources. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D). The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

The withholding of information by this office is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be post marked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

The records are enclosed for your use and all fees associated with this request are waived.

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. ZF400214w

As of MAY 17-79 all material  
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

[Redacted Signature] MAY 79  
(Signature) (Date Signed)

[Redacted Name] 7  
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA  
OP AR 3  
REVIEW

[Signature]

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
APO 403 US Forces

AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Services (U)

28 AUG 1959

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
Attn: CE Branch

1. (U) Inclosed for your information and retention in HIS modus operandi files is one copy of a German translation from the Hungarian paper HEPSZBADSAG.

2. (U) Regraded unclassified upon separation from Confidential inclosure.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

1 Incl:  
Cy of German  
Translation from  
HEPSZBADSAG

for [redacted] Colonel GS  
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

Telephone: Heid Mil 7312

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 10 Apr 98  
BY USAFNSCOM FOWPA  
Auth Para 4-102 EOE 5200.1

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date NOV 5 1959 Init 463

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

192

2162 002 (b)(7)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
VS-Nur für den Dienstgebrauch

TO: 857  
FROM: [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT: Artikel aus der ung. Zeitung  
"NEPSZABADSAG" v. 23.7.59  
REFERENCE: ohne

13. August 1959  
Nr. 209/59 VS-HfD

Als Anlage wird die Übersetzung eines in der "NEPSZABADSAG" vom 23.7.59 erschienenen Artikels zur Kenntnisnahme übersandt.

Artikel solchen Inhalts sollen seit etwa 6 Monaten systematisch in der ungarischen Presse veröffentlicht werden.

Anlage

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 10 APR 98  
BY USAFSCOM FOLTA  
AUSL Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

134

3

Jung's wo seit ihr?

So schildert er die Anwerbung des ehemaligen Flugzeug-  
Mechanikers \_\_\_\_\_, der in \_\_\_\_\_

5 USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

2025 (b)(7)(C)

RAD kommenden und die aus AMBROZFALVA im Komitat CSONG-

Das Ausbildungslager Fort Bragg wird von der Special Warfare Division erhalten. Hier sollen, die 82. Lufttransportdivision, das 503. IR, die 77. Spezial-Fallschirmjägergruppe und eine Divergentenschule liegen. Der Kdr. der Schule ist Oberst! Die Soldaten dieser Einheiten werden im Fort Carson und Camp Haleb, die im Wald von PISGAN liegen ausgebildet.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

133

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In SÜD-KOREA diente auch KUKLIS Vilmos, dessen Vater in KISKUNMAJSA vor nicht langem die Ver-  
ständigung erhielt, daß sein Sohn, dessen Erkennungs-  
nummer "RA 10 - 813 - 147" war, an den Folgen eines  
"Gewehrschußes" vor nicht langem verstarb.

In SÜD-KOREA dienen aber auch noch andere Ungarn, wie  
der, in PESTLÖRINC beheimatete

und noch viele junge Ungarn. Die Eltern dieser wissen  
nicht, wo ihre Söhne sind, denn ihre Briefe werden aus-  
nahmslos in SAN FRANCISCO aufgegeben.

Alle diese Jugendlichen dachten, daß sie an einer ame-  
rikanischen Universität weiterstudieren werden können.  
Statt dem werden sie unterwiesen, wie sie, mit Funkge-  
räten, Schalldämpferpistolen, Chiffren, Chemikalien und  
sonstigen Gegenständen ausgerüstet, über die Grenze  
zu schleichen haben.

Abschließend warnt der Artikel die Jugendlichen von  
diesem Beruf und bemerkt, daß sie diesen dienen, deren  
Absichten nicht friedlich sind.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

2 Nov 61

5

132

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5050332 (b)(7)(C)

Translation

~~CONFIDENTIAL USE ONLY~~

13 August 1959  
Nr 209/59

SUBJECT: Article from the Hungarian  
newspaper "NEPSZABADSAG", 23 July 1959

Reference: None

Inclosed herewith is a translation of an article which appeared in  
the 23 July 1959 issue of "NEPSZABADSAG" for your information.

Articles of such a nature have allegedly been appearing for the  
past six months regularly in the Hungarian press.

s/

~~CONFIDENTIAL USE ONLY~~

131

Boys, Where are You?

The article deals with the recruitment of young Hungarian refugees into the US Army and describes, giving several names and serial numbers, how they are recruited, where they are serving at present and how their lot is turning out.

Thus he describes the recruitment of the former airplane mechanic [redacted] who lived in [redacted] fled to the west in the cargo space of an airplane for further training, and is now serving as a US soldier with a US base in Panama. In addition to [redacted] the Hungarians [redacted] and others are also supposed to be serving at this base.

The now 17 year old son of a certain [redacted] residing in BUDAPEST went to the training camp of the US Army at Fort Jackson and was trained here as infantryman. As a stateless refugee he was well suited for this since America's youth does not particularly like difficult dangerous tasks. After he did not return to his unit from a leave, he was arrested as a deserter. From prison he wrote to his parents that he would like to return home since things were being taught to him in the US Army which, if he told them in Hungary, would be very unpleasant for the American leaders.

There are allegedly many young Hungarians in Fort Jackson, such as [redacted] from [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] and others from Ambrozfalva in Komitat Csongrad.

Frau Jozsef FEIL, residing at Szamuely utca 18 in Budapest, recently received the message that her son, who served at the training camp Fort Bragg in North Carolina and whose serial number was RA 10 813 584, was killed in an accident near the camp on 25 May 1959.

The Fort Bragg training camp is maintained by the Special Warfare Division. Here the 82 Air Transport Division, the 503d IR, the 77th Special Parachute Group and a diversion school are located. The commanding officer of the school is Colonel [redacted] The soldiers of these units are trained in Fort Carson and Camp Haleb which are located in the forest of Pisgan.

In South Korea Vilmos KUKLAS also served. His father [redacted] in KISKUNMAJSA recently received the message that his son, whose serial number was RA 10 813 147, died as the result of a "gun shot".

(Article from Hungarian newspaper  
Nepszabadsag dated 23 July 1959)

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date NOV 5 1959 Init 463




However, there are also other Hungarians serving in South Korea. such as

~~and~~ from PESTLORING and many other young Hungarians. The parents of these latter do not know where their sons are since their letters are without exception mailed to San Francisco.

All these young people thought that they would be able to continue their studies in an American university. Instead they are taught how to sneak across the border/<sup>equipped</sup> with radio apparatus, pistols with silencers, codes, chemicals and other objects.

Finally the article warns the youths against this profession and remarks that they are serving those whose intentions are not peaceful.

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)



~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Forces

24 AUG 1959

AEUC-OPCE (AUS) 274/46  
D-567323/d

AUG. 20 1959

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service  
Re: Modus Operandi (S) (u)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Forces  
ATTN: AEAGB-IC(OECS)

1. (U) Reference is made to Intelligence Collection Memorandum CI-A&E-CE-1-56 (Priorities II-III), your Headquarters, dated 15 March 1956.
2. (U) Forwarded herewith is Summary of Information dated 29 July 1959, subject and file number as above.
3. (S) Source A-IV is identified as X-7-M, evaluated B, who obtained the information from Major [REDACTED]
4. (U) (C) The individual listed in the attached report could not be identified in a Central Registry check conducted on 7 August 1959.
5. (u) (S) It could not be immediately determined whether or not the Austrian authorities intend to close the courier route or permit it to remain in operation and kept under their observation. Any additional information received relative to the operation of the route or to the true identity and disposition of [REDACTED] will be forwarded upon receipt. 5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)
6. (U) Regraded CONFIDENTIAL 20 August 1962.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

1 Incl:

SOI, dtd 29 Jul 59 (trip)(S)

Captain, AI (INF)  
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M11 2498  
BGM/MMB/pt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES  
COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

MR: MMB/pt/20 Aug 59. Adv fws to G2 USAREUR 3 cys of an SOI wherein it is reptd that [REDACTED] rec info which inde that the HIS had estb a courier route into WG fm Aus. Inves revealed route did exist and was loc in vicinity of Hallein, Aus. HIS has recruited Aus Nat, name unk, who serves as a guide for HIS couriers entering WG. In Jul 59, Aus Pol intercepted a Hun utilizing route who had ID docu image of [REDACTED] Inves authenticity of these docus. CLASSIFIED SECRET BY AUTH [REDACTED] MAJ, AI(INF) OPO

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

Info not limited eval whether or not Aus auth will permit route to continue in operation.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US FORCES

31 JUL 1959

AEUC-OPCE (HIS): 274/46  
D-567323/d

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service  
Re: Modus Operandi (S) (u)

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section

Date 1 SEP 1959

Init 447

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
ATTN: AEUC-OPCE (Austrian Desk)

1. (U) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 4/55, your Headquarters, dated 23 November 1955.

2. (U) FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Region IV, subject and file as above, dated 29 July 1959.

3. (S) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: a. Source A-IV is identified as X-7-M, evaluated B, who obtained the information from [REDACTED]

b. Preparing agent is Special Agent, [REDACTED]  
Region IV.

4. (S) REMARKS: a. It could not be determined at this time if Austrian Army Intelligence intends to close this courier route or permit it to remain in operation and kept under their observation.

b. The location, disposition and allied information concerning [REDACTED] are unknown at present.

5. (U) Regrated Confidential 28 July 1962

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

1 Incl:

(S) SOI, dtd 29 Jul 59 (1 pg)

js/McG M 8345

Major, AI (Sig C)  
Commanding

OUT LOG Nr.

0562/59

10

~~SECRET~~

Page 1 of 1 pages  
Copy 1 of 4 copies

END TO G2  
20 AUG 59  
2149

M/C 3140

(S)(X)(D)

(U) (S) 552 (b) (1) (C)

(C) (Z) (b) (1) (C) 552

(C) (Z) (b) (1) (C) 552

~~SECRET~~

SUMMAR OF INFORMATION

DATE  
29 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

D-567323/d

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

In July 1959, [redacted] received information which indicated that the Hungarian Intelligence Service (HIS) had established a courier route into West Germany from Austria. Investigation by [redacted] revealed that a route did exist and was located in the vicinity of Hallein (nca), Austria. It has been further determined that HIS has recruited an Austrian national, identity unknown, who serves as a guide for the HIS couriers entering West Germany. At an unknown date in July 1959, Austrian police intercepted a Hungarian who was utilizing this route to enter Austria from West Germany. The individual, whose true identity is unknown, had in his possession identification documents in the name of [redacted] Hungarian refugee. Austrian police are presently investigating the authenticity of these documents.

SOURCE: A-IV

~~EXSC~~ 552 (b) (7) (C)

(B-6)

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date 1 SEP 1959 Init 447

DISTRIBUTION 1 - Hqs 66th CIC Group --  
1 - CE Region IV

1 - ICO Region IV  
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

11

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

~~SECRET~~

(b)(7)(D)  
EXSC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
319 Jul 59

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 12

SUPPLEMENT TO JULY 23, 1977 WEPH/MADEAG

**WHERE ARE YOU, BOYS?** - Helicopters are towering into the air and at their feet the great number of motorcars is slowly progressing in the crowded streets on American films. Colored neon lights are shining. The sight suggests an easy life - prosperity, riches and enjoyment. This is what the boys who went away were after. The further they went from the Hungarian border, the more remote seemed that dream of life. Camps, mass hostels, charity, a rush for gift parcels, many, many promises, even more deceptions, waiting, loss of hope, transports from which they were left out - "perhaps next month". Would it not be better to go home? New promises, intimidation, gift parcels, then Italy. "We do not want to stay here, this is a bad place for workers". Finally, everything seemed lost, nothing succeeded.....

One day American officers came. They looked at the boys. What do you wish? To work or to go to university? What did you do at home? Checking again and again - medical checking, the lungs and the heart, eyesight, are they all right? There remains only a declaration to be signed - I enter the army of the USA. The past pains, the fretting, the depression - have they been only a bad dream? Light is again shining, dollars are rolling in imagination, there appeared the nightclubs, jazz music stirred up the mood and girls smiled.

There were those who dreamt of the heights of science - universities, miraculously equipped laboratories, white coats and the magnificent secret that opens only to the elected.

RA 10813462 Encl 9 Oct 57

He was 20 years of age when he stepped out from the house. Today he is 23 years. He was an airplane mechanic of MALEV. His father says that the boy wanted to see the world. He said he was always afraid to get scoured up at home. The father himself was a motorcar driver before retiring, he had worked for a foreign trade company. One can understand the youngsters. The father says that he did not encourage his son but did not keep him back either. Let him choose for himself the life he wants. He was desirous of studying, of widening his horizons. He did even hide in the baggage room of the airplane and emerged only when it was already flying and they could not throw him out. So great has been his curiosity. He wanted to get continuation training in his profession out there.

We believe that he wanted this. But can he do it? Today he is wearing the uniform of the US Army and his training enables him to be thrown in as a parachuter whenever his commanders deem it necessary. Do you know that? We ask his father. He shrugs his shoulders. He had to do active duty, without that no American citizenship can be obtained. And if this is not simply a term of active duty? - we ask. If the boy should be used against his homeland against peaceful countries? - this please, is impossible, says senior. My son will do nothing against his homeland. 1-1/2 months ago he wrote that he is working in Columbia at an airplane factory. Is that so he is concerned - says his mother - Hungary can be quiet. Say the boy is getting now special training. Yes, we would not be so sure of his future if we would be his parents. Because X is doing duty in Panama.... This is also in the USA - interrupts the father. If our knowledge of geography is not wrong, Panama is not in the USA. But the US have got military bases in Panama. At one of these bases are at present doing active duty and several other Hungarian boys.

RA 10813417

Oct 57

RA 10813417  
Encl 25 Oct 57

13

UNCLASSIFIED

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

UNCLASSIFIED

In the past, the [redacted] the dairy shop, the corner of Post-  
lorine market place has [redacted] a calm man too, sure of his [redacted] was  
also satisfied that his son was alright until he learned what is inside the  
training camp of Fort Jackson. His son was 14 years when he went away, now  
he is 17 and in one of his letters he hinted that he was there. [redacted]  
grew desperate - his son is still a child. He had supposed that the boy would  
grow up over there in America; he would learn how to work and make his way.  
When after long vicissitudes he arrived in America, he got a job at a provin-  
cial restaurant. A fire destroyed the restaurant and the boy remained alone  
in the unknown, strange world. He wrote scared letters; then arrived the letter  
in which he mentioned Fort Jackson. The US Army gave help to the child.  
He is at their mercy. He is excellently apt to become a jemiseary; he has got  
only flesh, bones, muscles and at most a mind, as well as some value expres-  
sible in dollars. The American boys do not like difficult, dangerous missions,  
anyway. They may be excellently substituted by such homeless boys. They  
receive everything that is necessary for them to die for the USA. [redacted]  
wrote a letter: My boy, come home. What are you really? I have had  
forebodings. I do not want to lose you, I do not allow you to take this job.  
Soon a letter came: I am in New York, I have obtained two weeks furlough  
from that hell. I am here already four weeks, I did not go back. I have  
got no more money, now I shall be declared a deserter and, maybe, I shall be  
sent to prison - some mission has forwarded it. The 17 year old mercenary  
of the American Army wrote that he was sitting behind the bars and crying  
because he was not allowed to go home, that he was to be sent back to that  
military camp where he is being trained to do things which would sure be  
disagreeable to the American leaders if he would disclose them back home.  
The letter runs: I do not know whether this letter will get into your hands  
but if so, please do everything to get me out of the hands of the Army, I  
want to go home, I have had enough. So you know, Mr. H. what your son is  
supposed to do? Have you an inkling of it? You are no longer calm. You  
are afraid for his future. H. said that he would write to President  
Eisenhower, demand back his child whom he is not willing to lose.

Many young Hungarians are sent to Fort Jackson.

from [redacted] in Csongrad

County, [redacted]

What are they doing there? What are they being trained to do? One war  
training, mine-searching, mine-laying, parachute exercises, scrambling in  
swampy terrain 30km from the camp.....these are the items of the curriculum.

Mrs. [redacted] is just about to go to work, leaving her apartment  
in Szamaly utca 10. She is working at the winery on the corner of  
Horved utca and Szalay utca. Her son was a candyshop apprentice in Buda.  
In November 1956, he went West. American officers recruited him to the US.  
He was doing active duty at the training camp of Fort Bragg, North Carolina,  
USA, under the command of major general Hamilton Brown. He was attached to  
the 82d airborne "crack division" to the D company of the first battle group  
of the 503d Infantry regiment. He had already been appointed a private first  
class. His identity number was RA 10 613 584. Recently his mother received  
a letter that he had fallen a victim to a lethal accident, not far from the  
camp on May 25, 1959 at 10:30. His mother is assured of the deep sympathy  
of the command.

The training camp at Fort Bragg is maintained by the 8 special Warfare  
Division-also other units are there besides that in which the deceased Hungarian  
boy served. Among others the 77th special parachute group and the diversion-  
ist school. There, commander is Colonel [redacted]. Training is being given  
at Pinyon Wood, in Fort Carson and at Camp Hale.

UNCLASSIFIED

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

A former mining 5 yokes in Kiskunmajsa, resident is  
had received a letter from his son Vilmos to the effect  
that this letter was engaged on geological studies in the USA. This sounded  
fine. A beautiful peaceful job to be a geologist. In reality Vilmos had  
taken the place of an American soldier with the interventionist US forces in  
Korea. Hungarian soldier - cheap blood. They can do with him as they  
like - as soon as he had lost the soil of the homeland from under his feet.  
Not long ago Vilmos KILLIS, identity number RA 10 813 147 deceased as a  
result of a shot. His father got a notification and letter worth of stamps  
he was asked to give his wishes concerning the burial. They ask  
the Supreme command of the USA to send to Kiskunmajsa the personal belongings  
and photos of their son... RA 10813157  
Enl 28 Sep 57

A resident of Pestorinc, has 5 children. The eldest  
is the 22 years old In the past they lived in  
where the boy had learned the profession of an ironworker. There is his  
picture on the wall in the small house. Where is the boy? In San Francisco  
says the mother. His letters will arrive from there. In sunny California.  
According to our information he is a bit farther away - in South Korea.  
Ready for battle. Will this be good for him? This is not so sure. The  
job he chose is not a very safe one. But, maybe, it has not been who chose  
the job - maybe he had no other choice. The mother takes a letter from the  
wardrobe. sent it to the address of one of his friends. Did he write  
where he was? He is in San Francisco says the mother and hurriedly replaces  
the letter in the wardrobe.

The lost son of Kiskunmajsa has been in South Korea with James L. Antal.  
There the special explosion school is set up near to the border of the Chinese  
Peoples Republic, on the 38th degree of latitude. Also atomic bases are there  
about six of them. RA 10813157  
Enl 28 Sep 57

They are doing active duty  
and many other young Hungarians. n/Kol Enl

In the house he living with his daughter and his  
son-in-law Mrs. Her son who went West - is from her  
second marriage. He went to second form of Istvan Highschool. On that  
morning he went to get some bread with another boy from the house. He never  
returned. The neighbors boy was "lucky", he had a job a some theater in  
Budapest now he is singing in some nightclub in Montreal, Canada. The dream  
of Andras was to get to America. After 9 months in a camp in Italy, he signed  
a paper - a military paper. Now he too is sending his letters from San  
Francisco. Does his mother know that her son is a mercenary in S. Korea, under  
the American flag? She knows. Her questions, repeated several times by letter,  
how long his present service would last, what would happen then, remained  
unanswered. Perhaps not even the son knows the answer.

Where are you boys? What will happen to you? Instead of motorcars,  
nightclubs, saxophones and drums, instead of a dream-life, there you are,  
within the high walls of Fort Jackson and Fort Bragg. Instead of learned  
professors, your teachers are sergeants of the US Army.

You believed that science would surround you, soft steps, white uniforms.  
But the universities of Washington, the Howard, Harvard university in Mass-  
achusetts, the University of California, the universities of Oregon, Pennsyl-  
vania and New York are not made for you. You are being trained what to do  
when you will ex- tionally across the border, with radio sender-receivers  
pistols, vi des and ch tters and other equipment. Your good  
boys from

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)




Your parents are hopeful, there are those who are confident, others are indifferent as to your future. There are many among them who are unable and unwilling to believe the fate that your bosses have meted out, your bosses, who before handing you a boat or plane ticket somewhere in Europe, have carefully examined your physical condition and have made you sign a military paper. You belong to those who are hating the peoples power of your homeland and its allies - you are serving those whose intentions are not peaceful. And in these unpeaceful endeavors they have given you dangerous parts, condemning your souls to hell.

Many parents are sobbing. They believe, they are seeing, they realize that is your fate. Desperately they shout - throw away the uniform of the mercenary. If at any time you raise your hands against your homeland, if you assault your parents with the murderous dagger, you will seal your fate yourselves. You will take upon you the shame of treason.

(FULL TRANSLATION)

USC 552 (b)(7)(C)



che, die sich während der Konterrevolution gar nicht kompromittierten, aber jetzt zumeist als einfache Arbeiter in Fabriken und Betrieben ihren Lebensunterhalt erwerben bzw. bei dem unter amerikanischer Leitung stehenden sogenannten "Labour Company Service" oder direkt in der amerikanischen Armee Waffendienst versehen. Die amerikanischen Nachrichtenorganisationen schulen diese jungen Leute und wählen dann diejenigen aus, die ihnen für die Durchführung von Spionagetätigkeiten geeignet erscheinen. Dabei verwenden sie die Methode, daß sie den einen oder den anderen dieser von ihnen ausgewählten Jugendlichen materiell unmöglich machen und sie dann unter verschiedenen Verspiegelungen (z.B. besserer Arbeitsplatz, raschere Erledigung des Einwanderungsansuchens in die USA etc.) dazu veranlassen, daß sie sich dazu bereit finden, sich zu den schwersten Verbrechen gegen ihr Vaterland - Spionage, Hochverrat etc. - herzugeben.

Im Besitze der ungarischen zuständigen Stellen befinden sich zahlreiche Unterlagen, die beweisen, daß die amerikanische Regierung auch nach der bewaffneten Konterrevolution des Jahres 1956 von diesen mit allen diplomatischen Bräuchen im schreienden Gegensatz stehenden Methoden nicht abließ und daß sie bei der Budapester amerikanischen Gesandtschaft als Diplomaten getarnte Nachrichtensagenten beschäftigt. Diese sogenannten Diplomaten betreiben unter Mißbrauch des Wohlwollens der ungarischen Volksrepublik eine zerstörende und unterminierende Tätigkeit gegen unser Land und sein Volk. Diese eigenartigen Diplomaten arbeiten nicht daran, um das Verhältnis zwischen Ungarn und den USA auf allen Gebieten immer besser und freundlicher zu gestalten, sondern ihr Ziel ist es, für ihre zerstörende Tätigkeit immer detaillierteren Daten über die ungarische Armee, ihre Stärke, ihre Bewaffnung, die Ausbildung derselben, ihre Kampfmoral und Disziplin, Armee- und kriegswichtige Objekte, die obersten Kommandanten und zugeordneten Offiziere der Armee oder aus den verschiedensten Gebieten unserer Politik, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft, nicht in letzter Linie über die in Ungarn stationierten sowjetischen Verbände zu erlangen.

Die Organe der ungarischen inneren Sicherheit haben seit der Niederschlagung der bewaffneten Konterrevolution eine nicht geringe Zahl amerikanischer Spione in Haft genommen. Darunter befinden sich manche, die aus dem Westen über die Grenze gekommen sind, viele derselben haben aber auch von daheim aus ihren im Westen befindlichen Auftraggebern und Verbindungsmännern die Hand gereicht oder einzelnen Diplomaten der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft geheime Daten bekanntgegeben oder geheimes Material ausgeföhrt. Über die zu diesem letzteren Punkte festgestellten Tatsachen will ich Sie nun in erster Linie informieren:

Der ungarischen Öffentlichkeit ist bekannt, daß zur Zeit der Kon-

10'00 hr (5600) Budapest an alle - Der Sprecher der Regierung hat anlässlich der letzten Pressekonferenz folgende Erklärungen abgegeben:

Der Weltöffentlichkeit, insofern es die fortschrittliche Menschheit betrifft, ist die Tatsache allgemein bekannt, daß amerikanische Regierungskreise, ohne Mühen und materielle Opfer zu scheuen, sich bemühen, in den sozialistischen Ländern Unruhen mit dem Fernziele zu stiften, letzten Endes die in diesen Ländern bestehende Ordnung zu stürzen. Dementsprechend sind die ungarischen Behörden auch immer häufiger in den Besitz von Unterlagen gelangt, die beweisen, daß die USA jede Gelegenheit benützt, um sich in unsere inneren Angelegenheiten einzumengen und die volkedemokratische Ordnung in Ungarn mit Gewalt und auch unter Benützung der Mittel der Spionage und der Unterminierung zu beseitigen. Für das tatsächliche Bestehen dieser Zielsetzung zeugen u.a. auch die über einen ungeheuren Apparat verfügenden diversen Nachrichten- und Diversionenorganisationen, die im Auftrage der amerikanischen Regierung eine immer aktivere Spionagetätigkeit gegen die ungarische Volkdemokratie entfalten.

Es ist auch allgemein bekannt, daß während und nach der Konterrevolution unter den Flüchtlingen ungarischer Staatsangehörigkeit sich auch eine große Zahl ganz gewöhnlicher Verbrecher, Kriegsverbrecher, konterrevolutionäre Terroristen, Mörder, Einbrecher, Defraudanten etc. befanden, die teils um sich der Verhängung eines Restes von über sie bereits verhängten Strafen zu entziehen, teils weil sie sich fürchteten, zur Verantwortung gezogen zu werden, den Weg nach dem Westen gewählt haben, wo jetzt die dortigen Polizeibehörden deren "segenreiche Tätigkeit" in ihren Tagebüchern verzeichnen. Diese Kriegsverbrecher, Mörder und Banditen bzw. der größte Teil derselben sind sofort nach ihrer Flucht in die Kadern der amerikanischen Nachrichtenorganisationen eingetreten, so z.B. auch der ehemalige Rechtsanwalt Dr. [redacted] der im Jahre 1946 wegen kriegsverherrlichender und volkfeindlicher Verbrechen vom ungarischen Gerichte zu lebenslänglichem Kerker verurteilt worden war, und der nunmehr im Auftrage der Amerikaner in dem in der Nähe von Salzburg befindlichen Camp 8000 Spione auswählt und zur Mitarbeit anwirbt. In gleicher Eigenschaft betätigt sich auch Dr. [redacted] ehemaliger Horthy-Oberst, der von den Konterrevolutionären im Oktober 1956 aus dem Gefängnis befreit wurde.

Ausser den genannten Personen und ihren gleichartigen Komplizen benützen die amerikanischen Nachrichtenorganisationen auch im Grunde genommen anständige, aber unter der Einwirkung der westlichen Propaganda oder aus bloßer Abenteuerlust ins Ausland geflüchtete Jugendliche.

U.S.C. 352 (b)(7)(C)

Vorrevolution einige amerikanische Diplomaten unter Mißbrauch ihres diplomatischen Status eine mit ihrem extraterritorialen Charakter unvereinbare Tätigkeit entfaltetem. Als u.B. der Vertreter seine Neutralitätserklärung abgegeben hatte, erschien der seither ausgewiesene amerikanische Luftwaffenattaché, Oberstg. [redacted], beim Kommandanten einer ungarischen Armeeeinheit und forderte unter Berufung darauf, daß Ungarn nunmehr ohnehin "neutral" sei, die Herausgabe der Beschreibung der elektronischen Einrichtung eines ungarischen Kampfflugzeuges, was ihm allerdings nicht gewährt wurde. Ähnlich wollten unter dem Schlagwort der "Neutralität" auch der stellv. amerikanische Militärattaché, der Herr [redacted] [redacted] die Daten eines ungarischen Panzers kennen lernen und die Ergebnisse eines Industrieunternehmens besichtigen und fotografieren. Bei seinem Abschied nahm er "aus"zufällig mehrere Konstruktionspläne mit. Nicht unerwähnt soll bei dieser Gelegenheit bleiben, daß bei dieser Versprechung sich auch ein aus München angekommener Nachrichtendienst in Gesellschaft Gleasons befand.

Von Oberst [redacted] sei noch nachgetragen, daß dieser prominente Diplomat - jetzt ist er in Anerkennung seiner "guten Arbeit" bereits Generaloberst - auf dem Gebiete der Ungarischen Volksrepublik ein Nachrichtennetz aufgebaut hat und sich nicht nur persönlich sondern auch unter Verwendung seiner Agenten bemüht hat, in den Besitz geheimer Daten zu kommen. So unterhielt er u.B. auch mit dem von den Staatssicherheitsorganen bereits am 27.8.1957 verhafteten [redacted]

Bei seiner Verhaftung wurden bei [redacted] von ihm angefertigte Informationen, Spionagemeldungen sowie entwendete Originaldokumente vorgefunden, die er den Mittelsmännern [redacted] hätte übergeben sollen. Wie festgestellt werden konnte, hatte [redacted] beauftragt, die Militärobjekte und zivilen Bauten einer Reihe von Flugplätzen auszuspähen, was dieser auch besorgt hatte. [redacted] hatte auch bei geheimen Zusammenkünften mit [redacted] demselben detaillierte Anweisungen für Geheimhaltungsmethoden etc. gegeben. U.a. hatte [redacted] betont, daß im Falle eines Bekanntwerdens der Tätigkeit des [redacted] mit seiner Verurteilung, entweder zu einer langjährigen Freiheitsstrafe oder zum Tode und mit seiner [redacted] Ausweisung, und anschließenden Zerstörung seiner Karriere zu rechnen sei. Er gab [redacted] daher zwecks Wahrung des geheimen Charakters ihrer Verbindung die Telefonnummer seiner Wohnung, unter der ihn [redacted] mit veränderter Stimme anrufen und sich dabei mit dem Decknamen Maria vorstellen hatte. Für seine Spionagetätigkeit bekam [redacted] ca. 8.000 Forint Bargeld, einen Fotoapparat, eine Armbanduhr, einen elektr. Rasierapparat, einen Ring, mehrere Pullover, Hemden, Schokolade und andere

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

Beechenka. Das Oberste Gericht der Ungarischen Volksrepublik hat auf Grund seines teilweisen Geständnisses sowie des Beweismaterials wegen der Verbrechen der Spionage und des Hochverrats zum Tode durch den Strang verurteilt.

Anfänglich wollte man ihm gar nicht glauben, daß ein einer so hohen Rang einnehmender und in einer so prominenten Verwendung befindlicher amerikanischer Diplomat sich unter Besudelung aller diplomatischen Gepflogenheiten mit Spionagetätigkeit befassen könnte. Daher wurde in der Befürchtung, daß irgend eine Provokation vorliegen könnte, eine sorgfältige Überprüfung der Anzeige angeordnet. Dieselbe ergab aber, daß der amerikanische Diplomat tatsächlich von Oberleutnant [ ] Informationen über die Organisation der ungarischen Armee und über Kampfmittel derselben, in erster Linie über fliegerische Angelegenheiten sowie über Garnisonierung, Bewaffnung und Stärke der in Ungarn stationierten sowjetischen Truppen verlangt hatte. Oberst [ ] wollte solche Daten in jedem Falle schriftlich haben und hat dem Oberleutnant [ ] den er als für die Spionagetätigkeit schon gewonnen glaubte, ebenfalls stets zu größter Vereicht und Verschwiegenheit ermahnt. Das Ergebnis der von den ungarischen Behörden eingeleiteten Überprüfung, die sich sehr verwickelt und mühsam gestaltete, war die Feststellung, daß der amerikanische Diplomat tatsächlich Spionagetätigkeit betrieb. Infolgedessen wurde dem Fliegeroberleutnant [ ]

Bei diesen Zusammenkünften teilte [ ] Daten mit, die für ihn von Staatssicherheitsdienst bereits ausschließlich zur Weitergabe an [ ] zusammengestellt worden waren. Als über die Spionagetätigkeit des amerikanischen Diplomaten bereits eine große Menge von Material gesammelt worden war, wurde an dessen Ausweisung geschritten, die bekanntlich in den amerikanischen Regierungskreisen so großen Unwillen erregte.

Als sich nach der Konterrevolution die Situation in Ungarn schon einigermaßen konsolidiert hatte, begannen die amerikanischen Diplomaten abermals mit einem intensiveren Besuche Ungarns, das sie, wie sie sagten, wegen seiner Landschaftlichen Schönheiten gründlicher kennenlernen wollten. Nun würden solche regelmäßige und methodische Besichtigungsreisen seitens ausländischer Diplomaten von Ungarn nur begründet werden, wenn deren Zweck tatsächlich die angebliche Beob-

50 552 (b) (7) (C)

REFUSED  
50 552 (b) (7) (C)  
REFUSED

tigung der Naturschönheiten und Kunstschätze unserer Heimat wären. Solche Besichtigungsreisen würden wir als einen Beitrag zum besseren gegenseitigen Verstehen der Völker und als eine freundschaftliche Geste auffassen. Nicht als freundschaftliche Geste sondern als das gerade Gegenteil muß uns aber erscheinen, wenn unter dem Deckmantel von Besucherreisen in unser Land diese sogenannten Gäste sich für militärische Objekte und die Stärke der einzelnen Garnisonen interessieren, was, wie die in unseren Händen befindlichen zahlreichen Beweismittel einwandfrei ergeben, in Wirklichkeit der Fall war. Der schon erwähnte Oberst [redacted] hat s.B. am 6.3.1957 unter dem Vorwande einer Besichtigung der Kunstschätze von Veesspren sich längere Zeit in einem Gebüsch verbergen und mangels anderer Kunstgegenstände eine Kampfmaschine fotografiert. Als er bei dieser seiner Tätigkeit einer Polizeipatrouille ansichtig wurde, so, er es ver, sich rasch zu entfernen. Weitere haben Oberst [redacted] der amerikanische Militärattaché und dessen Stellvertreter, Hauptmann [redacted] am 3.4.1957 anlässlich einer "Besichtigungsexkursion" längere Zeit eine sicherlich nicht zu Kunstdenkmälern zu zählende und im Gegenteil sehr nüchtern aussehende Kaserne beobachtet. Wahrscheinlich von ihren kunstverständigen Neigungen geleitet stellten sie sich einige Zeit später mit ihren Wagen direkt vor der Kaserne auf. Dort konnten sie nur durch das Einschreiten der zuständigen Organe an einer noch gründlicheren Inaugenscheinnahme der Kaserne und daran gehindert werden, dieselbe zu fotografieren.

Nicht uninteressant ist auch der Fall eines Ungarn namens [redacted] aus Budapest, der sich im Jahre 1956 mit der Bitte um Medikamente an die amerikanische Gesandtschaft wandte. Der Genannte verhandelte in der Folge mehrere Monate mit dem amerikanischen Konsul, bis sich anfangs März 1957 auch Herr [redacted] der stellv. Militärattaché in das Gespräch einschaltete. Die Verhandlungen drehten sich aber nicht, wie arglose Leute glauben könnten, um Medikamente, sondern s.B. darum, wie die Verhältnisse der Familie Kagyari waren, wo seine Eltern lebten und arbeiteten, wie sein und seines Vaters Militärverhältnis sei etc. Nach vielen Monaten bekam [redacted] von den Amerikanern schließlich einige Medikamente. Diese Medikamente erwiesen sich aber als ein bloßer Köder, denn schon kurze Zeit nach dieser "gütigen Spende" stellte der stellv. Militärattaché am [redacted] das Ansinnen, auch weiterhin regelmäßig in die Gesandtschaft zu kommen und ihm allenfalls bekanntwerdende interessante Tatsachen mitzuteilen. [redacted] kam erst zu diesem Zeitpunkte darauf, daß es die amerikanischen Diplomaten allenfalls darauf angelegt haben könnten, ihn als Verräter seines Vaterlandes zu mißbrauchen. Er sagte daher nicht, seine Erfahrungen

den zuständigen Sicherheitsorganen mitzuteilen.

Die ungarische Regierung hält es nun für nötig, die Öffentlichkeit davon in Kenntnis zu setzen, daß den zuständigen ungarischen Stellen immer mehr Beweismittel darüber in die Hände fallen, daß seit November 1956, als ungarische Staatsangehörige massenhaft ins Ausland flüchteten, ausländische, in erster Linie amerikanische, Nachrichtenorganisationen parallel mit den sogenannten Hilfsaktionen tätig begannen, die Flüchtlinge systematisch und methodisch mit dem Ziel zu verhören, in die wirtschaftlichen, politischen und kulturellen Angelegenheiten Ungarns; vor allem aber in militärische Dinge, wie Stärke der Garnisonen, Bewaffnung der Armee und andere geheime Daten gehauen Einblick zu gewinnen. Diese Verhöre spielten sich entweder in den Büros staatlicher amtlicher Stellen oder auch in den Lokalen der Vertretungen westlicher Staaten bzw. in den Flüchtlingslagern und in den Büros der verschiedenen "Hilfsorganisationen" ab. Diese Flüchtlinge wurden in der Folge zwar als "Dissidenten" bezeichnet, das politische Asylrecht bzw. die weitere Gewährung materieller Hilfe wurde ihnen aber nur dann anerkannt, wenn sich die Flüchtlinge diesen Verhören unterwarfen und deren Ergebnis zufriedenstellend war. Wer politisches Asylrecht oder Unterstützung erhalten wollte, mußte auch alle Fragen darüber beantworten, wo und was für bewaffnete Kräfte in den einzelnen Landesteilen Ungarns garnisoniert sind, wie ihre Ausrüstung und Bewaffnung, sowie ihre militärische Ausbildung ist, wo sich kriegswichtige Objekte und Industriebetriebe befinden, was für kriegswichtige bzw. neue Waffen erzeugt werden und was für Bekannte die Flüchtlinge in den Kreisen der demokratischen und kommunistischen Bevölkerung haben.

Diese Einvernahmen dienen, wie auf Grund vielfacher Erfahrungen nunmehr einwandfrei festgestellt werden konnte, ausschließlich dem Zweck, die Nachrichtenorganisationen der westlichen Staaten in den Besitz derartiger geheimer Daten zu setzen, die es ihnen ermöglichen sollen, immer neue Handhaben für weitere Einmischungen in die inneren Angelegenheiten Ungarns und für die Verübung neuer provokativer Aktionen zu gewinnen. Die amerikanischen Nachrichtenorganisationen bezwecken sich auch darum, die Einvernahmen zum Verrat derartiger staatlicher und militärischer Geheimnisse zu bewegen, die eine derartige Kompromittierung der Betreffenden bedeuten, daß sie ihnen die Rückkehr nach Ungarn endgültig unmöglich machen. Solche Einvernahmen wurden von den Amerikanern z.B. in der Wiener amerikanischen Botschaft und in verschiedenen anderen Lokalen, wie z.B. in der Caritas, im KCWC etc. durchgeführt. Die amerikanischen Diplomaten haben aber auch, da in

der Ungarischen Volksrepublik die Freistellung der ausländischen Diplomaten in keiner Weise eingeengt ist, in Verkennung der wahren Situation das ungarische Staatsgebiet als freies Jagdgebiet angesehen und, wie die Beispiele beweisen, häufig ganz offen Spionage getrieben. So hat sich der amerikanische Militärattaché z.B. so weit vergessen, daß er im heutigen Jahre unter dem Schutze der Dunkelheit auch des Nachts seine Beobachtungen fortsetzt und, auf dem Bauche liegend, mit einem Fernglas ein militärisches Objekt offenbar zu Spionagerwecken genau in Augenschein nahm. Es erübrigt sich wohl zu sagen, daß eine solche nächtliche Beobachtung unangenehme Folgen hätte haben können, wenn unsere zuständigen Stellen nicht ohne Zutun der amerikanischen Diplomaten für deren körperliche Sicherheit bedacht gewesen wären.

Im Zusammenhange mit ihren Rekoonesierungszügen verletzen die Diplomaten und Beamten der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft in zahlreichen Fällen auch die Verkehrsverschriften auf das schwerste. So fahren sie sowohl im verbauten als auch in unverbauten Gebiet mit einer Durchschnittsgeschwindigkeit von 120 - 150 km und gefährden mit ihren Kraftwagen insbesondere in den Abendstunden die Sicherheit sowohl der Passanten als auch der Fahrzeuge. Diese Situation wird noch mehr angespannt durch die Tatsache, daß einzelne dieser Chauffeure mit Diplomatenstatus sich nicht nur einmal im alkoholisierten Zustand ans Steuer setzen. So hat z.B. vor einigen Wochen der ehemals der Luftfahrtabteilung der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft zugeteilte Wachtmeister \_\_\_\_\_ sein Auto im betrunkenen Zustande gesteuert und am Donaukanal einen dort Dienst tuenden Polizisten niedergestossen. Trotz seines alkoholisierten Zustandes nahm der Fahrer den von ihm verursachten Unfall wahr, verlangsamte das Tempo und fragte den Polizisten in gebrochenem Ungarisch in ironischem Tone, ob ihn die erlittenen Verletzungen schmerzten. Nach der bejahenden Antwort des Wachorgans ließ der Verkehrssünder sein Opfer im Stiche und suchte mit großer Geschwindigkeit das Weite. Nach diesem Vorfall hat das ungarische Außenministerium die amerikanische Gesandtschaft davon in Kenntnis gesetzt, daß Wachtmeister \_\_\_\_\_ auf ungarischem Gebiete in Zukunft einen Kraftwagen zu lenken nicht mehr berechtigt sei. Das amerikanische Außenministerium hat diesen Schritt Ungarns damit beantwortet, daß es diesen Gesandtschaftsfunktionär zurückberief. Es lohnt sich wohl noch zu erwähnen, daß den Mitarbeitern der amerik. Gesandtschaft ca. 30 Kraftwagen zur Verfügung stehen. Dies bedeutet, daß auf jeden in Budapest aufhältlichen amerikanischen Diplomaten pro Person 3 Kraftwagen entfallen. Wozu diese große Zahl von Kraftwagen dient, kann man aus den vorangehenden Ausführungen leicht er-



raten. Einige Mitarbeiter der Gesandtschaft verfolgen unserer militärischen Daten auch die Entwicklung der ungarischen Volkswirtschaft mit großer Aufmerksamkeit. Wie zahlreiche Beispiele beweisen, entspringt dieses Interesse keineswegs besonders freundlichen oder wohlwollenden Absichten. So hat z.B. ein Mitarbeiter der Gesandtschaft am 20.7.1958 eine Tour in die Gegend von Kiskunhalas unternommen und dort den auf der Strasse Nr. 534 beschäftigten Strasseninstandhaltungsarbeiter nach den Ernteaussichten sowie nach den Ergebnissen der Wirtschaftsentwicklung der an der Strasse gelegenen staatlichen Landwirtschaft befragt. Später wollte er durchaus wissen, mit was für Mitteln die Bauern in die landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften gezwungen werden. Da er auf diese Fragen nicht die von ihm erwartete Antwort erhielt, fuhr er weiter, nachdem er vorher seinen Gesprächspartner nach einem "kursen Vortrag" über den höheren Standard der amerikanischen Landwirtschaft gehalten hatte.

Ich möchte aus dem jetzigen Anlaß auch darüber sprechen, daß ungarische Staatsangehörige, die als Parteien bei der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft versprochen, auf eine ganz seltsame Art behandelt werden. Ich kann nicht glauben, daß die Methoden, die diese Gesandtschaft z.B. den um Einwanderungswissen ansuchenden Personen gegenüber anwendet, durch die amerikanischen Gesetze gedeckt sind. Solche Personen werden nämlich in alle Einzelheiten gehend über ihren Arbeitsplatz, die dort erzeugten Produkte, über den Leiter der Fabrik etc. befragt. Ausserdem beehrt man von solchen Gesuchstellern auch detaillierte Angaben über Angelegenheiten militärischer Natur. Derartige Befragungen werden von der Konsularabteilung der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft durchgeführt. Wir besitzen auch Beweise dafür, daß von in die USA auswandernden Personen "Erklärungen" abverlangt werden, in denen die betreffenden bestätigen müssen, an keinerlei linksgerichteter Bewegung beteiligt oder Mitglied einer Linkspartei gewesen zu sein. Diese Erklärung muß auch die Versicherung enthalten, daß der Betreffende seiner Militärdienstplicht nicht nachgekommen ist. Infolge dieser Praxis sind Fälle vorgekommen, daß einige Jugendliche, die in die USA auswandern wollten, unter dem Eindruck solcher Erklärungen die Ableistung der Militärdienstplicht verweigerten und erst nach längerem Zureden zu der Einsicht gebracht werden konnten, daß sie ihrer staatsbürgerlichen Pflicht auch dann nachkommen müßten, wenn dies der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft nicht genehm sei.

Es hat sich aber auch die Praxis ausgebildet, daß ungarische Staatsangehörige, die bei der amerik. Gesandtschaft um Medikamente oder eine sonstige Unterstützung versprochen in unschmeicheleicher Weise

●	●	○	○	○	○
○	○	○	○	○	○
○	●	○	○	○	○
○	○	○	○	○	○
○	○	○	○	○	○
○	○	○	○	○	○

**552 (b) (7) (C)**

10/11/75

strasse 32 befindlichen "E-Informationendienst", wo \_\_\_\_\_ und \_\_\_\_\_ angeworben wurden, oder in der Mühlstrasse 25, in einer dort befindlichen Villa ab, wo \_\_\_\_\_ und der ebenfalls hier bei der Pressekonferenz anwesende \_\_\_\_\_ von amerikanischen Nachrichtendienst angeworben wurde.

Als ein anderes Beispiel sei hier erwähnt der ungarische Staatsangehörige \_\_\_\_\_ (der von seinen Auftraggebern illegal nach Ungarn zurückgeschickt wurde, wo er sich aber sofort bei den zuständigen Stellen meldete und angab, daß er von der amerikanischen Nachrichtenstelle in Frankfurt a/M, Becherheimer Landstrasse Nr. 161, bzw. von dem dort befindlichen sogenannten "Amerikanischen Versteckbüro", auch "Amerikanisches Armeeministerbüro" (?) genannt, angeworben worden sei, bzw. da man ihn dort zuerst studiert und ihn dann zum Zwecke des Einbaues nach München entsandt habe.

Die zuständigen ungarischen Stellen verfügen auch über konkrete Daten darüber, daß in mehreren Städten Österreichs und Westdeutschlands (Wien, Salzburg, München, Nürnberg, Stuttgart etc.) in raschem Tempo Agenten zum Zwecke des baldigen Einsatzes in Ungarn ausgebildet werden. Einen großen Teil der Arbeit der Anwerbung von Agenten besorgen die amerikanischen Nachrichtendienststellen in München. Die Anwerbungsbearbeitung bei den erwähnten Versteckstellen wird von Organen versehen, die die Decknamen "Barna", "Parkas", und "David" führen. Bei diesen Personen handelt es sich durchwegs um amerikanische Nachrichteneffiziere. Ihnen stehen zur Seite der ehemalige Horthy-Offizier \_\_\_\_\_, der derzeitige amerikanische Wachtmeister \_\_\_\_\_ sowie ein Hauptmann, der sich den Namen "Jalda" beilegt. Wie den ungarischen Stellen bekannt ist, ist die Mehrzahl der angeführten Nachrichteneffiziere ungarischer Herkunft.

Die einmal Angeworbenen werden von amerikanischen Nachrichteneffizieren ausgebildet. Die Ausbildung erstreckt sich auf die Art der Beschaffung interessanter Daten, auf die Verwendung von Geheimschriften, die Art der Aufrechterhaltung gegenseitiger Verbindung, der Gebrauch von Kompaß und Landkarte, das richtige Verhalten im freien Gelände, das Fotografieren sowie als besonderen Lehrgegenstand auf die mehrfachen Arten bzw. mehrfachen Möglichkeiten einer illegalen Überschreitung der ungarischen Grenze. Der amerikanische Nachrichtendienst hat in der Umgebung von München auf einer Waldlichtung ein naturgetreues Duplikat der ungarischen technischen Grenzsperre aufgebaut. Hier wird mit den in Ausbildung befindlichen Agenten das illegale Überschreiten der Grenze geübt. Behufe Erlernung des "erfolgreichen Verhaltens" während der Nacht haben die Amerikaner an dieser nachgebildeten Grenzsperre ein be-

- 11 -

sonderes Raketen-Signal-System eingerichtet. Die bereits angeworbenen und ausgebildeten Agenten wurden von den amerikanischen Nachrichtenleuten sodann nach Ungarn zurückinstruiert. Ihr positiver Grenzübergang wurde durch die Verbindungslente des amerikanischen Nachrichtendienstes sowie durch Menschenhändler ermöglicht. Die Agenten werden bei jeder Gelegenheit mit im Westen angefertigten falschen Personalausweisen, Militärbüchern, Arbeitsbüchern, weiters mit Minensuchgeräten, mit einem Messer, einem Kompaß und einem größeren Betrage in ungarischer Währung ausgestattet. Diese über die Grenze geschickten Agenten erhalten in jedem Falle - wie dies bei einer großen Anzahl entlarvter Spione festgestellt werden konnte - die Aufgabe, folgende Dinge auszuspielen und darüber zu berichten: Kasernen der ungarischen Armee, militärische Ausbildungsstätten, sonstige militärische Objekte, Bewaffnung und Ausrüstung der Soldaten, Motorisierung der Armee und Dotierung derselben Kettenfahrzeuge, Stärke der Luftstreitkräfte, Stärke der Garnisonen in den einzelnen Orten, Verteilung wichtiger Industriee Objekte über das Land sowie Zahl und Standorte der sowjetischen Besatzungen. Von den ausgesandten Agenten wird ein nicht geringer Teil auch mit der Mission betraut, innerhalb Ungarns das Spionagenetz des amerikanischen Nachrichtennetzes zu organisieren bzw. weiter auszubauen.

Zahlreiche der von den amerikanischen Nachrichtenstellen gewonnenen und ausgebildeten Agenten machten, als sie mit ihren Spionageaufgaben an der österreichisch-ungarischen Grenze eintrafen, eine schwere seelische Krise durch. Erst hier an der Grenze wurde ihnen nämlich bewußt, wozu sie sich eigentlich hergegeben bzw. von den amerikanischen Verbänden hatten verleiten lassen, nämlich nicht nur ihrer Heimat, sondern auch ihren Eltern, Geschwistern und Freunden gegenüber zum Feind zu werden. Nicht wenige von diesen Reuengeworbenen fassten hier an der Grenze den Entschluß, sich gleich nach Überschreitung derselben beim Grenzschutz zu melden und dort wahrheitsgemäß die ganze Intrigue, in die sie verwickelt wurden aufzudecken. Dies s.B. hat auch der schon erwähnte Stan getan. Über Auftrag der ungarischen Regierung tun die zuständigen Stellen alles Erdenkliche, um solchen ~~Stimmen~~ Gestrauchelten, wenn sie ihre Verfehlungen freiwillig und rückhaltlos gestanden haben, wieder die Rückkehr in die den Sozialismus aufbauende Gesellschaft zu ermöglichen.

In unseren Besitz befindet sich auch eine Reihe von Daten, die darauf hindeuten, daß die nach Ungarn entsandten amerikanischen Agenten nicht nur durch geheimschriftliche Briefe, Funkanlagen und Kuriers mit ihren Auftraggebern in Verbindung stehen, sondern daß sich auch Radio Freies Europa in ihren Dienst stellt. Die Mitarbeiter des ~~Magnum~~

Freies Europa befassen sich aber gleichfalls mit der Auswahl, der Anwerbung und Ausbildung der Agenten und Radio Freies Europa quittiert in seinen Sendungen nicht nur den Empfang der von einzelnen Agenten eingeschickten Meldungen sondern erteilt denselben auch Weissagen, wobei diese bzw. die Quittungen durch Chiffrenwerte kenntlich gemacht werden.

Die Justisbehörden der Ungarischen Volksrepublik fällen in Angelegenheiten von entlarvten Spionen nach gründlicher Untersuchung und Aufhellungen der von ihnen gesetsten Straftaten gerechte und sich streng im Rahmen des Gesetzes haltende ~~Stamm~~ Urteile. Spione, die noch zeitgerecht zum Bewußtsein dessen gelangen, wozu sie sich verurteilen ließen, und die auf Grund dieser Erkenntnis sich freiwillig melden und zur Aufgabe ihrer hochverräterischen Tätigkeit bereit erklären, können auf weitestgehende Anwendung des Milderungsrechtes, ja, in den meisten Fällen sogar auf Straferlaß zählen. Hier unter uns sitzt z.B.                      der durch viele Jahre hindurch Agent des amerikanischen Spionageschetzes war, der sich aber dann beim ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienst meldete und freiwillig seine Hilfe zur Entlarvung der amerikanischen Nachrichtendienstlichen Unterminiertätigkeit anbot. Andere solche Fälle sind der bereits erwähnte                      sowie                      von denen der letztere schon wiederholt von

den in Österreich etablierten amerikanischen Nachrichtendienststellen zur Mitarbeit aufgefordert wurde. Die Genannten, die eines vollen Gnadenweises teilhaftig wurden, sind heute bei dieser Pressekonferenz ebenfalls zugegen und erfreuen sich vollster Achtung als gleichwertige Mitglieder unseres sozialistischen Staates. Solche verworfene Elemente aber, die sich aus der von ihnen betriebenen Unterminierarbeit kein Gewissen machen, wird die Justiz der ungarischen Volksrepublik nicht davor verschonen, daß sie die Gerechtigkeit mit voller Schwere trifft. Solcher Abschaum der Menschheit kann auch nicht mit Gnade seitens der Volksmacht rechnen.

Die Organe des Innenministeriums stehen mit den Mitarbeitern der amerikanischen Spionagesagenturen in ständigem Kampfe. Mögen sich alle anständigen Staatsbürger dessen bewußt sein. Daß die Entlarvung der imperialistischen Unterminiertätigkeit und die Hintanhaltung der unsere friedliche Arbeit bedrohenden Utriebe der Spione und ihrer Auftraggeber nur dann möglich sind, wenn unser ganzes Volk noch intensiver als bisher die Organe der staatlichen Sicherheit unterstützt und durch Erstattung von Anzeigen <sup>deren</sup> Staatsinteressen Interesse der Sicherheit der Ungarischen Volksrepublik geleistetem harte und opferreiche Arbeit erleichtert.

Abschließend kann ich feststellen, daß die Spionage- und Unterminiertätigkeit der amerikanischen offiziellen und illegalen Organisationen nur ein Glied in der Kette der Aggressions- und Provokationsversuche gegen unsere volkedemokratische Staatsordnung bedeutet und daß sich darin die dem ungarischen Volke feindliche politische Tendenz widerspiegelt. Ebenso klar ist auch, daß diese ganze feindliche Tätigkeit ein organischer Bestandteil der aggressiven amerikanischen Außenpolitik ist, mit der man die Spannungen in der Welt künstlich aufrecht zu erhalten und weiter zu steigern bemüht ist.

Wir müssen daher die seitens der aggressiven amerikanischen Kreise gegen Ungarn betriebene Unterminiertätigkeit als kriegshetzerisch brandmarken. Trotzdem wird die Ungarische Regierung im Interesse des friedliebenden ungarischen Volkes auch weiterhin eine Außenpolitik verfolgen. Die sich die Pflege guter Beziehungen zu allen Völkern und Staaten, also auch zu den USA, zum Ziele setzt. Grundlegende Voraussetzung für eine Besserung der ungarisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen ist aber, daß die amerikanischen offiziellen und illegalen Stellen ihren Einmischungsversuchen und ihrer Unterminiertätigkeit entschlossen und endgültig ein Ende bereiten. - Budapest, 13. September 1958 \*

10:00 hours (5600) Budapest to all - The spokesman for the Government made the following statements at the last press conference:

It is generally known to the world at large, at least the progressive world, that the American Government circles are striving, without shunning any trouble or material sacrifices, to stir up unrest in the socialist countries with the long-term goal of overthrowing the existing order in these countries. Accordingly, the Hungarian authorities have obtained more and more documents showing that the USA uses every opportunity to meddle in our internal affairs and to eliminate the Hungarian People's Democracy by force and the use of espionage and subversion. The evidence for such an objective includes the existence of various intelligence and diversionist organizations, which have an enormous apparatus at their disposal, and which are developing increasingly active espionage for the American Government against the Hungarian People's Republic.

It is also a matter of general knowledge that during and after the counter-revolution the refugees of Hungarian citizenship included a large number of quite ordinary criminals, war criminals, counter-revolutionary terrorists, murders, house-breakers, embezzlers, etc.; partly to evade serving the balance of the sentences already passed on them and partly out of fear of being held to account, they chose the path to the West, where police agencies now record their "beneficial activity" in the police records. These war criminals, murderers and bandits, or at least most of them, immediately entered the cadres of the American intelligence organizations; for example the former lawyer, DR. \_\_\_\_\_ who had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 1946 by the Hungarian court, for incitement to war and crimes against the people, and who recently on behalf of the Americans has been selecting spies at Camp Roeder, near Salzburg, and recruiting them for cooperative work. Also employed in this capacity is

USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

DR. \_\_\_\_\_ a former Horthy Colonel, who was let out of prison in October 1956 by the counter-revolutionaries.

In addition to the mentioned persons and their accomplices of the same type, the American Intelligence organizations use basically decent youths who fled from the country, because of Western propaganda or merely for adventure. They did not compromise themselves during the counter-revolution; they are now mostly earning their living as ordinary workers in factories and plants; or serving in the so called "Labor Company Service", under American supervision, or directly in the American Armed Forces. The American intelligence organizations train these youths and then select those who seem suitable for performance of espionage. Thereby they use methods of the following character; they will bring material ruin to one or the other of the youths so picked and then on various pretexts (such as the prospect of better jobs, speedier processing of their applications for immigration to the USA, etc.), induce them to declare themselves ready to perpetrate the most serious crimes against their own country, high treason, etc.

The competent Hungarian agencies have ample documentary material proving that the American Government, even after the armed counter-revolution of 1956, did not stop using these methods that are in screaming contrast to all diplomatic usage; and that at the American Embassy at Budapest it is using intelligence agents cloaked as diplomats. These so-called diplomats in an abuse of the good will of the Hungarian People's Republic, carry on subversive and undermining activities against our country and people. These peculiar diplomats do not work toward the goal of constantly bringing about better and more friendly relations between Hungary and the USA in all fields; their goal of their subversive activity is: to obtain increasingly detailed information on the Hungarian Armed Forces, and on their strength



weapons, training, combat morale and discipline; on installations of importance to the Army and with regard to a war; on the leading commanding officers, and other officers assigned to the military; and about various fields of our political affairs, our economy, our science, and, not the least, about Soviet units stationed in Hungary.

The organs of the Hungarian Internal Security have arrested no small number of American spies since the armed counter-revolution was crushed. Among them are many who had come across the border from the West; but many of them cooperated from their home bases with their handling agents and liaison agents in the West, or gave information on secret matters, or delivered secret material, to individual diplomats of the American Embassy. I shall now give you particulars with regard to this latter point:

The Hungarian public knows that at the time of the counter-revolution, some American diplomats engaged in activity incompatible with their extra-territorial status, and in violation of their diplomatic status. For example when the traitor \_\_\_\_\_ had given his statement of neutrality, Colonel

the American Air-Force Attache, at the time, who has since then been expelled, appeared before the commander of a Hungarian Army unit and requested, on the grounds that Hungary was then "neutral", a description of the electronic equipment of a Hungarian fighter plane, a request which was not granted.

MR. \_\_\_\_\_ the deputy American Military Attache, likewise using the slogan of "neutrality," wanted information about a Hungarian tank, and to observe and photograph the products of an industrial enterprise. When he left, he took along, quite "by chance", a number of designing plans. In this connection mention should be made that an intelligence officer from Munich was with GLEASON when the latter made his request.

With regard to COLONEL \_\_\_\_\_ it should also be mentioned that this prominent diplomat, now he is already a Brigadier General in recognition of

his "good work", had set up an intelligence net in the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic, and tried to obtain secret information, not only personally, but through his agents. For example, he had been maintaining contact with [redacted] who was arrested by the State Security agencies on 27 August 1957, already. At [redacted] arrest there was found in his possession information that he had prepared, espionage reports, and stolen original documents; he was supposed to have delivered these items to [redacted] intermediaries. It was found that [redacted] had given [redacted] the mission to observe the military installations and civilian buildings of a number of airfields, a mission which [redacted] performed. Furthermore, at secret meetings with [redacted] he gave the latter detailed instructions for procedures for maintaining secrecy, etc. Among other things, [redacted] had stressed that in the event that ~~in the event that~~ [redacted] activity became known, there would be the prospect of his being sentenced to life imprisonment, or death, and his own [redacted] expulsion and then the ruin of his career. So he gave [redacted] in the interest of preserving the secrecy of their contacts, the telephone number of his residence; when using this number, [redacted] was to alter his voice and use the cover name of MARIA. For his espionage work [redacted] received from [redacted] about 8000 Forint in cash, a camera, a wrist-watch, and electric shaver, a ring, several sweaters, shirts, chocolate and other gifts. The Supreme Court of Hungary sentenced [redacted] to death by hanging, on the basis of his partial confession and the evidence, for the crime of espionage and of high treason.

At first people did not want to believe that an American diplomat with such a high rank and

5050 552 (b)(7)(C)

REFUSED

in such a prominent position could concern himself with espionage, and thus contaminate all diplomatic usages. So, in the fear that some kind of provocation might exist, a careful check of the report was ordered. But this showed that the American diplomat really had requested from [ ] information about the organization of the Hungarian Armed Forces, their combat equipment, especially air-force matters, and the garrisons, weapons, and strength of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. COLONEL [ ] wanted by all means to have such information in written form; he warned [ ] who he believed to be already won over for the espionage activity, likewise to maintain the greatest caution and silence at all times. The results of the checking procedure instituted by the Hungarian authorities, which developed into a very complicated and troublesome affair, showed that the American diplomat was really carrying on espionage. Therefore [ ]

At these meetings [ ] gave [ ] information which had already been assembled for him by the State Security Service exclusively for forwarding to [ ]. When a large amount of evidence had already been gathered concerning the espionage activity of the American diplomat, steps were taken toward his expulsion, which, as is well known, caused so much annoyance among American governmental circles.

When the situation in Hungary had become somewhat stabilized already after the counter-revolution, the American diplomats again began to tour Hungary intensively; they said they wanted to become thoroughly acquainted with its scenic beauties. Now such regularly occurring and methodic tourist trips by foreign diplomats would receive nothing but a welcome from Hungary if their purpose were really to see the natural beauties and art treasures of our homeland. We would look upon such tourist trips as a means of bringing about a better mutual understanding between the peoples, and as a friendly

gesture. But it must appear to us, not as a friendly gesture but the exact opposite if, under the cloak of tourist trips in our country, these so-called guests take an interest in military installations and in the strength of the several garrisons, as was actually the case, as clearly proved by the ample evidence in our hands. For example, on 6 March 1957 COLONEL [redacted] already mentioned, on the pretext of viewing the art treasures of Veszprem, hid among the bushes for a long time and photographed a fighter plane, with no other object of art there than that. When he was seen at this activity by a police patrol, he decided to make a hasty departure. Furthermore, on 3 April 1957, COLONEL [redacted] the American Military A ttache, and his deputy, CAPTAIN [redacted] during a "tourist excursion," observed for a long while a kaserne, something which certainly cannot be considered a monument of art, but, on the contrary, a very prosaic-looking object. Probably motivated by their artistic inclinations, some time later they stopped their car directly before the kaserne, where only the intervention of the responsible agencies prevented them from getting a still more thorough observation of the kaserne and from photographing it.

Also of interest is the case of a Hungarian by the name of [redacted] from Budapest, who in 1956 applied for medicines to the American legation. The mentioned person subsequently had dealings for a number of months with the American Consul; and in early March 1957, MR. [redacted], the deputy Military Attache, also entered into the discussions. The dealings however, concerned, not medicines, as unsuspecting people thought, but such matters as the circumstances of [redacted] family, where his parents lived and worked, particulars about his [redacted] and his father's military status, etc. After many months [redacted] finally received a few medicines from the Americans, but these medicines turned out to be mere bait; for shortly after this "generous gift", the deputy Military Attache, proposed to [redacted] that

he continue to come regularly to the legation and inform him about anything of interest that he might learn of. Not till then did MAGYARI realize that the American diplomats really could have been seeking to misuse him as a traitor to his country. So he did not hesitate to inform the competent security agencies of what he had found out.

The Hungarian Government now deems it necessary to bring it to the attention of the public that the competent Hungarian agencies are getting a constantly increasing amount of evidence that since November 1956, when Hungarian citizens fled from the country in large numbers, foreign intelligence organizations, particularly American ones, began an action, parallel with the so-called assistance actions, of methodically and systematically interrogating the refugees for the purpose of obtaining accurate information about the economic, political, and cultural affairs of Hungary, and above all about military matters, such as strength of the garrisons, equipment of the armed forces, and other classified matters. These interrogations were carried out in the offices of official state agencies and in the installations used by the agencies representing Western States, such as the refugee camps and the offices of the various "assistance organizations." Subsequently these refugees were referred to as "dissidents"; however, the right of political asylum or the allowance of any more material help was granted them only if they submitted to these interrogations and if the results of them were satisfactory. Anyone who wished to be granted the right of political asylum or to receive assistance had to answer all the questions as to where and what kind of armed forces are garrisoned in the several regional areas of Hungary, about their arms and other equipment, about their military training, about the locations of installations of military importance, the locations of industrial plants, about production of new weapons or other weapons of military importance, and about

people who were known to the refugees and who were among the democratic and communist circles of the population.

As has now been ascertained beyond shadow of doubt from a great deal of experience, these interrogations serve the exclusive purpose of providing the intelligence organizations of the Western States with secret information that will put them in the position of getting more and more means of meddling in the internal affairs of Hungary and of engaging in further acts of provocation. The American intelligence organizations are also trying to induce the persons interrogated to betray state and military secrets such as would constitute a compromising of the persons concerned and thus make their return to Hungary definitively impossible. For example, such interrogation procedures were carried out by the Americans in the American Embassy in Vienna and in various other places, such as at the Caritas, the NCWC (this abbreviation may be for the National Catholic Welfare Conference), etc. But since the Hungarian People's Republic in no way restricts the liberty of action of foreign diplomats, the American diplomats have treated Hungarian State territory as a free hunting ground, in a mistaken conception of the true situation, and often have engaged quite openly in espionage, as a number of cases have shown. Thus, during this current year the American Military A ttache so far forgot himself that he kept carefully observing with field glasses a military installation, while lying on his belly, and at night in the cover of darkness, obviously for the purpose of espionage. It would probably be superfluous to mention that such an observation at night could bring some unpleasant consequences if our responsible agencies did not take precautions for the physical safety of the American diplomats, regardless of what they do about their own safety.

In connection with their reconnaissance activities, the diplomats and

officials of the American legation often commit the most serious traffic violations, as well. Thus, in built-up areas, as well as in those not built up, they drive with an average speed of 120 to 150 km, and endanger with their motor cars the safety of both pedestrians and vehicles, especially in the evening. This situation is made even worse by the fact that some of these chauffeurs with diplomatic status take their seats at the steering wheel while under the influence of alcohol, and this does not happen only once. Thus several weeks ago Cpl (possibly Sgt) [REDACTED] formerly assigned to the American Legation, Air Division, was driving his automobile while he was intoxicated, and ran down a policeman on duty at the Danube pier. Despite being intoxicated, the driver was aware of the accident he caused, and slowed down; in broken Hungarian and in an ironic tone of voice he asked the policeman whether the injuries incurred were causing him any pain. Upon receiving an affirmative answer from this agent of law and order, the traffic violator left his hit and run victim with great speed. After this accident the Hungarian Foreign Ministry informed the American Legation that Cpl. [REDACTED] would no longer have the right to drive a vehicle in Hungarian territory. The American State Department responded to this measure by recalling this legation functionary. It would also probably be worth mentioning that the personnel of the American Legation have about 30 motor vehicles at their disposal. This means that there are three motor vehicles for each of the American diplomats stationed in Budapest. From what has been previously said, it is easy to see what purpose this large number of vehicles serves. Some personnel of the legation take the greatest interest in the developments of the Hungarian economy, in addition to military matters. As many examples show, this interest is in no way due to any particularly friendly or well meaning intentions. Thus on 20 July 1958, a member of the legation, undertook a tour in the Kiskunhalas area, where on Road number

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5050 552 (b) (7) (C)

534, he asked [redacted] a worker employed on road maintenance, about the harvest prospects and about how state-operated agricultural enterprises in the vicinity of that road were developing. Later he was bent on finding out about the means used to compel the farmers (or peasants) to enter the agricultural cooperative enterprises. Failing to get the expected answers from him to these questions, he kept on going, after first giving his partner in the discussion a "short lecture" on the higher standard of American agriculture.

In this connection I would also like to mention that Hungarian citizens who appeal for help from the American Legation, are treated in a quite unusual manner. I am unable to believe that the methods used by this Legation, for example, with regard to persons seeking immigration visas, such a person is asked in great detail about his place of employment, the products made there, the manager of the factory, etc. Further, detailed information is desired from an applicant, about matters of military nature. Such interrogations are carried out by the Consular Department of the American Legation. We also have evidence that emigres going to the USA are required to give statements in which they must vouch for the fact that they have not belonged to any leftist party. This statement must also contain the assurance that the person concerned did not fulfill his military duty. As a result of this practice there have been cases in which youths intending to leave the country for the USA, have refused, while under the effect of such a declaration, to perform military services, so that only after lengthy persuasion could they be brought around to the viewpoint that they must perform their duty as citizens, even if this was not to the liking of the American Legation.

But the practice has also developed that Hungarian citizens who applied to the American Legation for medicines or other assistance were also subjected to attempts to influence them in a non-permissible manner.



What had already been prepared beforehand through radio broadcasting and other means of propaganda, prior to the revolution, has been continued after the uprising, in the refugee camps, with the people who left the country. In Austria, for example, in Camp Traiskirchen, as early as the beginning of December 1956, [redacted] who fled from Győr, tried to induce refugee students in that Camp to return to Hungary on espionage missions. In Camp Roeder at Salzburg, DR. [redacted] and DR. [redacted] who have already been mentioned, are engaged as agents of the American intelligence service in the selection and recruitment of agents from among the refugees. Both made a number of attempts, moreover, to locate and to recruit as agent [redacted] from Diosgyőr, who is at this present press conference. Before a prospective candidate for recruitment is employed, the American Intelligence agencies require a detailed personal background history from him, and any documents which he has, such as the Hungarian personal identity paper, military service book, employment record book, etc. Then the candidate must fill out various questionnaires, consisting of forms printed in English. These questionnaires contain, besides the questions about all kinds of personal data, questions such as about the person's nearest relatives (parents, brothers and sisters, spouse, children, etc.), vocational training, former employments, and military status. The questionnaire is also provided with a photograph of the candidate; a number of pictures are taken of him right then and there in the open street. The questionnaire is also provided with a comment about how the mutual contacts are to be maintained in the future. The Hungarian authorities were able to prove this fact conclusively in the cases of the American spies, [redacted], and [redacted], for example.

The competent Hungarian agencies also know what is going on in the organizations that serve to cloak American intelligence agencies, and where

5050 552 (b) (7) (C)

person are invited to go for recruitment who have been picked for consideration. Through statements that have been made, and facts brought to light, it was found that in Hotel Cottage, for example, at Vienna, [redacted] was recruited by members of the American intelligence service assigned there, who used the cover names of "BOB" and "PISTA", respectively. We also know of the methods that were used and the training that was given to [redacted]. Similar procedures are used at Munich, for example, at the so called "American Historical Research Institute", at Marsstrasse 30, where [redacted] for example, was recruited; and at the "US Information Service" at Lachnerstrasse 32, where [redacted] and [redacted] were recruited; and in a villa at Moehlstrasse 5, where [redacted] and [redacted] who is also at this press conference, were recruited by the American intelligence service.

BUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

Another example that might be mentioned is the case of the Hungarian citizen [redacted] his handling agents had him return to Hungary illegally; there, however, he immediately reported to the competent agencies and revealed that he had been recruited by the American intelligence service in Frankfurt am Main, at Eschersheimer Landstrasse 161, that is the so called "American Recruiting Office"; also called the "US Army Recruiting Office": he said he was at first studied there, and then sent to Munich for indoctrination and training.

The competent Hungarian agencies also have concrete evidence that in a number of towns in Austria and in West Germany (Vienna, Salzburg, Munich, Nuernberg, Stuttgart, etc.), agents are rapidly being trained for use in the near future in Hungary. The American intelligence agencies in Munich do much of the agent recruiting. The recruiting at the mentioned recruiting offices is done by agents using the cover names of "BARNA", "FARKAS" and "DAVID". These persons are all officers of the American intelligence service.

They are assisted by \_\_\_\_\_ a former Horth officer, by ' \_\_\_\_\_  
 now an American Corporal, by \_\_\_\_\_, and by a captain who uses the  
 name of "JALDA". The Hungarian agencies know that most of these intelligence  
 officers are of Hungarian origin.

Once recruited, the individuals are trained by American intelligence  
 officers. The training includes: Methods of obtaining information that  
 is of interest; use of secret writing; manner of maintaining the contacts  
 on both sides; use of compass and maps; recommended procedure in open  
 terrain; photography; and the special subject of the various methods and  
 possibilities of crossing the Hungarian border illegally. The American  
 intelligence service set up near Munich, in a cleared area in the woods, a  
 replica of the Hungarian border obstacles, where the agents in training  
 practice illegal border crossing. For the learning of "successful procedure"  
 at night, the Americans installed a special signal flare system at these  
 imitation border obstacles. The agents already recruited and trained were  
 sent back to Hungary by the American intelligence personnel. Their final  
 crossing of the border was made possible by intermediaries of the American  
 intelligence service and by smugglers of persons. On every occasion an agent  
 is provided with the following types of items, made in the west: false  
 personal identity document; military service book; employment record book;  
 mine detector rod; knife; compass; and considerable sum of Hungarian money.  
 Whenever an agent is sent across the border, he is given the mission as  
 has been found from a number of intercepted spies - to observe and report on  
 the following: kasernes of the Hungarian Armed Forces; military training  
 areas and similar installations; weapons and other equipment of soldiers;  
 motorisations of the Armed Forces, and information on tracked vehicles;  
 strength of the Air Force units; strength of the garrisons in the various  
 towns; locations of important industrial plants in the country; number and

locations of the Soviet occupation forces; Many of the agents sent out receive the mission to organize and/or to enlarge the espionage net, in Hungary, of the American intelligence net.

Many of the agents recruited and trained by the American intelligence agencies went through a painful mental crisis when they arrived with their espionage mission at the Austrian-Hungarian border. Not till they were at the border did they realize what they had let themselves in for, that is, that they had allowed the American recruiters to use them as the enemy, not only of their own country, but of their parents, sisters, brothers and friends. At the border many of these newly recruited agents resolved to report at once to the Border Guards, on crossing over, and to reveal the truth about the whole intrigue in which they were involved. The already mentioned \_\_\_\_\_ for example, did just this. If persons thus led astray voluntarily confess to their errors without holding anything back, the competent agencies, on order of the Hungarian government do everything possible to enable such person to return to the system of society that is constructing socialism.

We also have a number of facts indicating that the American agents sent to Hungary not only keep in contact with their handling agents by means of letters in secret writing, wireless equipment, and couriers, but that Radio Free Europe (also) lends them its service. The personnel of Free Europe (sic) however, also engage in the selection, recruitment, and training of agents; and Radio Free Europe not only acknowledges the reception of the reports sent in by the individual agents, but also sends them instructions; the instructions and the mentioned acknowledgements are in code or ciphers.

The judicial organs of the Hungarian People's Republic pass just sentences strictly in keeping with the law, in cases of revealed spies, after thorough investigation and a clarification of the acts established by them

as offenses. Any spies who in due time come to a realization of what they let themselves in for, and who on the basis of this realization turn themselves in and declare themselves ready to give up their activities of high treason, may count on a broad application of the right relative to extenuating circumstances; yes in most cases, even a pardon. Right here among us, for example, is \_\_\_\_\_ who had been an agent of the American espionage net for a number of years, but who then reported to the Hungarian State Security Service and voluntarily offered his service for the detection of the undermining activities of the American intelligence agencies. Other such cases include the already mentioned \_\_\_\_\_, the latter has repeatedly been requested already by the American intelligence agencies stationed in Austria, to cooperate with them. The mentioned persons, who were fully pardoned, are also present at this press conference today, and enjoy the fullest respect as equal members of our socialist state. But the judiciary of the Hungarian People's Republic will not hesitate to let any depraved elements whose conscience does not deter them from carrying on their undermining activities, feel the full weight of the balance of justice. And such human scum may not count on mercy from the power of the people.

The organs of the Interior Ministry are in a constant struggle with the persons who cooperate with the American espionage agencies. Let all respectable citizens realize this: That the only way to detect the imperialist undermining activity, and to prevent the wrecking work of the spies and their handling agents which jeopardizes our peaceful labor, is for all our people to assist the State Security agencies, more intensively than ever, to lighten the hard and sacrificing work already accomplished by denouncing such elements in the interest of the security of the Hungarian People's Republic.

44

Finally, I can assure you that the espionage and undermining activities of the American official and illegal organizations are only a link in the

chain of attempts to promote aggression and provocation against our form of government of a people's democracy, and they reflect a political tendency hostile to the Hungarian people. It is just as clear that this entire hostile activity is an organic part of the aggressive American foreign policy, whereby it is intended artificially to maintain and increase world tension.

Therefore we must brand the undermining activity carried on against Hungary by the aggressive American circles as war mongering. Nevertheless the Hungarian Government will go on pursuing, in the interest of the peace loving Hungarian people, a foreign policy which sets as its goal the cultivation of good relations with all peoples and states, including the USA, but the basic condition for any improvement of Hungarian-American relations, is that the American official and illegal agencies resolve that their activities of intervention and undermining come to a definite end.

— BUDAPEST, 13 September 1958 —

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

~~FOIA~~ 552 (b) (1)

~~(b)(7)(D)~~

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

46 - 48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US FORCES

12 MAY 1959

AEUC-OPCE (HIS): 274/46

SUBJECT:

(U)

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
ATTN: AEUC-OPCE

1. (U) REFERENCES: a. Messages D-1079 and F-5775.

(U) b. Letter, Region IV, subject: Hungarian Intelligence Service (C), re: Modus Operandi, file: EE-567323/d, dated 1 August 1958. *Lib*

2. (U) REMARKS: a. Neither *nor* has had further contact with X-7-M. After being arrested by the Bavarian Border Police for illegally crossing the Austrian-German border near Schwarzbach, Germany, on 18 June 1958, both: were later extradited to Switzerland, where they were wanted by the Swiss Police for theft.

b. Case is closed in Region IV.

(U) (C) 5USC 552

*Major AI (Sig C)*  
Major, AI (Sig C)  
Commanding

*/gf/McG M 8345*

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED  
CIVIC AAR 98  
EX USARV GCM/FOIPA  
Auth Para 4-102 FDD 5200.1R

49

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13 AUG 1958

REGION IV (MUNICH)  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US FORCES

AEUC-SCCE: KE-567323/d

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service (C)  
Ref: Modus Operandi

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

This Document Has Been  
Coded by C/R Section  
27 OCT 1958 415

1. Reference: a. Message D-1079, Region IV (Munich), dated  
10 July 1958.

b. Message F-5775, your Headquarters, dated 15 July 1958.

c. Summary of Information, Region IV (Munich), subject and  
file as above, dated 1 August 1958.

2. Forwarded: Summary of Information, Region IV (Munich),  
subject and file as above, dated 13 August 1958.

3. Control of Information: a. Source Agency A-IV is identified  
as the

b. Preparing agent is Special Agent  
Region IV (Munich).

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C) (X)(D)

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

1 Inol  
SOI, dtd 13 Aug 58

AMR/gf/McG M 8345

Major, MI (Sig C)  
Commanding

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

OUT LOG Nr.

00800

OUT LOG Nr.  
00800

50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
1 August 1958

## PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV (Munich), 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567323/d

## SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (C)  
Re: Modus Operandi (U)

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Information received from Agency-A-IV

2. Additional information from Agency A-IV received

SOURCE: Agency A-IV

(B-2)

This Document Has Been  
Coded by C/R Section  
Date 27 OCT 1958 Init H/15  
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

## DISTRIBUTION

1 - Hq 66th CIC Group  
1 - CE Rgn IV (Munich) 51

~~SECRET~~

REGION IV (MUNICH)  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US FORCES

1 AUG 1958

AEUC-SCCE: EE-567323/d

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service (u)  
Re: Modus Operandi

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date 7 Aug 58 Init 373

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) Reference: a. Message D-1079, Region IV  
(Munich), dated 10 July 1958.

b. Message F-5775, your Headquarters, dated 15 July 1958.

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Forwarded: Summary of Information, Region IV  
(Munich), subject and file as above, dated 31 July 1958, with Exhibit I.

3. (SECRET) Control of Information: a. Source A-IV is identified  
as X-7-M, evaluated B, who obtained the information from Source B-IV. who  
is identified as [REDACTED]

b. Preparing agent is Special Agent [REDACTED]  
Region IV (Munich). (u)

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

4. (CONFIDENTIAL) Remarks: X-7-M has been instructed that if  
recontacted by [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] he should make no commitments and should  
attempt to obtain more information on individuals concerned.

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl<sup>3</sup>  
SOI dtd 31 Jul 58 (S)  
w/Exh I

AMR/ag/McG M 8345

Major, MI (Sig C)  
Commanding

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

OUT LOG Nr.

00081

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ag

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

31 July 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV (Munich), 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567323/d

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (c)  
Re: Modus Operandi (u)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . .	6

### SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On [redacted] Source B-IV, while sitting in the [redacted] was approached by two unknown Hungarian males. The two Hungarians did not identify themselves, but stated that they knew Source B-IV [redacted] and that they needed his assistance. The two Hungarians then asked Source B-IV as to the whereabouts of [redacted]. The Hungarians stated that they wanted to locate [redacted] because they knew he was the "chief" of United States Intelligence in the Salzburg and Berchtesgaden 33TUN59, Germany area. Source B-IV informed the hungarians that he knew nothing of [redacted] but he did know that [redacted] had left Salzburg and was now residing somewhere in Germany. Source B-IV then informed the unknown persons that he knew a very close friend of [redacted] that could perhaps help them. The Hungarians then identified themselves as [redacted] and [redacted]. Source B-IV then telephoned Source A-IV and informed him of what had taken place and gave him the names of the individuals. Source A-IV agreed to meet the Hungarians at the [redacted].

Prior to going to the meeting, Source A-IV surveilled the area in which the meeting was to be held and observed an unidentified individual loitering in the vicinity of the [redacted]. Source A-IV left the area, telephoned the [redacted] and asked for [redacted]. [redacted] answered the phone and was informed by Source A-IV that he had been detained and would have to reschedule the meeting for 1430 hours, [redacted]. As Source A-IV entered this [redacted] on [redacted], he was approached by an individual who identified himself as [redacted]. Approximately 15 minutes after this introduction, a second individual approached Source A-IV and [redacted] in the [redacted] and introduced himself to Source A-IV as [redacted]. At this point, Source A-IV informed [redacted] that he was a close friend of [redacted]. [redacted] asked Source A-IV if he worked with [redacted]. Source A-IV replied that he did. Both men appeared to be satisfied with this answer and informed Source A-IV that they would speak openly with him. [redacted] then stated that from papers published and speeches made by [redacted] after [redacted] had defected to Hungary, they had learned that [redacted] was the "chief of American Intelligence in the Salzburg-Berchtesgaden Area". They therefore were desirous of contacting [redacted] so that they could gain employment with American Intelligence and perhaps return to Hungary to carry out a mission of any nature. [redacted] further stated that he had been the leader of a band of rebels during the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and that he presently had five truck loads of guns and ammunition hidden in Hungary. Source A-IV then informed the two men that he could do nothing for them until he knew something about their background. [redacted] stated that he had been the commander of the 3d battalion of Hungarian rebels during the Hungarian revolt and had fought in the Budapest, nca, Hungary area. During the fighting, [redacted] was wounded and taken to the Rochus Hospital in Budapest. With the aid of friends, whom [redacted]

DISTRIBUTION

1 - Hq 66th CIC Group  
1 - CE Rgn IV (Munich)

53

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

~~SECRET~~

USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 4/1/98  
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA

~~SECRET~~

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
31 July 1958

### PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV (Munich), 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567323/d

### SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (C)  
Re: Modus Operandi (U)

### CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	6

### SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

refused to identify, he escaped into Austria in [redacted] In [redacted] states that he returned to Hungary in an attempt to bring his wife out of Hungary and into Austria. After crossing the border into Hungary, was arrested by the AVH and taken to Győr, nca, Hungary where he underwent a series of interrogations. [redacted] stated that he lied during these interrogations but that the AVH believed him and released him without charge. After his release, [redacted] went to Budapest and then defected to Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1957, [redacted] emigrated to Switzerland where he remained until June 1958. While in Switzerland, [redacted] read the Hungarian Government release of the statements made by [redacted] [redacted] had defected to Hungary. In these statements, [redacted] learned that [redacted] and one [redacted] were agents for American Intelligence, and [redacted] in Munich 32UPU93, Germany. In his desire to offer his services to American Intelligence, [redacted] wrote to [redacted] in care of RFE, asking that he be put in touch with American Intelligence. [redacted] had emigrated to the United States and the letter was forwarded to him. [redacted] answered the letter on [redacted] recommended that [redacted] contact [redacted] somewhere in Salzburg. [redacted] refused to show Source A-IV the letter, but gave Source A-IV the envelope in which the letter was sent. (see Exhibit [redacted]). Upon receipt of the letter, [redacted] and [redacted] left Switzerland and arrived in Salzburg on 8 June 1958. Both [redacted] and [redacted] stated that they were traveling on legal passports and [redacted] showed his passport to Source A-IV. The passport was numbered [redacted] and issued in Dornbach, nca, Switzerland.

AGENT'S NOTES: Source A-IV stated that the passport was issued in [redacted] however, the picture of [redacted] that was contained in the passport depicted [redacted] as a younger man.

2. When Source A-IV queried [redacted] as to his background he refused to discuss the subject stating that his story was similar to [redacted] Source A-IV concluded the meeting by stating that it would take several days to locate [redacted] Another meeting was planned for 1000 hours, [redacted] Neither [redacted] or [redacted] were present at the appointed time and Source A-IV left the area. As of [redacted] Source A-IV has not been recontacted by either of the men.

3. [redacted] is described as follows: DOB: [redacted] POB: [redacted]  
height: 5'11"; weight: 160-165 pounds; eyes: blue; hair: brown, combed straight back; shape of face: triangular with broad forehead and pointed chin; distinguishing characteristics: none.

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE [redacted]

DISTRIBUTION 1 - Hq 66th CIC Group  
1 - CE Rgn IV (Munich)

54

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 10 APR 96  
BY USAINSCOM FOWA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ag

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

31 July 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV (Munich), 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567323/d

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (C)  
Re: Modus Operandi (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

4. [redacted] is described as follows: DOB: [redacted] POB: [redacted]  
height: 5'6"; weight: 140-145 pounds; eyes: blue; hair: reddish blond  
and very thick; shape of face: oval; distinguishing characteristics: heavily  
freckled on face and arms.

AGENT'S NOTES: The identifying data of the above named individuals was  
obtained by Source A-IV through personal observation and from the

[redacted] where [redacted] and [redacted] registered [redacted]  
The home address given by both [redacted] and [redacted] was listed on the register  
as [redacted]

(B-3)

Source: Source A-IV  
Source B-IV

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 10 Apr 96  
BY USAINSCOM [redacted]  
Auth Para 4-102 EOE, 27 Apr 96


EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DISTRIBUTION 1 - Hq 66th CIC Gp  
1 - CE Rgn IV (Munich)

55

~~SECRET~~

(b)(7)(D) EUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)



5USC 552 (b) (7)(C)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 57-62



FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

63

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET


Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.




Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)


It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 63

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 64-65

~~SECRET~~

61B78-0899

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
APO 403 US Forces

22 AUG 1958

AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 GB

(b)(1)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
Attn: CE Division

EE 564323/D

(b)(1)(C)  
Ev.

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Reference letter AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 GB, this Office, same Subject, dated 6 August 1958, inclosing one copy of translation of Subject document.

2. (SECRET) Attached hereto is Annex to referenced document received from [REDACTED]

3. (UNCLASSIFIED) Downgrading data cannot be pre-determined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

1 Incl: - [REDACTED]

for Jon K. Downey, H Col, MI (41)

CHARLES F. MUDGETT, JR.  
Colonel GS  
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

64

~~SECRET~~

7051

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
APO 403, New York, New York

11-61789  
185739  
GB 78-0899

Dr 19  
76

AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 GB

22 AUG 1958

015165

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.  
Attn: Chief, Counterintelligence Branch  
Security Division

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Reference letter AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 GB, this Office, same Subject, dated 6 August 1958, inclosing one copy of translation of Subject document.

2. (SECRET) Attached hereto is Annex to referenced document received from [REDACTED] (b)(1)

3. (UNCLASSIFIED) Downgrading data cannot be pre-determined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

1 Incl: [REDACTED] (b)(1)

for Tom R. Downey, Lt. Col. MI(41C)  
CHARLES F. MUDGETT, JR.  
Colonel GS  
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

Recd from  
Army Gdr Hq  
25 Sep 58

Sp. Op. Enr, ACSI  
Control Number

40-58-350

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Eg 902d CIC Det  
Log S-12976

65

SOB Log In No. 58-1457

~~SECRET~~

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

66-72

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

66-72

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

73-77



~~SECRET~~

Counter Intel 16  
N-64224  
GB 78-0131

2083  
JUL 23 1965

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
APO 403, New York, New York

184244

015165

6-AUG 1958

AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 GB

for 19  
p 76

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.  
Attn: Chief, Counterintelligence Branch  
Security Division

1464) AGST 910.1 Hungary

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Transmitted for your information and retention is translation of Subject document. This document was issued 8 October 1956 over the signature of Laszlo Piros, who was then Hungarian Interior Minister and AVH chief.

2. (SECRET) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

3. (SECRET) [REDACTED]

6 Aug 58

(b)(1)

4. (SECRET) The notes appended to subject document are those of [REDACTED] (b)(1)  
DOWNGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

Recd from  
Army Cdr Jp  
25 Sep 58  
JS

2 PIC  
1 Incl

74

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Hq 902d CIC Det  
Log S- 11060

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 GB

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (C)

(b)(1)

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) Downgrading data cannot be pre-determined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

1 Incl:

[REDACTED]

*Charles F. Mudgett, Jr.*  
CHARLES F. MUDGETT, JR.  
Colonel GS  
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

1464) ACBI 910.1 Hungary

6 Aug 68

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Reg 17 00043

Secret Control #

HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

APO 154

US ~~ARMY~~ FORCES

AEUC-SCCE: 274/46

EE-567323/d

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] *82*

16 JUL 1958

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region IV, 66th CIC Group  
APO 108, US Forces  
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. (~~SECRET~~) Forwarded herewith for your perusal and return to this Headquarters is single copy of report, Subject: [REDACTED] (b)(1)

2. (~~SECRET~~) (u) It is desired that the inclosed information be kept within the confines of CIC channels and not under any circumstances be loaned to, or brought to the attention of, any other agency.

3. (~~SECRET~~) [REDACTED] (b)(1)

4. (~~SECRET~~) [REDACTED] (b)(1)

EXCLUDED FROM GDS  
& DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

76

~~SECRET~~

Page 1 of 2 Pages  
Copy 1 of 6 Copies

~~SECRET~~

AEUC-SCCE: 274/46  
KE-567323/d  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

16 JUL 1958

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
[REDACTED]

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371  
GPV/NAW/ps

*Michael Sains Maj m1 (Inf)*  
RUSSELL B. BEMIS  
Major, MI(CE)  
Adjutant

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

77

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of 2 Pages  
Copy 1 of 6 Copies

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐


Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 178-100

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET


Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.




Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

78-100

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXSC 582 (b) (7) (C)

GEM 15

RR UFPWO

DE UFPWOGCR 13D

R 291300Z

FM FIELD OFFICE HEIDELBERG

TO CO 66TH CIC GP

DA GRNC

BT

ROUTINE

EE-567323/d

29 May 58

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION - PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION-NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

((CONFIDENTIAL)) REF NR M-765. OPR FOR AEUC-SCCE FROM AEUC-CO.

1. REF YR MSG F-4306.

2. SOURCE RECEIVED INFO REPORTED IN M-662 DURING MEETING OF HUNGARIAN STUDENT CONGRESS IN BAD GASTEIN, <sup>W</sup> GER. FROM 5-9 MAR CURR. HUNGARIAN STUDENTS FROM VIENNA, AUSTRIA, WHO STILL HAVE CONTACTS WITHIN HUNGARY, NAMES UNKNOWN, REPORTED THAT HUNGARIAN POLICE HAD CONFISCATED PRIVATE AND BUSINESS DRIVERS LICENSES OF HIGH RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS AND GOVT OFFICIALS. IT WAS OPINION OF CONGRESS MEMBERS THAT THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN BECAUSE MANY OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS HAD LENT THEIR VEHICLES TO HUNGARIAN REVOLUTIONARIES

CFN .-765 F-4306 M-662 5-9

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

101

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 1 of 2

Copy 1 of 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO UUPWOC CR 13D  
IN 1956.

3. OUR SOURCE,

HE IS CONSIDERED

FAIRLY RELIABLE EXCEPT IN MATTERS REGARDING THE HUNGARIAN REGIME  
AND REVOLUTION, ON WHICH SUBJECTS HE IS EMOTIONALLY INVOLVED

BT

CFN 1956

29/1328Z

REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

NNNN

REC'D 29 MAY 58/1405Z

102

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 2 of 2  
Copy 2 of 3

(b)(7)(D)

102



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CFM07

/44 771029

DE BUFPWOGCR 05C

161110Z

FM FIELD OFFICE HEIDELBERG

TTO CO 66TH CIC GP

DA GRNC

BT

((CONFIDENTIAL)) M-662. OPR FOR AEUCISCCE FM AEUC CO.

ROUTINE

16 May 58

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION - PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION-NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

5USC 552

(X7D)

EVALUATED "F" REPORTS THAT THE HUNGARIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY HAS PUT A NEW ORDER IN FORCE, DIRECTING ALL OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO WERE EVEN SLIGHTLY SUSPECTED OF ACTIVE OR PASSIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE HUNGACIAN REVGLUTION, TO TURN IN THEIR PERSONAL AND MILITARY DRIVERS LICENSES. DATE OF ORDER UNKN.

BT

CFN M-662

16/1115Z

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date 12 Feb 1968 Init 423

REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

EE-567323/9

38  
30  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 10 Apr 98  
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

103

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

RECD 16MAY 58/1310Z

11  
Page 1 of 1 Page  
Copy 1 of 3 Copy

JOINT MESSAGE FORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER							
<div style="position: absolute; top: 10px; left: 10px; font-size: 2em;">01</div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 10px; right: 10px; font-size: 2em;">23 May 58</div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 40px; right: 10px; font-size: 3em;">23/08A52</div>							
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL		ORIG. OR REFERS TO	
ACTION ROUTINE		BOOK    MULTI    SINGLE		DA		ORIG:	
INFO		X					
<b>FROM:</b> CO 66TH CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT GER						<b>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</b>  <div style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg); font-weight: bold;">           REGARDING DATA OF REQUIREMENTS            ACCORDING TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTED            TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTED            MOVEMENTS TO BE CLASSIFIED            GROUP IS CITED. IF THE DATE TIME            CLASSIFIED IN ADVANCE         </div>	
<b>TO:</b> G2 USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER  <div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">F-4304</div> Op for AEAGB-CI (SACE) from AEUC-SCCE.  <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SUBJ is Hungarian Intel Svc Regarding Modus Operandi (C).</li> <li>2. <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">Eval</span></li> </ol> F, rept that the Hungarian Defense Ministry has put a new order in force, dir all officers and civilian pers who were even slightly suspected of active or passive participation in the Hungarian Revolution to turn in their personal and mil drivers licenses.  Date of order is unknown.  3. Files of CR, this Gp, contain no rec of person mentioned above.  4. Orig source of info and validity of info is being checked and will be fwd your ofc upon rec.							
M/R: FOH dev above info, however, info not considered complete. Add req has been sent to FOH for source of orig info. Above fwd initial info to G2 with add info to be fwd upon rec.							
<div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">FILE</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 50%; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">KE-567323/d</div>				NAW/ps/Stgt Mil 8371/22 May 58 EXCLUDED FROM DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE			
<b>WRITER</b>  PHONE 8371		<b>RELEASEE</b>  CAPTAIN, MI (INF)		CHIEF, CE DIV		TITLE MAJOR, (INF)	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  <div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">CONFIDENTIAL</div>		PAGE 1 NR. 1		NR. OF PAGES 1		SUSC 562 (b)(7)(C)	

JOINT MESSAGE RM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER							
<div style="position: absolute; top: 10%; left: 10%; font-size: 2em;">03</div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 15%; right: 10%; font-size: 1.5em;">23 May 58</div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 20%; left: 60%; font-size: 2em;">23/08552</div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 20%; right: 10%; font-size: 2em;">2</div>							
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL		ORIG. OR REFERS TO	
ACTION ROUTINE		BOOK    MULTI    SINGLE		DA		M-662	
INFO		X					
<b>FROM:</b> CO 66TH CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT GER						<b>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</b>  <div style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg); font-weight: bold;"> ACQUISITION DETERMINED  TO CATEGORY B ENCIPHERMENT  ADVANCEMENTAL REFERENCES BY DATE TIME  GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION NO UN-  CLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE TIME  GROUP IS QUOTED. </div>	
<b>TO:</b> CO FLDO HEIDELBERG GER							
<p style="margin-left: 40px;">F-4306      Opr for AEUC-SCCE from AEUC-SCCE. Ref your msg M-662.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SUBJ is Hungarian Intel Svc Regarding Modus Operandi.</li> <li>2. CR check ref source is negative.</li> <li>3. Desire your source be queried as to who is the orig source and the validity of the info rec.</li> </ol> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">-----</p> <p>M/R: Ref msg states all officers and civilians who played part in Hungarian Revolution have been req to turn in civilian and mil drivers licenses. Above req FOH to dev who is source of info and what is validity of info.</p> <p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 40px;">NAW/ps/Stgt Mil 8371/22 May 58</p> <div style="margin-top: 20px; margin-left: 40px;"> <small>DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED</small>  <small>ON 2 NOV 01</small>  <small>BY USIA/COMUSIA</small>  <small>AND PER 4-102 DCD SEC 1A</small> </div> <div style="position: absolute; bottom: 20px; left: 10px; font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;"> 1478 ✓ </div>							
FILE				EXCLUDED FROM DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE			
<b>SYMBOL</b> AEUC-SCCE    EE-567323/d <small>(if required)</small> CAPTAIN, MI (INF)				<b>DATE</b> 23 <b>TIME</b> 0800 <b>MONTH</b> <b>YEAR</b>			
<b>NR.</b> 8371		<b>PAGE NR.</b> 1		<b>NR. OF PAGES</b> 1		<b>CHIEF, CE DIV</b> 105	
<b>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</b> <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>		<b>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</b> <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>		<b>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</b> <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>		5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)	

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 106-108

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

sb

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
28 February 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Munich, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

D-567323/d

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (C)  
RE: Modus Operandi (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SOURCE: A-POMUN

(S)(X7)(D)

(B-3)

6USC 153 (b) (1)

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

DISTRIBUTION

1 - Hq, 66th CIC Group

109

1 - CE, FO Munich

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS, REGION XII  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 227  
US ARMY

5052 (b)(7)(C)

AEUC-SCCE; EE-567323/d

13. FEB. 1958

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service (C)  
Re: Modus Operandi

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. Reference your message F-308, 16 January 1958.

2. Sgt. RA 18 174 840, Company "C", 2d Battle Group, 8th Infantry Division, APO 185, US Army, was contacted in reference to the envelope mentioned in your message. [redacted] was unable to make the envelope available inasmuch as it had been sent to his brother in the United States. Sgt. [redacted] has written for return of the item and should it be returned to him he will make it available to Region for photostating. Sgt. [redacted] did however make available a second envelope which is identical to the one referred to except that it does not bear the 14 Budapest Customs Office stamp. Photostatic copy of the envelope is forwarded herewith. Itemized figures were written by Sgt. [redacted]

5052 (b)(7)(C)

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

Incl:  
Photostat of envelope

WBR/tb/W Mil 226-407

Lt Colonel, MI (Inf)  
Commanding

004284

17 FEB 1958

5052 (b)(7)(C)

ATTENTION IS INVITED TO  
PAR 43. SR 380-320-10.

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
2 NOV 01  
REASON: E.O. 13526, 13526.1A  
AUTHORITY: 60252001

DECLASSIFIED  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

110  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING LOG  
XII 10611 13. FEB. 1958

## JOINT MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

03

16/0935



PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	ROUTINE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	DA	ORIG	
INFO				X			

FROM: CO 66TH CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT GER

TO: CO CIC REGION III OFFENBACH GER  
XII KAISERSHAUTERN GER  
F-308  
Opr for AEUC-SCCE from AEUC-SCCE.

1. SUBJ is Hungarian Intel Svc, Re: Modus Operandi (C),  
EE-567323/d.

2. On 19 Jul 57 [redacted] and his wife, name unknown,  
mailed a ltr from their present residence at Refugee Cp Bks 2/24/3,  
KAPFENBERG, Austria, to Mrs. [redacted], sister of Mrs. [redacted]  
and the wife of a USA Capt who resides at [redacted]  
[redacted] The ltr was rec in FUERTH on 2 Sep 57  
and bore the stamp of the 14th BUDAPEST Customs Office, BUDAPEST,  
Hungary.

3. Info of 10 Jan curr indicated that one [redacted] SFC,  
RA 18174840, born in [redacted] and his wife, [redacted] nee name  
unknown, born [redacted] at an unknown place, resided at [redacted]  
[redacted] from 2 Nov 56 to 18 Nov 57. [redacted]  
was trf with Co "D", 2d Battle Gp, 8th Inf Div, to MAINZ (32 UMA 47),  
Ger, on 18 Nov 57.

REGRADING DATA REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR  
CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION. REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME  
MOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES TO DECLASSIFICATION-NO UN-  
GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION IF THE DATE TIME  
CLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE TIME  
GROUP IS QUOTED.

DATE	TIME
16	0900Z
MONTH	YEAR
1	1958

SYMBOL	RR-567323/d	SIGNAT	[redacted]
WRITER	[redacted]	RELEASE	[redacted]
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	CONFIDENTIAL	CHIEF, CE DIV	MI(INF)
PAGE NR.	1	NR. OF PAGES	2

111 EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 54, WHICH IS OBSOLETE FOR ARMY USE.

AGL (1) 6-57-1000M-58348

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

EUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

AINSCOM FOIPA

Auth Para 4-102 DoD 5200.10

EUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

5USC 552 (b)(Z)(C)

*incho*

*Mrs.*


*1000*

6865  
1060  
1467  
362  
7534

3461  
2613  
2614  
-91

*Firth Bay.*

112





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: CO 66TH CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT GER

4. Desire your office loc SFC (Capt) and Mrs. [ ] and attempt to obtain a photostatic copy of the envelope in which the above mentioned ltr was dlvr. This Gp has no interest in the contents of the ltr.

M/R: Fwd to Rgn XII a req that SFC [ ] be contacted for photo copy of an envelope which had been processed through Hungarian Customs.

NAW/ps/Stgt Mil 8371/16 Jan 58

EUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
2 NOV 01  
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
AND Para 4-101.1.00

113

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

SYMBOL

AEUC-SCCE

EE-567323/d

PAGE  
NR

2

NR OF  
PAGES

2

SECURITY

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INITIALS

INCOMING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10 JAN 58

TOO: 101440Z JAN 58

FOR:

101440Z

CODE CLERK

RJM

FROM: CO CIC RGN 17

PRECEDENCE:

ROUTINE

TO: CO 66TH CIC GP

REFERENCE NR:

G-5247.

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-PHYSICALLY  
REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION  
NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

OPR FROM AEUC-SCCE FOR AEUC-SCCE.

1. REF MSG F-89, SUBJ IS HUNGARIAN INTEL SVC REF: MODUS OPER-  
ANDI (C). EE 567323/D.

2. ATTEMPTS BY THIS OFO TO LOCATE CAPT [REDACTED] AND HIS WIFE,

[REDACTED], RESIDING AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MET WITH NEG RESULTS.

3. [REDACTED], SFC, RA 16174840, BORN IN [REDACTED] AND HIS  
WIFE, [REDACTED], NEE NAME UNK, BORN [REDACTED] AT AN UNK PLACE RESIDED  
AT [REDACTED] NOV 56 TO 18 NOV 57.

[REDACTED] WAS TRANSFERRED WITH CO D, 2ND BATTLE GP, 8 INF DIV TO MAIN  
32 UMA 47), GER ON 18 NOV 57. UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED, CON-  
SIDERED CLOSED IN THIS RGN.

NAR.

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAF/SCOM FOMTA  
Auth Part 4-102 EOD 5200.10

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

REGRADE DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

114

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

AEUC FORM 173(L)

28 NOV 56

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

## JOINT MESSAGE JRM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

(07)

07/ 40202

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	ROUTINE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	DA	ORIG	
INFO				X			

FROM: CO 66TH CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT GER

TO: CO CIC REGION IV NUERNBERG GER

5-89

Opr for AEUC-SCCE from AEUC-SCCE.

1. SUBJ is Hungarian Intel Svc Re: Modus Operandi (C). EE 567323
2. On 19 Jul 57 [redacted] and his wife, name unknown, mail a ltr from their present residence at Refugee Gp Barrack 2/24/3, KAPFENBERG, Austria, to Mrs. [redacted] sister of Mrs. [redacted] and the wife of a USA capt, who resides at [redacted]. The ltr was rec in FUERTH on 2 Sep 57 and bore the stamp of the 14th BUDAPEST Customs Office, BUDAPEST, Hungary.

3. Desire your office loc Capt and Mrs. [redacted] and attempt to obtain a photostatic copy of the envelope in which the above mentioned ltr was dlvr. This Gp has no interest in the contents of the ltr.

M/R: Fwd to Rgn IV a req that a Capt [redacted] be contacted for a photo copy of an envelope which had been processed through Hungarian Customs.

NAW/ps/Stgt Mil 8371/7 Jan 58

5550 552 (b) (7) (C)

DATE	7	TIME	1035
MONTH		YEAR	58

SYMBOL	[redacted] SCCE EE-567323/d		
WITER	CAPTAIN, MI (INF)	PAGE NR.	1
PHONE	8371	NR. OF PAGES	1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SIGN

[redacted] (for signature) name and title

[redacted] MAJOR, MI (INF)  
Chief, CE Div

DECLASSIFIED ON [redacted]

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 40, WHICH IS OBSOLETE FOR ARMY USE.

AGL (1) 6-57-1000M-58348

REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREPARED PRIOR TO AC-PARAPHRASE BY DATE-TIME TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-NO UN-MOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES TO GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION IF THE DATE TIME CLASSIFIED REFERENCE IS QUOTED.

(C) (Z) (b) (7) (C)

5550 552 (b) (7) (C)

(C) (Z) (b) (7) (C)

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

10 NOV 61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FIELD OFFICE MUNICH  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
APO 108 US ARMY

D-567323/a

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service (u)  
(C)

DEC 30 1957

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. Reference: Operational Memorandum 4/55, dated 23 November 1955.
2. Forwarded: Summary of Information, Field Office Munich, Subject and file as above, dated 3 December 1957.
3. Control of Information: a. Source A-FOMUN is identified as V-7-FOMUN, evaluated B.
- b. Preparing agent is Special Agent Field Office Munich.
4. Remarks: Information of the type contained in the report has been previously received on two occasions, but has not been reported because of infrequency of the happenings and the possibility of such events being caused merely by the mishandling of mail by post office employees. In that this particular information involves the wife of a US Army Captain, whose assignment is unknown, the attached report is forwarded. The previous happenings concerned Hungarian refugees in Vienna and Salzburg.
5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

5 USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

5 USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

RECEIVED

2 Nov 01

DISPATCHED

1 Incl: 300000

SOI dtd 3 Dec 57

Tele: McG Mill 8195

Major, MI (Sig C)  
Commanding

JWR/mls

Document Has Been 2 JAN 1958  
Carded by C/R Section 79  
Date \_\_\_\_\_ Init 323

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 116

OUT LOG Nr.

4446

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

elf

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
3 December 1957

## PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Munich, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-567323/d

## SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service  
Re: Modus Operandi

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

(u) (c)  
COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 19 July 1957, [redacted] and his wife, name unknown, mailed a letter from their present residence at Refugee Camp Barrack 2/24/3, Kapfenberg, (nca), Austria to Mrs. [redacted] sister of Mrs. [redacted] and the wife of a US Army Captain, who resides at [redacted]. The letter was received in Fuerth on 2 September 1957, and bore the stamp of the 14th Budapest Customs Office Budapest (nca) Hungary.

SOURCE: A-FOMUN

B-6

5060 562 (b) (7) (C)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

## DISTRIBUTION

1 - Hq, 66th CIC Gp 1 - CE FOMUN

117

30 Dec 57

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐


Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 118-133

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):


(b)(1)

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

118-738

EVALUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
TO <b>OO, Field Office MURICH, 66th CIC Gp, APO 108, US Army, ATTN: ARUC-800E</b>		FROM <b>OO, 66th CIC Group APO 154, US Army</b>
DATE OF EVALUATION <b>24 January 1958</b>	REPORT NR <b>EE-567323/d</b>	DATE OF REPORT <b>15 January 1958</b>
SUBJECT <b>Hungarian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (U)</b>		REFERENCE <b>Cover Ltr dtd 21 Jan 58; Log nr 4602</b>
SOURCE NR <b>(CW)</b>	DATE RECEIVED <b>23 January 1958</b>	REQUESTED
EVALUATION DATA		
OVERALL VALUE		VALIDITY
	1. OUTSTANDING (based on importance, timeliness, completeness and accuracy)	1. CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
	2. VALUABLE (of value but does not meet criteria for outstanding)	2. PROBABLY TRUE (accepted as true until proved false)
<b>X</b>		3. POSSIBLY TRUE (not accepted as true until proved true)
	3. WORTHLESS	4. DOUBTFUL (not accepted, possibly false)
		5. PROBABLY FALSE (accepted as false until proved true)
<p>COMMENTS: (in all cases, comments will consist of a narrative critique to substantiate and explain the overall value and validity. This critique will include the factors evaluated, the facts bearing on evaluated factors and pertinent discussions and conclusions derived therefrom. Comments may also contain recommendation, suggestions, or transmit informational data to the collection agency.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>5 USC 552 (b) (7)(C)</b></p> <p>1. The statement that [redacted] made to the Hungarian Intelligence Service concerning his ignorance as to the contents of the letters he carried, and then being released is hardly acceptable. Unless future information indicates possible USAREUR security or interest, suggest that source refrain from further contact with [redacted]. Due to the paucity of identifying data reference personalities appearing in your report, Central Registry file check negative.</p> <p>2. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.</p>		
<p>REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b> 134</p>		
SIGNATURE OF ANALYST <b>Capt MI(Inf)/pa/8372</b>		APPROVED - SECTION CHIEF <b>MaJ MI(Inf)</b>





CONFIDENTIAL

ALG

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
15 January 1958

## PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Munich, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-567323/d

## SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (S)  
RE: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. (S) Austrian citizen, who resides at (S) was arrested on 1 December 1957 for espionage and black-marketing in Budapest (nca) Hungary. On 28 December 1957, (S) was released and on 29 December 1957 he returned to Vienna. In 1953, (S) immigrated from Hungary to Austria, and during that year he started a used car business that necessitated travel between Hungary and Austria. On 31 November 1957, (S) departed from Vienna for Budapest, and at the time of his arrest on 1 December 1957, had in his possession 18,000 Forints and five letters which were addressed to persons living in Budapest. (S) was taken to the Foe utca Prison, placed in solitary confinement and interrogated daily by the Blegyministerium Politikai Rendorseg (Political Police of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior). In addition to being questioned about the money and letters in his possession, (S) was questioned as to his knowledge of a number of Hungarians living in Vienna. Particular emphasis was placed on (S) knowledge of one (S) told his interrogators that he knew many of the named persons, including Mauskopf, but only by name and has no personal knowledge of them. During his periods of interrogation, which lasted from one to three hours daily, (S) is interrogators addressed each other as "Inspector", "Comrade Inspector" or by a number. (S) heard no names used, but recalled that after giving one individual a statement concerning the money he was carrying, the individual signed the statement, as a witness, with the name Captain (fnu) saw no other prisoners, and except for the interrogation was not permitted to leave his cell. (S) statements that he borrowed the money from friends and that he did not know the contents of the letters that he carried were verified, according to one of his interrogators, who further stated that he would be released. Two days later (S) was told that he could return to Vienna.

2. On 3 January 1958, the Vienna newspaper "Bildtelegraph" carried the story of (S) arrest, and further stated that some of the information (S) had given his captors had been investigated in Vienna by an AVH colonel who had somehow entered Austria without the benefit of an Austrian Visa. The newspaper article was in the form of a protest over the arrest of an Austrian citizen and the AVH colonel entering Austria without a visa.

SOURCE: A-POMUN

EVALUATION: F-3

DECLASSIFIED  
& NOV 01  
DECLASSIFIED  
11/11/01

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

## DISTRIBUTION

1 - Hq 66th CIC Group  
1 - FO Munich File

136

567323 (b) (7) (C)

567323 (b) (7) (C)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 137-138

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

139-148

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8 AUG 1957

6 August 1957

AEUC-SCOE; KE-567323/a

SUBJECT: Specially Marked Identity Documents  
of Hungarian Refugees (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: AEAGB-C(OA)

1. Reference is made to letters, this Group, Subject as above,  
dated 20 May 1957 and 8 July 1957.

2. The following information was received from

3. Further information received under this Subject will be for-  
warded your office upon receipt.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DISC 552 (b)(7)(C)

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371  
DER/MAW/pc

CWO, W-2, USA  
Asst Adjutant

M/R: Fwd G2 info rec from ( ) stating marks on ID documents of  
Hungarian refugees are/only printing marks.

149

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISC 552 (b)(7)(C)

HQ  
LOG NR

4801/

DISC 552 (b)(7)(C)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 150

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS, REGION XII  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 227 US ARMY

16 JUL 1957

AEUC-SCCE

SUBJECT: Hungarian Personal Identification Cards (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. Reference is made to letter, your headquarters, subject and file as above, dated on or about 15 March 1957.

2. Transmitted herewith, for your information, photocopies of Hungarian identification cards belonging to [redacted] and [redacted] Hungarian Nationals currently residing in the vicinity of Mainz MA4839. Attention is invited to the markings contained on each document in the fold between pages 16 and 17.

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 Incl:

- |               |     |      |
|---------------|-----|------|
| 1. ID card re | ( ) | 1 cy |
| 2. ID card re |     | 1 cy |
| 3. ID card re |     | 1 cy |

Lt Colonel, MI(Inf)  
Commanding

16 JUL 1957

32397

5959 WBR/tb/W M11 226-407

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Attention is invited to par 43, SR 380-320-10, which prescribes that disclosures of the nature, sources, or even the existence of such counterintelligence information to persons mentioned in such a report or to other persons not normally entitled to such information may be made only when specifically authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, or higher authority. Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered to be a violation of AR 380-5.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

OUTGOING LOG  
XII 3222 16 JUL 1957

151

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



**Stamps**

## 1. Cakrādi

!!

## 2. Unknowns

**3 F4616**

(bonykari) note:

#### 4. Szabványos helyje:

**Subpart**

40

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

Endings: 60 Feb 7

## 7. Logarithms of area

2. Stockpiling: . . . 150

7. Kational ng-noh stoma:  
Onatallidn ng-noh stoma:

10. Allumponarango: ---

## 11. Anyjondh neanyish ceolodh de vionek

12. Apronak citodol


13. Kullinos otapya

कोलकाता - ७१, बालुवाबाग

14. Kulturen bereiten: Japanisch

data

100


 THE AMERICAN  
 EST. 1855

Ind #1

ÁLLANDÓ LAKÁSVÁLTOZÁSOK

Budapest  
Károly  
35  
1949. máj 1 n.  
Tóth, László

A jelen lakásból  
költséget bejelentette.  
P. H.

19. ...  
vörösi  
költség  
19. ...  
ho ...  
P. H.

A jelen lakásból  
költséget bejelentette.  
P. H.

19. ...  
vörösi  
költség  
19. ...  
ho ...  
P. H.

ÁU-II. 397112

ÁLLANDÓ LAKÁSVÁLTOZÁSOK

...  
vörösi  
költség  
19. ...  
ho ...  
P. H.

A jelen lakásból  
költséget bejelentette.  
P. H.

19. ...  
vörösi  
költség  
19. ...  
ho ...  
P. H.

A jelen lakásból  
költséget bejelentette.  
P. H.

19. ...  
vörösi  
költség  
19. ...  
ho ...  
P. H.

[illegible][illegible]

154

18

ANYAKÖNYVI RÉSZ

Család adatai:

NOBIA

Házastárs neve:

Születési helye és éve:

Házasságkötés helye:

Házasságkötés helye:

VALTOZASOK

SZEMÉLYI

IGAZOLVÁNY

SZEMÉLYI

IGAZOLVÁNY

AU-II. 397112

MAGYAR NEMZETISÉG

ANYAKÖNYVI RÉSZ

VALTOZASOK

19

155

Munkatársi név: .....

Szaktitellősi név: WMA-9

Változatok: .....

Munkatársi név: .....

Alkalmazottak minőség: Tapsi

Munkatársi név: S. ...

Munkatársi név: 19. ...

Munkatársi név: 19. ...

Munkatársi név: 19. ...

Munkatársi név: 19. ...

Munkatársi név: 19. ...

Munkatársi név: 19. ...

AU-II. 397112

156

BUSSC 552 (b)(7)(C)



**Bevezetendők:**

10. Baleseti károk el és 3 évig terjedő időtartamig behatárolt az, aki baleseti károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy, továbbá aki baleseti károkat okozó személy károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott.

11. Baleseti károk el és 3 évig terjedő időtartamig behatárolt az, aki baleseti károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott.

12. Baleseti károk el és 3 évig terjedő időtartamig behatárolt az, aki baleseti károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott.

13. Baleseti károk el és 3 évig terjedő időtartamig behatárolt az, aki baleseti károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott.

**Végző rendelkezések:**

14. E törvény a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott.

15. Baleseti károkat okozó személy károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott.

16. A személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott.

17. A törvény a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott, vagy a személyi károkat okozó személy károkat okozott.

AU-II: 597112

SZEMÉLYI  
KÁROK

MAGYAR NEMZETISÉGI

158

**ALL 436757**

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

159

1. 2



AD-1 150757

# IGAZGIVANY

1. SZEMÉLYI KÉRTŐZŐ

2. SZEMÉLYI KÉRTŐZŐ

3.

R.N.

R.N.

Az alábbiakban megadott személyek a következők:

Az alábbiakban megadott személyek a következők:

SZEMÉLYI

SZEMÉLYI

IGAZGATÓVÁNY

IGAZGATÓVÁNY

R.N.

R.N.

Az alábbiakban megadott személyek a következők:

Az alábbiakban megadott személyek a következők:

AL-1 456757

AL-1 456757

1. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

2. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

3. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

4. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

5. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

6. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

7. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

SZEMÉLYI

IGAZOLVÁNY

1957. 11. 16.

1. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

2. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

3. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

4. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

5. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

6. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

7. ÁLLAMTITKÁRSÁG

SZEMÉLYI

IGAZOLVÁNY

1957. 11. 16.





[illegible]

11. Amount over \$10,000: Any unpaid balance outstanding on old debt-secured transactions is generally treated as a new debt, thereby allowing a new basis in the property. However, all nondebt secured transactions, *even* "equity participations" under Section 8541, are treated as new debt.

11. Defendant moved to be 24/7 supervised throughout her custody in, and subject to mandatory hearings in, every 30 days until such time as the court is satisfied that defendant is fit to be released.

[illegible]

# Verdacht

**IT'S THE ONLY WAY TO GET THE MOST OUT OF YOUR BUSINESS.**

II. Secondary literature: Integrated with a section on  
 Bibliography and references.

[illegible]

### THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

**ALL 458757**

353-628

5 USC 552 (b)(7)(C)




SZEMELY

# IGAZOLVÁNY

5111.

15

165



166




(C)(2)(9) 255 DSUS



AD-4 716976


Form with multiple horizontal bars and checkboxes, mostly obscured by redaction.



STANDARDIZATION


Form with handwritten text and redacted areas.

- 1. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 2. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 3. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 4. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 5. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 6. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 7. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 8. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 9. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 10. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 11. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 12. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 13. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 14. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 15. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 16. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 17. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 18. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 19. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 20. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 21. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 22. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*
- 23. *Indicate with a checkmark in 23*





[illegible][illegible]



AM-4 710976

SZEMÉLYI  
IGAZOLVÁNY



személyi igazolvány

Egy 1855. évi




SZEMÉLYI  
IGAZOLVÁNY






személyi igazolvány

169







ARANYI BESI		ARANYI BESI	
VALÓDOKI		VALÓDOKI	
			
SZEMÉLYI		SZEMÉLYI	
IGAZOLVÁNY		IGAZOLVÁNY	
AM-A 716976			

APYAKOVY!  
POMOMI! POMI! POMI!

**Chlorine**

100

# SZEMÉLYI

# ICAZOVANY

~~ALL~~ 716876

**0187**  
**CY-400**

五、

7

SZEMELYI

# IGAZOLVANY

MAHARISHI UNIVERSITY OF MANAGEMENT

173

22 SZAKKÉPESÍTÉS VÉGZŐKÉRT

Iskolai igazolás: U 112976

Iskolai igazolás: 112976



SZEMÉLYI  
IGAZOLVÁNY

Al-1 716976

Iskolai igazolás: 112976



1. Iskolai igazolás: 112976

2. Iskolai igazolás: 112976

3. Iskolai igazolás: 112976

4. Iskolai igazolás: 112976

5. Iskolai igazolás: 112976

6. Iskolai igazolás: 112976

174

11

1. A widely known fact is that the system of education, such as it is, is not only not doing its job, but is actually hindering the growth of the people. The system of education is not only not doing its job, but is actually hindering the growth of the people. The system of education is not only not doing its job, but is actually hindering the growth of the people.

李 子 行 藏

~~It is suggested that the following names be added to the list of persons who are known to have been in contact with the subject during the period from January 1968 to March 1970:~~

As a member, I am proud to bring students and staff together in a positive learning environment.

Q Is an important question about a boy's intellect relevant to his sexual behavior?

● **collisions, obstructions, planned obstructions**  
 involved related to security threats.

10. The following information was obtained from the records of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, for the year 1964:

2. RESEARCH has been conducted regarding various aspects of the problem of international terrorism, including a study of the causes and effects of international terrorism.

~~44-4~~ 718876

## Aspen Grove Elementary School

5. A secondary transcribing der. deszendiert also in sekundäres Gen (nicht) einströmend ist, in Injektion 6. der.

...and naturally! I have been very much interested in your study's experimental, statistical part - it is really a great job!

A number of other, very important, interesting topics — as the kinetics, the following subjects & others

7. It has worked a profit of \$100,000.

at 67 degrees and 1000 hours.

It is generally recognized that the only solution to the problem of the world's food supply is to increase the productivity of the land.

# SCIENTE LYT

4. When I returned to society yesterday, he stayed.

# STEVAN

1. For the purpose of this document

6. A further security investigation

27. In 1974, \_\_\_\_\_  
 28. In 1974, \_\_\_\_\_  
 29. In 1974, \_\_\_\_\_

Edward A. Tamm  
U. S. Supreme Court Building  
Washington, D. C.

**Batallas e importantes eventos del día de la Independencia en Chile**

[illegible]

175



**Bevezető rendelkezések.**

10. Ezen törvény hatálya alá tartozik az az állampolgár, aki Magyarországon született, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek.

11. Ezen törvény hatálya alá tartozik az az állampolgár, aki Magyarországon született, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek.

12. Ezen törvény hatálya alá tartozik az az állampolgár, aki Magyarországon született, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek.

13. Ezen törvény hatálya alá tartozik az az állampolgár, aki Magyarországon született, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek.

**Végző rendelkezések.**


14. Ezen törvény hatálya alá tartozik az az állampolgár, aki Magyarországon született, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek.

15. Ezen törvény hatálya alá tartozik az az állampolgár, aki Magyarországon született, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek.

16. Ezen törvény hatálya alá tartozik az az állampolgár, aki Magyarországon született, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek.

17. Ezen törvény hatálya alá tartozik az az állampolgár, aki Magyarországon született, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek, vagy a Magyarországon született állampolgár házasságából származó gyermek.

AM-A 716976



**SZEMÉLYI  
IGAZOLVÁNY**

**Magyar Népköztársaság**

176

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 177-184

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.


DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

185-193

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 185-193

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AKUC-SCCE; RE-567323/d

8 July 1957

SUBJECT: Specially Marked Identity Documents  
of Hungarian Refugees (U)

10 JUL 1957

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: AEACB-C(CA)

1. Reference letter, this Group, Subject as above, dated 20 May 1957.

2. Forwarded herewith is a report  
Subject:

Information contained in the attached report is felt to be connected, in a limited way, with the subject of this letter.

3. Files of Central Registry, this Group, reveal no record of the persons mentioned in the attached report.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5USC 552 (b)(7)(D)

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

1 Incl:

(b)(7)(D)

Captain, MI (Armor)  
Adjutant

Telephone: Sigt M11 8244  
DER/RAW/et

M/R: Fwd to G2 addl info as pertains to the marking of Hung Ident Documents.

194

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CC CENTRAL FILE

LOG NR

43670

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.




Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):


BUSC 552 (b) (1)

~~(b) (7) (D)~~


It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

195-199

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 200-202

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

**BUSC 532 (b) (1)**

~~(b) (7) (C)~~

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

203



FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 204-213

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 214-219

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEUC-SCCE; KE-567323/4

20 May 57

SUBJECT: Specially Marked Identity Documents of  
Hungarian Refugees (U)

21 MAY 1957

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, United States Army  
ATTN: AEAGE-C(OA)

1. Reference is made to letter, this Group, Subject: Specially Marked Passes of Hungarian Refugees who are Members of the Hungarian Communist Party (KPU)(U), dated 9 April 1957, and letter, this Group, Subject: as above, dated 6 May 1957.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a report

SUSC 552 (b) (1) (1)

(U)(D)

3. 1

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

220

1 Incl

Captain, MI (Armor) SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M11 6244  
DER/EC/g

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED  
MR. Fyvis to G2 add info on spec marked ident documents in possession of certain Hungarian refugees

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LOG NR

31094

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

D-260991

SUBJECT: USSR and Satellite Identity Documents Collection (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: CE Division

APR 18 1957

1. Reference: Disposition Form, your headquarters, Subject: Specially Marked Passes of Hungarian Refugees who are members of the Hungarian Communist Party (KPU) (U), dated 4 April 1957.

2. Forwarded: Agent Report, Region IV, subject and file as above, dated 18 April 1957.

3. Control of Information: Source A-IV is X-0317-IV, evaluated "B"

4. Case is pending

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl: AR, dtd 18 Mar 57

/ggl/Luft M 625-21

MAJOR MI (AGC)  
Commanding

26 APR 1957

25566

C. P. I. CARDS HAVE BEEN  
PREPARED ON THE NAMES  
CONTAINED IN THIS  
DOCUMENT.

INITIALS

221

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OUT LOG Nr.  
IV 2028

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

2 NOV 01  
TO: 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
FROM: 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

7777

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT  
(SR 880-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

USSR and Satellite Identity Documents  
Collection (C)(U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

18 April 1957

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-260991

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 12 April 1957, Source A-IV in Vienna 33UXPO4, Austria, reported the following information concerning Hungarian identity documents:

A Hungarian Refugee,  
reported that AVH personnel among refugees could be identified as follows from their Hungarian Identity Cards:

- a. If there are no three (3)(...) dots between pages 16 and 17 at the binding.
- b. If the stamp on the photograph is inverted (pressed in) instead of a relief effect.
- c. If the identity number of the document begins with two zeros, for example: AU-I00456789.
- d. If the linen on the innerside of the back cover is blue.

(B-6)

DECLASSIFIED  
2 Nov 01  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

222

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

Reg IV, 66th CIC Gp

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47.

1-30083

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

CONFIDENTIAL

jh

## SUMMAR OF INFORMATION

D-56723/d

DATE

11 April 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service-  
AVHRe: Modus operandi  
(Recruiting of informants)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The AVH enjoys a tremendous advantage over the intelligence agencies of the free world on account of its unlimited police power. Most of the inhabitants of Hungary are afraid not to cooperate with the AVH because of the ever-present threat to their lives and the lives of their families. At the slightest unproven accusation the AVH is at liberty to arrest any Hungarian, try him, and sentence him to prison. On the basis of this situation an AVH agent has only to approach any Hungarian, regardless of his position in society, and tell him that he is to work for the AVH. Even if the prospective informant is not offered material gain, the AVH agent need only mention the fact that anyone can be arrested by the AVH and the person approached will usually cooperate. Source was first approached by the AVH [redacted] when she was summoned into an empty office [redacted] where she was employed [redacted]

The AVH agent openly identified himself as such and began to ask Source questions dealing with the low wages, unjust dismissals [redacted] other personnel in the Office, members of Source's family, and certain facts about Source's background. The AVH agent then stated that he had no intention of harming Source, but that he was only concerned about her future. He then asked her to write out a personal history of her life. About one week later Source was summoned to Budapest Police Headquarters, where she again met the AVH agent. At this time she was instructed to write out a statement to the effect that she was willing to work voluntarily for the AVH and that she would complete any mission requested by the police headquarters. Source was then required to make a list of all her friends and relatives. When Source was unable to remember all of them, the AVH agent supplied the names she had neglected to mention. Source was required to make an oath that she would not mention her AVH work to anyone, not even her relatives, under penalty of death or imprisonment. Source accepted money from the AVH to cover the cost of streetcar fares and meals. Source received no form of training.

SOURCE: [redacted]

DS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED P-6

PREPARED ON THE NAMES  
CONTAINED IN THIS  
DOCUMENT.

INITIALS 320

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DISTRIBUTION

1 cy-Hqs, 66th CIC Group  
1 cy-Region IV File

223

MD

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-567. 3/d

DATE

11 April 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service-  
AVH

Re: Modus operandi  
(Contacting of Informants)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source was required to turn in an informal written report to her handling agent every week at a predesignated time and place. At these meetings, which were usually held in a restaurant or public park. Source received her assignments and instructions for the next meeting. Usually, Source was met by the same handling agent, but in the event that he could not meet her, she was given the name and/or description of the person who would contact her.

SOURCE: 

EVALUATION: F-6

(170)

RECEIVED  
6 MAY 01  
F. J. HENRY  
F. J. HENRY

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DISTRIBUTION

1 cy-Hqs, 66th CIC Group  
1 cy-Region IV Files

67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-56732, d

DATE

11 April 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service-AVH  
Re: Modus operandi  
(Informants-social categories)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1

USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B

PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2

FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C

POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D

DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4

UNRELIABLE . . . . . E

IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The AVH utilizes informants in all levels of society. They may be roughly divided into two categories, those who are selected because of their position within some particular office or organization and those who are carefully selected, trained, and then inserted within some particular office or organization. Those belonging to the first category are usually selected on the basis of their unquestionable loyalty to Communist principles. Informants in the first category may also be selected if they have relatives in prison or residing outside of Hungary. The selection for training in the second category is usually based on the individuals outstanding record in military schools, courses in communist theory, or diplomatic training schools. The AVH utilizes about the same number of female and male informants.

SOURCE: 1

EVALUATION: F-6

(S)(X7)(D)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

225

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

DISTRIBUTION

1 cy-Hqs, 66th CIC Group

1 cy-Region IV

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-567323/d

DATE

11 April 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66TH CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service-AVH

Re: Modus operandi

(Operational Authority)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A

USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B

FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D

UNRELIABLE . . . . . E

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1

PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2

POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3

DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4

IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The AVH (Allan Vedelmi Hatosag), or State Defense Authority, is under the direct control of the Ministry of the Interior.

SOURCE:

EVALUATION: P-6

(U)

2 NOV 01

226

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DISTRIBUTION

1 cy-Hqs, 66th CIC Group  
1 cy-Region IV Files

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-567 3/4

DATE

11 April 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service-AVH  
Re: Modus operandi  
(Legal powers)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The AVH possesses full power for the arrest and detention of any person suspected of committing anti-regime, i. e. anti-communist acts, planning to commit them, aiding someone else to commit them, or withholding information about persons who have committed any of these acts. The AVH has full power to conduct raids, searches, and/or seizures in the execution of its duties. Prisoners may be held for an indefinite period and interrogated. The AVH possesses full power of trial and punishment.

SOURCE:

EVALUATION: P-6

(S)(7)(D)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
AUM Para 4-102 DGD 5200.1R

227

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

DISTRIBUTION

1 cy-Hqs, 66th CIC Group  
1 cy-Region IV Files

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1h

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-567-3/a

DATE

11 April 1957

## PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

## SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service-  
AVH

Re: Modus Operandi

(Disengagement and disposition of  
informants)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

When it became known to the AVH, apparently through other informants who were submitting reports on Source, that Source was handing in false information, she received several phone calls and visits from AVH members, who warned her that she should be careful. During the period from [redacted]

Source's

In Source

was forced to execute a written statement to the effect that she would never speak to anyone about anything concerning her contact with the AVH. Source was told that this was a State secret and its disclosure is punishable by five to ten years in prison. Disclosure of this information to foreigners is punishable by death. Source was reminded that the AVH has agents in foreign countries in the event she should travel outside of Hungary.

SOURCE:

EVALUATION: f-6

(CATAD)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOL/FA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM GDS  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

## DISTRIBUTION

1 cy-Hqs, 66th CIC Group  
1 cy-Region IV Files

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIC FILE

10 APR 1957

AEUC-SCCE; KE-567323/4

9 April 1957

SUBJECT: Specially Marked Passes of Hungarian Refugees who are  
Members of the Hungarian Communist Party (KPU) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: AEAGE-C(OA)

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

1. Reference is made to message F-22560, this Group, dated 25 January 1957, and letter, AEZID-C, 274/10, USARCOMZ, ACoS, G-2, Subject: Rebellion in Hungary, Re: (U), dated 14 March 1957 and inclosed Summary of Information, dated 11 March 1957.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate, is a translation of a report  
subject as above.

3.

4. It is to be noted that the information referred to in paragraphs 1 through 3 above.

REGRAING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

229

EXCLUDED GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION CONTROLLER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1) (U) (S) (C) (X) (G) (D) (P) (U) (S) (C) (X) (G) (D) (P)

32381

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEUC-SCCE; EE-567,23/4

9 April 1957

SUBJECT: Specially Marked Passes of Hungarian Refugees who are  
Members of the Hungarian Communist Party (KPU) (U)

The reports, however, are in  
concordance concerning the type of markings used and the exact meaning of  
the markings.

5. Further information received to substantiate the type and mean-  
ing of the markings of identification documents will be forwarded upon  
receipt.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:

Captain, M1 (Armor)  
Adjutant

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Tele, hone: Stgt Mil 8244  
DER/NAW/at

M/R: Above fwd to G2 available info on marking of Hung ident documents,  
ident persons as AVH, HWP or Communist Party members.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

~~5~~USC 552 (b) (1) ~~(D)~~ (D)

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 231

# OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: Headquarters, Region III, APO 757. US Army Date: 4 April 1957  
Attn: S-2  
FROM: L/O Bremen, ( ) BUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)  
SUBJECT: Specially Marked Passes of Hungarian Refugees.

REF: OM, BRE-57-144, dtd 8 Mar 1957, subject: "Specially Marked Passes of Hungarian Refugees Who are Members of the Hungarian Communist Party (KPU)"

Forwarded herewith <sup>in triplicate</sup> for your information is a ~~second~~ <sup>report</sup> report.

Incl: Copy of original German report (with translations)

Distribution:

2-Addressee  
1-Hqs 66th CIC Group  
1-CIC F/O Bremerhaven  
1-AMCONGEN (BRE-57-193)  
1-File

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

File: BRE-57-192

232

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

~~(b)(7)(D)~~

~~FOIA b52 (b) (1)~~

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 233-235



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY COMMUNICATIONS ZONE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
EUROPE

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

APC 58

14 MAR 1957

AEZID-C 274/10

SUBJECT: Rebellion in Hungary

(U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Headquarters  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army

1. The information with regard to the markings of the membership books of the Hungarian Workers Party as reported by the above named SUBJECT may be of interest to your headquarters.

2. [ ] continues to indicate additional information coming to his attention which he offers to the American Intelligence Agencies for whatever value it may be.

3. Under existing laws this document cannot be downgraded.

1 Incl  
SOI (dupe)

Orleans Mil 8302

Colonel GS  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

28 MAR 1957

23037

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USANSCOM FOL/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 EOD 5260.1R

236

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

62 57-848

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 380-320-10)

DATE  
11 Mar 57

## PREPARING OFFICE

766th CIC Detachment, United States Army Communications Zone Europe, APO 58, US Army

## SUBJECT

Rebellion in Hungary (U)

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

F-010721

On 11 March 1957, ( ), Hungarian national, born [redacted] at [redacted] furnished the following information:

a. The membership book of all adherents of the Hungarian Workers Party (HWP), which must be carried on the person of HWP members at all times, is a book consisting of thirty-two or thirty-four pages approximately the size of an address book. Pages 16 and 17 of these books are blank, except for minute, almost invisible dots which denote the degree of communist affiliation of the person to whom the book is issued. An HWP member whose book contains no dots is a completely loyal, militant communist; one dot indicates a good communist; two dots denote an ordinary communist; three dots are assigned to communist sympathizers; and four dots indicate an anti-communist.

b. The above information is classified "top secret" in Hungary.

(F-6)

2 NOV 61

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

237

## DISTRIBUTION

✓ACofS, G2, Com Z - 4 copies  
 CIC Can Reg - 1 copy

766 Reg - 1 copy

DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47,  
 1 Dec 1951) (DA AGO) which may be used.

(Not Classified Un-  
 less Data Entered)

CONFIDENTIAL

Date 12 MAR 57  
 initials [signature]

AGL (1) 2-55-50M-42675

FUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE

ABUC-SCCH EE-567323/d

11 March 1957

SUBJECT: Hungarian Personal Identification Cards (8)

11 March 1957

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

5329

1.

[Redacted]

2.

[Redacted]

3. Should information confirming this report be obtained by your office, it is requested that reports be submitted to this Headquarters.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Telephone: Stgt K11 6241

Captain, MI(Armor)  
Adjutant

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

DER/NAW/EC/...  
...  
DISTRIBUTION: ...

- OIC, WEIDENBERG Flad
- OIC, STUTTGART Flad
- CO, Region III
- CO, Region IV
- CO, Region VIII
- CO, Region XII

M/R: (OVER)

238

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(D)

HO  
LOG NR 27989

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 239

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EX FILE

12 MAR 1957

AEUC-SCCE

11 March 1957

SUBJECT: Hungarian Personal Identification Cards (U)

TO: [REDACTED]

1. <sup>(u)</sup> Reference is made to your Memorandum, Subject as above, dated 4 March 1957.

2. <sup>(u)</sup> [REDACTED]

3. <sup>(u)</sup> Regarding data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8244  
DER/RC/ps

GEORGE T. NAKAMURA  
Captain, MI(Armor)  
Adjutant

M/R: [REDACTED]

EE-567323/d.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

239

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(1)

LOG NR 27809

(b)(1)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

240

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: Headquarters, Region III, APO 757, US Army Date: 8 March 1957

Attn: S-2

FROM: L/O Bremen, (

EXSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

SUBJECT: Specially Marked Passes of Hungarian Refugees Who are  
Members of the Hungarian Communist Party (KPU).

REF:

Incl:

1-as stated

2-Single copy-German

Distributions:

2-Addressee

4-Hqs 66th CIC Group

1-CIC F/O Bremerhaven

1-ALCONGEN (BRE-57-145)

1-File

(b)(7)(D)  
EXSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

241

File: BRE-57-144

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

5720 IN REPLY REFER TO  
Ser N09B10D/2U512941  
March 29, 2002

Mr. John Young  
Cryptome  
251 West 89th Street  
Suite 6E  
New York, NY 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

During the processing of your Freedom of Information Act request of March 29, 2001, the USAISC identified one document originated by the Navy and referred it to this Department for a release determination. Your request was received by this Department on March 11, 2002, and assigned file number 200200508.

The referred document is releasable to you in its entirety and a copy is enclosed.

Fees incurred by this office during the processing your request are waived in this instance. Should you require further assistance, please contact Ms. Sarah English of my staff at (202) 685-6583.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Doris M. Lama", is written over the typed name.

DORIS M. LAMA  
Head, DON PA/FOIA Policy Branch  
By direction of the  
Chief of Naval Operations  
(202) 685-6545

Enclosure

Copy to: (w/o encl)  
USAISC (#817F-01)



UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES GERMANY

APO 757, U. S. ARMY

N2/111

Ser G-0437

11 Mar 1957

CE 1?)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. T. C. Hughes, Jr.,  
OCA, American Embassy  
APO 80, U.S. Army  
Local

Subj: Hungarian Personnel Identification Cards

Dear Mr. Hughes:

Pursuant to the request in paragraph 6 of your letter BV-57-948 dated 4 March 1957, please be advised that this command has no information on subject.

R. H. Tenney  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Copy to:  
→ CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group (S3), USAREUR  
ACofS, G-2, Hq, USAREUR, CI Branch

13 MAR 1957  
21730

EE-567323/d

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7-2070

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 242-243

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 242-243

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 244

Magyarországi Állam

Magyarországi Állam

marking

SZEMÉLYI

IGAZOLVÁNY

SZEMÉLYI


IGAZOLVÁNY

245

AU-II. 700145

marking

MAGYARORSZÁGI ÁLLAM



CONFIDENTIAL

dn

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
21 February 1957

## PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-567323/f

## SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (u)  
Re: AVH Personalities-Identifying  
Clothing

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. ( )

2. ( )

SOURCE: ( )

EVAL: B-6

(S)(7)(D)

EUSC 552 (D) TIT

567323/f m/o

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

246

## DISTRIBUTION

1-Headquarters 66th CIC Group  
1-Region IV FileWD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

dn

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

21 February 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-260991

SUBJECT

USSR and Satellite Identity  
Documents Collection (C)(U)  
Re: Hungarian Soldier's Pay Book

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SOURCE: /

EVAL: B-6

(S)(7)(D)

2082 552 (b) (1)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

247

234

DISTRIBUTION

1-Headquarters 66th CIC Group  
1-Region IV File

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

D-567323

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service (C)  
Re: AVH Interrogation of: [REDACTED]

(U)

FEB 14 1957

USC 552 (b) (1)

(U)(7)(L)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: CE Division

C. P. I. CARDS HAVE BEEN  
PREPARED ON THE  
CONTAINED IN THE  
18. MAR. 1957

1. Reference: Operational Memorandum 6/56, dated 30 April 1956.
2. Forwarded: a. Agent Report, subject and file as above, dated 7 February 1957.  
b. Summary of Information, subject: Hungarian Intelligence Service (C), Re: AVH Personalities, file: D-567323/f, dated 7 February 1957. (U)
3. Control of Information: a. Source A-IV is identified as V-234 IV (T), evaluated F.  
b. Preparing agent for the attached Summary of Information is Special Agent [REDACTED] Region IV. USC 552 (b) (7) (C)
4. Remarks: a. Source A-IV, who is acquainted with both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stated that, [REDACTED] fled Hungary after World War II, went to Austria and became an intelligence operator in the MHBK (Hungarian Warriors Association), and that [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] to Hungary. Source A-IV is of the opinion that [REDACTED] deliberately compromised [REDACTED] to the AVH.  
b. Case is closed as pertains to [REDACTED]
5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

(U)(7)(D)

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

2 Incls: A/R, dtd 7 Feb 57  
SOI, dtd 7 Feb 57

Yeg1/Luft M 625-21

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

OUT LOG Nr.  
IV 0810

15 FEB 1957

19635

34

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

881

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (S)(U)  
Re: AVH Interrogation of [redacted]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

7 February 1957

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-567323

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

5USC 552 (b) (1)

On 3 February 1957, Source A-IV was interviewed in Vienna (33UXPO4), Austria and stated substantially as follows:

a. Source has known [redacted] since they [redacted]  
[redacted] was recruited to work for the [redacted] by Colonel [redacted]  
[redacted] After he was recruited [redacted]

[redacted] and then returned to Austria. Afterward, [redacted]  
[redacted] and tried to get a job with the 430th CIC Detachment in Salzburg (33TUN59), Austria, but the 430th would not hire him. (F-3)

b. In [redacted] Source A-IV interviewed [redacted] who revealed that he had been [redacted]

[redacted], according to [redacted]  
[redacted]. At approximately 1815 hours, 18 June 1956, [redacted] was arrested by members of the AVH on the Ring Divatesornak and Koerut Streets, Budapest, nca, Hungary. He was taken, unconscious, to the prison hospital Koebanya, where he remained unconscious for four or five days. After he regained consciousness he was given a preliminary interrogation by AVH Major [redacted] AVH 1st Lieutenant [redacted] and several unknown AVH officers. As far as he can remember, [redacted]

[redacted] for about two days he was held in the same prison where Cardinal Mindszenty was held. [redacted] does not remember the name of this prison. He was then moved to the Foe Utca Prison, Budapest, on 30 June 1956. [redacted]

(F-6)

c. [redacted]

(F-5)

(F-5)

249 5USC 552 (b) (7) (C) (Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

Hq Reg IV, 66thCIC Gp

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

38.

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (T) 12-52-200M-30063

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1386

(S)(X7)(D)  
5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
5USC 552 (b) (1)

(S)(X7)(D)  
5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
5USC 552 (b) (1)

(S)(X7)(D)  
5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
5USC 552 (b) (1)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

881

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (S)

Re: AVH Interrogation of

(S)(X)(D)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

7 February 1957

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-567323

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

USC 552 (b) (1)

(1) /

(2) /

(3) /

(F-5)

(F-5)

(F-6)

h. /

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

Hq, Reg IV, 66th CIC Gp

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

25

33

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30083

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1356

14 JUL 57

USC 552 (b) (1)

(S)(X)(D)

USC 552 (b) (1)

(S)(X)(D)

USC 552 (b) (1)

(S)(X)(D)

USC 552 (b) (1)(Z)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

egg

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (e)

Re: AVH Interrogation of ( )

2. DATE SUBMITTED

7 February 1957

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-567323

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SUSC 552 (b) (1)

( ) further alleged that ( ) is an acquaintance of ( ), born ( ) in ( ) a suspected UDBA (Yugoslavian Intelligence Service) agent who resides in Klagenfurt. (P-6)

AGENT'S NOTES: It is the opinion of Source A-IV that ( ) has an active imagination and that many of the punishments he allegedly received he had read about. Further questioning of ( ) was impossible because he returned to Budapest to fight with the "Freedom Fighters" and has not returned to Austria. Source A-IV has heard rumors to the effect that ( ) was killed in the fighting.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

Aq, Reg IV, 66th CIC Gp

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

1311

251

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30083

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1356

(b)(7)(D)  
(b)(1)

SUSC 552 (b) (1) (c)

14 JAN 57

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

D-567323/a

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service (S) (u) JAN 31 1957  
Re: Modus Operandi-Border Crossers(Illegal)

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: CE Division

1-854

1. Reference Operational Memorandum 19/55, Headquarters 66th  
CIC Group, APO 154, US Army dated 10 November 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith Summary of Information, subject and file  
as above, dated 29 January 1957.

3. Control of Information: Information contained in the attached  
report was obtained on 14 January 1957 during routine processing of  
Hungarian Refugees at the Transit Refugee Camp, Piding, Germany. Source  
and evaluation is as indicated within the report.

b. Contributing agent is S/A [redacted] Region IV.

c. Preparing agent is S/A [redacted] Region IV.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

5. Remarks: Case is pending.

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED  
2 NOV 61  
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

LT COL MI (Inf)  
Commanding

11 FEB 1957

OUT LOG Nr.  
IV 0534

1 Incl: SOI,  
dtd 29 Jan 57

C.F.I. CARDS HAVE BEEN  
PREPARED ON THE NAMES  
CONTAINED IN THIS  
DOCUMENT.

27. FEB. 1957

INITIALS 376

**CONFIDENTIAL**

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

881

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
29 January 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV 66th CIC Group, APO 108

D-567323/a

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service  
Re: Modus Operandi-Border  
Crossers (Illegal)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 14 January 1957, ( ) born ( ) in ( ) who was employed as a construction worker in the Rakosi Steel Works in Budapest (nca), Hungary and resided at ( ) prior to fleeing Hungary on 3 January 1957, residing in the Transit Refugee Camp, Piding (33TUN49), Germany as of 14 January 1957, reported that he crossed the Austro-Hungarian border during daylight hours on 3 January 1957 between Beresznye (nca), Hungary and Lotschmann (nca), Austria. During his entire trip he neither was stopped by nor saw any Hungarian Border Police.

2. While in a temporary Refugee Camp in Lotschmann, ( ) met one ( ) or ( ) a Hungarian Refugee who had been a newspaper reporter and feature article writer prior to fleeing Hungary. ( ) related to Hufnagel that she had crossed the border into Austria by the exact same route that he had taken, at a somewhat later time, and had been stopped by the Hungarian Border Police. At first they refused to allow her to continue on into Austria. ( ) had sold all her household furnishings in Hungary and had a considerable amount of money in her possession at the time she was stopped. When her pleading proved to be of no avail, she offered them a bribe in the form of money which they accepted and showed her the best way to get into Austria. ( ) stated that the amount she had given the Border Police was a considerable sum but did not state the amount.

3. Since this conversation with ( ) has heard through hearsay that the Hungarian Border Police allow anyone to come across into Austria if they have the money to pay. As a result it has become habitual for people to sell all their personal belongings and then buy their way across the border. According to ( )'s hearsay information, it is common knowledge in Hungary that there are illegal and unauthorized groups engaged in bringing people across the border. Some of them even guarantee a safe and harmless border crossing. However, they charge exorbitant sums and only the very rich can take advantage of these border crossing organizations. Allegedly truckdrivers, physicians, business men and other types of traveling people are involved and the Border Police collaborate for a share of the fee charged a prospective border crosser. (F-6)

C. P. I. CARDS HAVE BEEN  
PREPARED ON THE NAMES  
CONTAINED IN THIS

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM/FOIA  
AMZ Para 4-102 (C) (2) (C)

DOCUMENT

27 FEB 1957

INITIALS 376

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DISTRIBUTION

1 - Headquarters 66th CIC Group

1 - Region IV File

253

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

FUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

31 Jan 57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENTS REPORT

FILE: D-567323

29 January 1957

SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

On 27 November 1957, ( ) textile worker, born on ( ) in ( ) was interviewed aboard ship and furnished the following information concerning Hungarian military personnel whom he knew while a soldier from 1950 to 1952, and while employed by the Army from January 1953 to October 1956, as a supply clerk in Budapest and Godollo, Hungary.

( ) 2nd Lt. Asst. Hq. Co. Commanding Officer, Budapest Guard Force, Kilian Lektanya, 1950-1951, age 35, height 160 cm, grey, round eyes, brown smooth hair, receding forehead, heavy build, married, lisps.

( ) 2nd Lt. 1951-1952, Asst. Hq Co. Commanding Officer, Budapest Guard Force, Kilian Lektanya, age 22, height 170 cm, thin brown wavy hair, grey eyes, turned up nose.

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

( ) Lt Col. Political Officer, Quartermaster Officer School, Budapest, Hungary Ben Lektanya. (later political officer of Quartermaster, Transportation and Medical Corps Officer school, same location.) Height 170 cm, weight 80 kilos, round face, dark brown hair combed straight back, grey eyes, corpulent, guttural speech, led a battalion size group of troops and civilians against freedom fighters at the Kellenfold Allomas, Budapest during revolution. AVH Security Force at Quartermaster, Transportation, and Medical Corps officers school, Budapest, Hungary Ben Lektanya.

( ) Capt. leader of above mentioned security force, age 25, height 180 cm, weight 60 kilo, blond hair combed to one side, blue eyes, very thin.

( ) 2nd Lt. age 24, height 180 cm, weight 65 kilos, brown thin hair, thin build.

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

( ) 2nd Lt age 25, height 166 cm, medium build, black hair, smooth, combed straight back, eyes blue, round, small pointed nose, Residence Ujpest, Hungary, has illegitimate child by girl in Ujpest.

( ) 2nd Lt, age 25, height 165 cm, weight 70 kilos, smooth brown hair, eyes brown, round, round face, lisped, limps, has permanent injury right leg.

AGENT: ( )

EVALUATION: (F-6)

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USARNSCOM FOI/PA  
AUTH Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

254  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2nd 35'

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-567323/d

ih  
DATE  
11 January 1957

### PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group, APO 108, US Army

### SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service-AVH  
Re: Modus Operandi

### CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

#### OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

#### OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

### SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The headquarters of the AVH in Szombathely, Hungary is located on Bajcsizsilincki Street (formerly Kiraly Street.) This is a three-story brick building occupied solely by AVH personnel. These personnel usually wear civilian clothing. Most of them have personal automobiles and are armed with small calibre pistols. Among these AVH personnel are some female investigators. All of these AVH personnel live in the same section of Szombathely. Each AVH agent is assigned a specific area which is his zone of responsibility. Some of the AVH personnel assigned to the Szombathely office are natives of the region, however, the majority of them come from the other parts of Hungary. The AVH headquarters at Szombathely receives its orders directly from the Ministry of the Interior in Budapest (nca), Hungary. (F-6)

SOURCE: ( )

born ( )

(S)(7)(D)

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USARPCCOM/FOIPA  
AUC: Fmt 4-102 MOD 5/2007

255

### DISTRIBUTION

1 cy-Hqs, 66th CIC Group  
1 cy-Region IV

181

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 280-320-10)

jh

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

AVH Penetration of Hungarian Revolutionary Group

2. DATE SUBMITTED

11 January 1957

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-567323

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 24 November 1956, [redacted] born [redacted] at [redacted], a student at Budapest Engineering College, Budapest (nca), Hungary, who crossed the Austrian border from Hungary on 5 November 1956, was interviewed at the German Government Refugee Camp, Piding 33TUN49, Germany, and stated substantially the following information concerning an incident between a Hungarian revolutionary organization and the AVH in 1952:

An organization of revolutionaries, in possession of submachine guns and short wave radios, had been successfully penetrated by an officer (name and description unknown) of the AVH investigations section. During an assembly of the group near Csepreg (nca), Hungary, in 1952, the entire group was arrested and their arms and equipment seized. One of the leaders of the group, (fnu) SEBESTENY, photographer, died in prison. The other leader (name unknown) was a radio repairman. Other members of the group were: [redacted], Roman Catholic Priest, present location unknown; [redacted] Hungarian Air Force sergeant, escaped, last known location, Eisenstadt (nca), Austria; (fnu) [redacted] violinist, escaped, present location unknown. (P-6)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USA/NSCOM FOI/PA  
AUC Part 4-102 EOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

256

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66TH CIC GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

36.

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30083



## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

31 December 1956

## PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-567323/4

## SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (u)  
 Re: Modus Operandi (e)

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 27 November 1956, [redacted] born [redacted] in [redacted] and formerly employed by the Hungarian News and Documentary Film Studios, 15 Koenyves Kalman Kosut, Budapest IX, nca, Hungary, was interviewed by Agent B-IV at the German Refugee Camp, Piding, 33TUN49, Germany, and stated substantially the following:

a. All AVH personnel known by [redacted] reported directly to AVH headquarters at Jassai Mari Square, Budapest. They usually carried small caliber pistols on their persons. The main function of these agents and informants was to check on the activities of their fellow employees; where they went how long they stayed, and especially any contact they had with foreigners.

b. All persons in Hungary applying for a job must first fill out a questionnaire which is eventually routed to the AVH. In addition to the personal data this questionnaire is also concerned with the type of foreign correspondence in which the applicant engages.

c. All AVH agents and informants receive pay checks from both the film studio and the AVH. The exact amounts are not known, but [redacted] stated that a check from the AVH in the amount of 90,000 forints was found in the quarters of one of the agents during the October revolution.

EVALUATION: F-6

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
 ON 2 NOV 01  
 BY USARMC COM FOI/PA  
 ADD Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

257

## DISTRIBUTION

- 1 - Headquarters, 66th CIC Group
- 1 - Region IV File

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
31 December 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-567323/d

SUBJECT

(u)  
Hungarian Intelligence Service (C)  
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE ..... A  
USUALLY RELIABLE ..... B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE ..... C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE ..... D  
UNRELIABLE ..... E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN ..... F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES ..... 1  
PROBABLY TRUE ..... 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE ..... 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE ..... 4  
IMPROBABLE ..... 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED ..... 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 25 November 1956, [redacted] born [redacted] in Budapest, nca, Hungary, was interviewed by Agent A-IV at the German Refugee Camp, Piding 33TUN49, Germany, and stated substantially the following concerning AVH modus operandi:

a. In 1948 [redacted] assisted his friend [redacted] in a successful attempt to escape to the West. On 16 June 1956, the AVH accused Gallasz of being involved with [redacted] and having assisted [redacted] in acts of espionage against the state. [redacted] was given the choice of either ten years in jail or assisting the AVH as an informant. [redacted] accepted the proposition of working for the AVH as an informant because he felt that he would have no opportunity to escape to the West if he were imprisoned. Before he ever did any work for the AVH the revolution broke out in October 1956, and [redacted] was able to escape to Austria.

b. [redacted] stated that the majority of the AVH informants or contact men are recruited by coercion and are paid no salary.

c. The section within the Hungarian Ministry of Interior which is responsible for the AVH is under the supervision of Russians who may be MVD personnel.

d. Cars used by AVH are mostly Russian made Pobedos and their license numbers usually start with the letter "C" or the letters "CL". When [redacted] was arrested in June 1956, the car used by the AVH was a Pobedo with the license number "CL 115".

EVALUATION: P-6

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOLTA  
AUTH Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

258

DISTRIBUTION

- 1 - Headquarters, 66th CIC Group
- 1 - Region IV File

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

CONFIDENTIAL

USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1g

## SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION

DATE  
17 December 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-190073

SUBJECT

Danube River Shipping (u) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE ..... A  
USUALLY RELIABLE ..... B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE ..... C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE ..... D  
UNRELIABLE ..... E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN ..... F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE ..... 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE ..... 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE ..... 4  
IMPROBABLE ..... 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED ..... 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the spring months of 1956, Hungarian vessels engaged in Danube River commerce underwent border controls, AVH (Allan Vedelmi Matosag - Hungarian State Security Service) checks and inspections by the river police, customs officials and the shipping company at the port of Szob, nca, Hungary. At this port the vessels are boarded by a composite party consisting of representatives of the interested agencies and the ships are searched for contraband material, inspected for condition and identity documents of all persons on board are examined. The personal identity documents of all crew members are collected and receipted and the documents are returned to their owners upon their return to Hungarian territory. Bodily searches of individual crew members are conducted sporadically, however, except in the cases where the searches appear to be made as the result of an informant's report, they are not common and are apparently only spot checks. Procedures upon return to Hungarian waters are essentially the same as those upon departure. The vessels are piloted throughout the trip by Hungarian pilots, there appearing to be no requirement to take Czech pilots on board during any portion of the trip in a westerly direction from Hungary. Unless the vessel has a scheduled stop in a Czech port, there are no controls or restrictions upon the vessels or their crews while passing through Czech territory. If the vessel stops in Czech waters for any purpose other than a scheduled call at a Czech port, i.e., a breakdown, there is no search or inspection of the vessel, however, no member of the crew is permitted to go ashore during such stops. When vessels make a scheduled stop in a Czech port of call, the vessel is searched by customs and border authorities and by State Security Service officers, and the special "Seaman Passport" or identity documents of the crew members are checked. During stops in a port of call crew members are permitted ashore every other day for the duration of the stay. The length of the visit ashore is determined by ship's officers, however, the Czech authorities will permit visits lasting from about 0600 hours to about 2300 hours. When going ashore the crew members are required to report to a State Security office in the port area compound where they are issued a "Propuska" (temporary pass) which shows the name, date and place of birth of the bearer, the vessel on which he is employed and the length of the leave authorized. There are occasionally body searches made by State Security officers of persons leaving and entering the area in addition to the customs officers checks of baggage, packages and money. The State Security Service representative maintains a register of all persons entering and leaving the port area.

EVALUATION: F-6

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAHSCOM FOLTA  
AHL FRC 4-101 LCB 5203.17

259

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL~~  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DISTRIBUTION

- 1 - Headquarters, 66th CIC Group
- 1 - Region IV, File

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1g

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
17 December 1956

## PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-567323/b

## SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence Service (U)  
Re: Administration (Uniforms and  
Insignia)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The uniform worn by members of the AVH (Allan Vedelmi Hatosag - Hungarian State Security Service) is reportedly identical to that worn by the Hungarian army with the exception of the use of blue colored collar flashings, blue or blue piped shoulder boards and a band of blue ribbon encircling the service cap.

2. The service cap, which, in the Hungarian army, is worn only by officers and career NCOs, is worn by all members of the AVH regardless of rank. A "Sam Browne" type belt is worn in the AVH only by officers and career NCOs who are allegedly armed at all times when in uniform.

3. Insignia of rank is identical to that used by the Hungarian army except for the blue background on the insignia of enlisted personnel and the blue piping on the insignia of officers.

EVALUATION: F-6

UPGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Nov 01  
BY USAMICOM FOIPA  
AND DATE 4-10-02 DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Source: ( )

filed: 567323-1 - 19 Dec 56

## DISTRIBUTION

1 - Headquarters, 66th CIC Group  
1 - Region IV File

260

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
29 November 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

D-567323/d

SUBJECT

East European Intelligence Service

KEYS

Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)  
(Training Schools)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 29 November 1956, Source was interviewed at Region III, 66th CIC Offices, Offenbach (MA8349), Germany, and revealed the following information on AVH (Allamvédelmi Hatosag - State Defense Authorities) Schools:

- a. Name: Kénelharité Központ (Counter Intelligence Center).
- b. Location: The Kénelharité Központ is located in the Falka Máté Laktanya (Falka Máté Military Post), at Bartok Béla utca in Budapest (nca), Hungary.
- c. Description: The Kénelharité Központ consists of one two-storied stone building, grey in color and has a tile roof.
- d. Courses taught: Russian, English, French and German are taught at the center. Courses in cryptography, including ciphers and Morse code; radio and communications; photography; geography; topography; and politics are also taught at the center.
- e. Staff: The staff consists of the commander, Dr. ( ) altabornagy (equivalent to a lieutenant general, US Army) and executive officer, vezérőrnagy (equivalent to a Major General, US Army). Each wears a uniform during the duty day.
- f. Faculty: The faculty consists of seventeen officer instructors.
- g. Students: The student body consists of forty-three officers. They wear civilian clothing at all times. No other information was available. (F-6)

5050 562 (b) (7) (C)

*his is a positive intelligence*

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
NOV 01  
FBI/DOJ/COM/FOIPA  
100-410100-5200-17

DISTRIBUTION

1-CO, 66th CIC Group  
1-Region III File

261

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

262-264a

## DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (if any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO.

AEUC-OCE

SUBJECT

USSR and Satellite Identity Documents  
Collection (20)

TO

FROM

DATE

COMMENT NO. 1

Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: Technical Specialist

Headquarters  
Region IV  
APO 108, US Army

30 October 1956  
Capt SCHEUFLER/emcc/LuftM625-2

1. Reference is made to Operational Memorandum 12/56, your Headquarters, dated 24 August 1956.
2. Forwarded herewith in compliance with reference contained in paragraph 1, above, are two copies of letter of transmittal from this Headquarters, dated 30 October 1956, which forwarded Satellite document to the 7988th Army Unit.
3. Attached hereto is a photostatic copy of each page of Subject document.
4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

2 Incls:

- 1 - Ltr dtd 30 Oct 56  
(in dupe) (20)
- 2 - Photostats (4 pgs)

JOHN R HIMMELRIGHT  
Lt Col, MI (Inf)  
Commanding

2 NOV. 1956

11175

~~BARO~~  
3257

OUTLOG Nr.  
IV 1370

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 26 JUL 2002  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

D-358577 (General) Personal I.D. document (Hungary)

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED;  
EOD DIR 5200.10

262

"USACRF FILE COPY"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

30 October 1956

AEUC-OCE

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Documents (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
7988th Army Unit  
APO 757, US Army

Report No.

Source

Document

Country

1

(refugee)

(b)(1)

Incl: [REDACTED] (c)

SCHEUFLEER/emcc/LuftM 625/21

JOHN R HIMMELRIGHT  
Lt Col, MI (Inf)  
Commanding

263

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED PER AR 381-130

65 77 306



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY 25 OCT 1956

AEUC-OCE  
IV-D-260991

SUBJECT: USSR and Soviet Satellite Identity Documents (u)  
(c)

TO: Commanding Officer  
7988th Army Unit  
APO 757, US Army

1. Forwarded herewith [REDACTED]

the attached film was processed prior to receipt of revised instructions. (b)(1)

2. The original of the referenced document is located [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

264

125. OCT. 1956

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED;  
DOD DIR. 5200.10

1. 41210464

OUT LOG Nr.  
IV 1303


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARUC-OCE IV-D-260991

SUBJECT: USSR and Soviet Satellite Identity Documents

(u)

(e)



(b)(1)

1 Incl:  
Negatives

JOHN R HIMMELRIGHT  
Lt Col, MI (Inf)  
Commanding.

REGRADING DATA CANNOT  
BE PREDETERMINED

264a  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page (s)

265-268

IGAZOLVÁNY  
önkentes rendőrtől részére

MADE IN USA

1

2

3

4

5

265

**HIVATALOS FELJEGYZÉSEK**

**Bemélyi igazolványának**

**száma: .....**

**Állásad latta: .....**

**AZ ÖNKÉNTES RENDŐR SZOLGÁLATI  
TÉNYKÖRÖKE**

1. Rendőrségek alkalmazásával hordozópolgári állás, járőrök és járőrök irányítása.
2. Objektumoknál őrszolgálat ellátása.
3. Egyéni szolgálat ellátása.
4. Kötelezői beosztás, vagy beosztásukhoz hely-szolgálat ellátása.
5. Tűzveszély, vagy elemi csapás alkalmazásával megegyező munkakörök végzése.
6. Idegenek és végzetlenek beosztása.
7. Körrel megbeszélés, de, vagy járőr mellett járőr-szolgálat ellátása.
8. Belső, gabona és egyéb rakomány tárolásának ellenőrzése.
9. A társadalmi tulajdon védelmére vállalt (kijelölt, kiterjesztett) polgári önkéntes ellenőrzés.
10. A munkakörrel kapcsolatban álló személyek igazolása, fogvatartása a körrel megbeszélés megőrzéséig.
11. Bemélyi igazolványok megőrzésének ellenőrzése.
12. Az állás ellátás személyi-król és jelvényekről a körrel megbeszélés ellenőrzése.

**Szám: 17109**

Erteyos: 10.....

P. H. ....

aldras

Erteyos: 10.....

P. H. ....

aldras

Erteyos: 10.....

P. H. ....

aldras

Erteyos: 10.....

P. H. ....

aldras

Sam: 17109

Erteyos: 10.....

P. H. ....

aldras

Erteyos: 10.....

P. H. ....

aldras

Erteyos: 10.....

P. H. ....

aldras


Erteyos: 10.....

P. H. ....

aldras

Sam: 17109

267



1 2 3 4 5 6

Scanned by *Scanned by* *Scanned by*



*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

*Scanned by*

268

MADE IN U.S.A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION** IV-D-190073

DATE 31 July 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

DANUBE RIVER SHIPPING (S) (u)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Commercial vessels engaged in Danube River shipping which depart from Hungarian territory in a westerly direction are subjected to control and inspection at SZOB, (ena), Hungary, which is the normal border control point for such water traffic. Inspections are carried out simultaneously by three or four separate agencies, the procedure varying somewhat in detail on different occasions. The normal inspections are made by Customs officials, the River police and representatives of the border police forces. A representative of the shipping company also usually makes an inspection of the vessel at the same time. On occasion, members of the AVH (Allam Vedelmi Hatosag - State Security Service) are also present. The border police and AVH appear to be primarily interested in unauthorized passengers and/or stowaways, making comparisons of personnel with documentation and occasional body searches for unauthorized letters or written material. Customs officials make a thorough search of the vessel looking for contraband while the river police and the company representative make a technical examination of the vessel. Normal Hungarian identity documents are collected at the border control point in exchange for receipts, the documents being returned upon the return of the vessel to Hungarian territory. All members of the crew are in possession of a special identity document, a Seaman's passport, which is used in lieu of a normal passport. Unless the vessel enters a Czechoslovakian port there is no control or examination of the vessel while passing through Czechoslovakian territory. (F-6)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAREUR COM FOLTA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5280.1R

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

DISTRIBUTION

269

194



FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 270-291

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 270-291

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**SUMMAR OF INFORMATION** IV-D-56, 23/b DATE 12 July 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence  
Re: Administration (Uniforms  
and Insignia) (C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The uniform of the AVH (Allanvedelmi Hatosag - State Security Service) is basically the same as the service uniform of the Hungarian Army with the exception that the color appears to be somewhat darker, although it is of the same shade. All members of the AVH, enlisted as well as officer personnel, are issued and wear a peaked type service cap, on the frame of which is worn a light blue colored band. The normal military uniform has no distinctive band on the service cap, which is worn only by officer personnel of the army. AVH personnel, both officer and enlisted, wear a Sam Browne type belt. The lapel or collar flashings of the AVH are of the same blue color as the band of the service cap. The summer uniform of the AVH is different from that of the army in that an open collar jacket is worn instead of the closed neck type of blouse used by the army. (P-6)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DISTRIBUTION

292

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UNTIL COMPLETED

ORDER OF BATTLE SECTION

HEADQUARTERS

522nd Military Intelligence Battalion  
APO 757 US Army

JH/kbe

TO: Office of AC of S, G-2 Intell  
Hq, USAREUR APO 403 US ARMY

Date 3 May 56

SUBJECT: BUCSU (IX 1435)

REPORT NO.: OBH-170-56

INCLOSURES: None

SOURCE: 7999

EVALUATION: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE OF INFORMATION: 29 Dec 55  
27 Jan 56

DATE INFORMATION RECEIVED: 12 Apr 56

TP FRANKFURT: 8312

FORWARDED BY: Sept.

Project 1a (6)

BUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Source a former member of a Hungarian Border Guard Unit stationed at BUCSU, stated that on 29 Dec 55 at about 2200 hours two Hungarian agents were sent across the border into Austria. The crossing point was one kilometer north of BUCSU, left of the RECHNITZ (VN 9941) road.

On 27 Jan 56 at 2000 hours, two agents were sent across the border at the crossing point where the border section BUCSU and BOZSOK (IX 1342) meet, approximately 2 1/2 km north of BUCSU.

Source stated when agents are sent across, the border mines are rendered safe before the crossing takes place. The border sentries are withdrawn at the crossing point, and are replaced by unknown persons from BUDAPEST. Withdrawn guards are sent to their barracks until after the crossing is accomplished. Source said that he was informed of these crossings by older members of the border Guard, who for the most part had at least three years of service. From these guards source learned that agents returning to Hungary give light signals near the border from Austrian territory. Such signals were to be reported immediately to the Commander of the post. The sentries are then withdrawn from the area, and are told to report to the Barracks-Supervisors, and that these incidents were not to be mentioned to anyone.

Source was also informed by older members that there are agents of the Border Guard in Austria. Source did not know if they were Austrians or Hungarians.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Source was also informed that he could voluntarily enter into Agents Training School, location unknown. After a detailed interrogation the person is sent to the country duty. The train-

(G2) 10 Oct 55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGL (1) 10-55-94M-47517 18

2 NOV 61

FM 522ND MI BATTAL

741111-1001-00 5223.1R

3 May 56  
OBH-170-56

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ing lasts for three months. During this period the person is constantly under observation. If the person is considered to be suitable for this type of work, agents who are to be utilized in Hungary have to attend one more year of training. Agents for foreign countries have a two year training period.

Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

for ( Lt Col Inf  
Commanding

QUSG 553 (b)(7)(C)

2 NOV 01

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

294

-2-

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 696 US ARMY

AEUC-OCE  
VI-D-345600

SUBJECT:

(S) 5USO-552 (b)(7)(C)

TO:

Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: CE Division

1. REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 19/55, your headquarters, dated 10 November 1955.

2. FORWARDED:

- a. Agent Reports, this region, subject: (C)," file: VI-D-345600, dated 1 May 1956.
- b. Summary of Information, this region, subject: "Danube River Shipping (C)," file: VI-D-190073, dated 1 May 1956.
- c. Summary of Information, this region, subject: "Hungarian Intelligence, Re: Administration (Uniforms and Insignia) (C)," file: VI-D-567323/b, dated 1 May 1956.
- d. Summary of Information, this region, subject: "Hungarian Intelligence, Re: Installations (C)," file: VI-D-567323/c, dated 1 May 1956.
- e. Summary of Information, this region, subject: "Hungarian Intelligence, Re: Personalities (C)," file: VI-D-567323/f, dated 1 May 1956.
- f. Agent Report, this region, subject: "Hungarian Intelligence, Re: Personalities (C)," file: VI-D-567323/g, dated 1 May 1956.

5USO-552 (b)(7)(C)

2 Nov 01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEUC-OCF  
VI-D-345600  
SUBJECT: ( )

(u)  
(c) 5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. SUBJECT is identified as the source of the information contained in the enclosed Summaries of Information. This information was obtained during the processing of SUBJECT at BFAN (Bundesammellager fuer Auslaender in Nurnberg - Federal Assembly Camp for Foreigners in Nurnberg), NURNBERG, Germany.

b. Preparing agent of the enclosed Summaries of Information was S/A ( ) this region. 5USC 552 (b) (2) (C)

4. REMARKS: The information reported in the attached Agent Reports and Summaries of Information was obtained by SUBJECT through residence in BUDAPEST, Hungary, and through his employment which involved traveling on the Danube River in commercial vessels.

8 Incls:

- 1-3. ARs dtd 1 May 56 (dupe)
4. SOI (1 page) dtd 1 May 56 (dupe) Major Artillery Commanding
5. SOI (1 page) dtd 1 May 56 w/Exh I (dupe)
6. SOI (1 page) dtd 1 May 56 w/Exh I, II, III (dupe)
7. SOI (1 page) dtd 1 May 56 (dupe)
8. AR dtd 1 May 56 (dupe)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

RJT/HES/mp/Htg Nil 6161

296

2  
REGRADING DATA CANNOT  
BE PREDETERMINED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 Nov 01

# AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

born [redacted]

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

1 May 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

VI-D-345600

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 18 April 1956, [redacted] born [redacted] in [redacted] presently a resident of BfAN (Bundessammel-lager fuer Auslaender in Nurnberg - Federal Assembly Camp for Foreigners in Nurnberg), NURNBERG (32UPV5178), Germany, was interviewed pertaining to his knowledge of the AVH (Allanvedelmi Hatosag - State Security Service, Hungary) and to Danube River shipping with substantially the following results:

[redacted] who arrived at BfAN and applied for recognition as a political refugee on 15 March 1956, is a marine engineer by profession who, for about six years, has been employed by various Hungarian concerns operating vessels on the Danube River. [redacted] was last employed as second engineer of the Motorship "Hunor", from which he illegally departed on 15 March 1956 in order to avoid returning to Hungary with the vessel. [redacted] claims that he has been dissatisfied with the political and economic conditions under the communist regime for several years and that he took this opportunity on his second trip to a western nation, to depart from his ship and claim political asylum. In addition to his general dissatisfaction with conditions under the communist government in Hungary, [redacted] stated that family troubles connected with his divorce from his former wife and a desire to marry [redacted], who accompanied him to BfAN, contributed to his decision to remain in a western country.

[redacted] claims to have never been a member of a communist or communist-sponsored organization of any sort. He served as a member of the Hungarian Air Force for a period of two years, from April 1949 to April 1950. During his military service, he was assigned primarily as a mechanic and was never promoted beyond the grade of private.

[redacted] who has attended six years of elementary school and four years of intermediate school, has lived in BUDAPEST (cna), Hungary, and in GYOEMRE (cna), Hungary, a suburb of BUDAPEST, for his entire life with the exception of the period covered by his military service and the absences incident to his employment as a crew member on Danube River vessels.

Through residence in BUDAPEST, [redacted] learned the location of, and was able to furnish partial descriptions of three installations of the AVH in that city. Through employment on Danube River vessels, he

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

297

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66TH CIC GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30093

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

2/2/56



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 382-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

born

2. DATE SUBMITTED

1 May 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

VI-D-345600

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

came into contact with a member of the AVH as well as another person who may either be a member of the AVH or an informant for that organization, and was able to provide descriptions of both.

According to all vessels departing from Hungarian territory are required to undergo a series of inspections at the port of exit. These inspections are conducted by members of the AVH, the Hungarian Customs service and the shipping firm. The AVH inspection consists of a thorough search of the vessel, apparently for unauthorized passengers, and checking of all documents, both of the vessel and the personnel aboard. All members of the crew are checked against their passports and special documents, both by a physical checking of description and photo and by questioning about residences, date of birth and similar details, to insure that the person in question is actually the one described in the documents. All documents are then placed in the custody of a ship's officer who maintains control of them until the vessel returns to Hungarian waters. On board the "Hunor", the first mate, who is believed to be either a member of the AVH or an AVH informant, was charged with the custody of the documentation of the crew. The Customs inspection was a search of the vessel for contraband goods and an examination of the ship's manifest. The shipping company inspection was primarily technical in nature and dealt with the vessel itself although there was also a control of all members of the crew which was witnessed by the AVH inspector.

stated that the vessel had complete freedom of the Danube River during any voyage and was subjected to controls only when actually stopping at a port. A Hungarian pilot boarded the vessel before leaving Hungarian territory and remained responsible until it returned. At no time during the course of a trip was a special pilot taken aboard nor was the crew restricted in movement on the vessel. If the vessel stopped in a Czechoslovakian port, the vessel and its crew were then subject to inspection by Czechoslovakian authorities. While in the CSR, members of the crew were permitted to leave the port area only with special passes arranged for through the local customs offices. These passes were valid for varying lengths of time, would be issued only every second day to any person and were subject to restrictions which have varied from time to time.

stated that on the occasion of his last visit to a Czechoslovakian port, the passes issued were valid for a period of five hours and within a radius of about seven and one half miles of the port area. Personnel visiting the town area may be searched upon their return to the vessel, however, usually only packages are examined by the customs officials. Upon entry and departure from a Czechoslovakian port, the vessel is again searched by both customs and security service officers.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

66TH CIC GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

298

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

AGL (1) 12-52-230M-30082

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

11 NOV 51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-300-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (c) (u) ~~USC 552 (b) (7) (C)~~  
born [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

1 May 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

VI-D-345600

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(REGIONAL REGISTRY) On 23 April 1956, a check of the Registry, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army, revealed no record of any personality mentioned in the foregoing Agent Report.

CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

ON 2 Nov 01

BY USARNSCOM FOLPA

Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~USC 552 (b) (7) (C)~~

299

~~USC 552 (b) (7) (C)~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66TH CIC GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30093

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION VI-D 90073**  
(VI-D 45600)

DATE  
1 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT

Danube River Shipping (C) (u)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Hungarian vessels engaged in Danube River shipping are subjected to close inspection and control upon their departure from and return to Hungarian territory. The inspections are conducted separately but simultaneously by the AVH (Allamvedelmi Hatosag - State Security Service, Hungary), the Hungarian Customs Service, and the shipping company concerned. The AVH inspection consists of a thorough inspection of the vessel, apparently for illegal passengers, and a check of the documents of the vessel and of the crew members, with particular attention being given to comparison of the person to the description given on the documents to insure that only the properly described person is passed. The Customs inspection is mainly of the vessel and its cargo, the cargo being checked against the manifest to insure against the improper shipment of materials. The shipping company inspection is primarily a technical one of the vessel itself, although the members of the crew are also checked. Following the inspection of the vessel and prior to its departure, all documents pertaining to the vessel and crew are placed in the custody of a ship's officer. In the case of the Hungarian Motor Ship "Hunor", the documents are given to the first mate who is believed by crew members to be either a member of the AVH or an informant for that organization. There are no controls placed upon the vessels engaged in shipping on the Danube River unless they enter a port, at which time they become subject to the usual customs and security service checks and searches. Traffic on the river is free; there is no requirement to take aboard special pilots in the waters of any other nation nor is there any restriction in the movement of personnel of the vessel or towed barges at any point, all being free to be on deck at any part of the voyage. During visits to Czechoslovakian ports of call, the vessel is searched by customs authorities and the personnel are checked by security service personnel. Crew members are permitted to visit the port cities on a limited and restricted basis and are subject to body search at the discretion of customs officials both upon departure from and return to the controlled port area. Special passes are required for use by the crew during visits to the cities. These passes may be issued no more frequently than every second day and are valid for varying periods of time up to five hours as well as varying distances from the city up to about seven and one half miles. Upon return to the port area, personnel are required to submit any packages and/or purchases for inspection and may be subjected to body searches. (P-6)

DISTRIBUTION

2 NOV 01  
RECEIVED  
21 NOV 1956

300

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

Incl 4<sup>2</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Hungarian Intelligence  
Re: personalities (C) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

1 May 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

VI-D-567323/f; (VI-D-345600)

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(REGIONAL REGISTRY) On 23 April 1956, the files of the Registry, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army, were examined and revealed no record of the personalities mentioned in the attached Summary of Information.

2 NOV 51  
RECEIVED  
AMERICAN ARMY  
APO 696

BUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

301

BUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66TH CIC GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

ND-56732, 6  
(VI-D-345600)

DATE

1 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

SUBJECT

Hungarian Intelligence  
Re: Administration (Uniforms  
and Insignia) (C) (1)

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 606, US Army

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

1. The insignia of rank worn by members of the AVH (Allamvedelmi Hatosag - State Security Service, Hungary), consists of shoulder boards which are basically light blue in color for enlisted personnel. The edge of the shoulder board is piped with a narrow strip of yellow or gold-colored piping. The stripes denoting the various non-commissioned grades are of the same yellow or gold color as the piping. There are three grades of sergeant in the AVH, the differences in grade being denoted by the number of stripes crossing the shoulder board at right angle to its axis. All grades of sergeant have a narrow stripe extending along the axis of the shoulder board. (EXHIBIT     ). (P-6)

2. The uniform worn by members of the AVH is basically the same as worn by the Hungarian army with the exception that the color appears somewhat darker although of the same shade. The summer uniform varies from that of the army in that an open collar jacket is worn instead of the closed neck type of blouse used by the army. All members of the AVH, enlisted as well as officer personnel, are issued and wear a peaked type service cap, the frame of which carries a light blue colored band, while the normal military uniform has no distinctive band on the cap which is worn only by officer personnel of the army. (P-6)

2 NOV 01



302

DISTRIBUTION


5950 662 (b)(7)(C)

WOUNDED BOARDS WORK  
BY  
AVH PERSONNEL

SHADED AREAS OF BOARD  
UNSHADED AREAS OF BOARD



SE. SGT.



IS SCALE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOI, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696  
SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence, Re: Administrative (Signatures and  
Insignia) (C); FILE: VI-D-567323/b; (VI-D-345600); dtd 1 May 56

EXHIBIT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 NOV 01

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.


DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

304 322

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 304-321



## SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence

APO 403

11 February 1953

350.09 (ABr/SAS/CI)

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Headquarters, US Forces in Austria  
APO 168, US Army

1. Reference is made to your letter CI/1969/52, Subject as above, dated 1 December 1952.

2. A check of files available to this Office revealed no information concerning names mentioned in your communication other than the fact that all regions of 66th CIC have been alerted to be on the watch for alias alias and suspected HIS agents reported to have crossed into Germany. This information was reported to 66th CIC Headquarters by electrically transmitted message from CIC, SALZBURG, on 26 November 1952. To date no information has been received from the regions on the two individuals.

3. Of possible interest in connection with your study of the Hungarian Intelligence Service, is the attached 66th CIC letter dated 13 July 1950 with a translated newspaper article concerning the AVH in Hungary.

4. A further check of the files for information on this Subject shows a memorandum published by Region IV on 26 September 1946, which states that BUDAPEST is the center of an organization similar to the Comintern. Agents were to receive their assignments in BUDAPEST and be sent to other countries through the Political Police. The transfer point to other places in Europe was VIENNA, and SALZBURG was the transfer point for news and organization to the US Zone of Germany. MUNICH was the projected functioning point in the American Zone. Several cells were said to be working at various places in Germany, such as BAD AIBLING, PLATTLIN, and BOCKING. This information is recorded as having originated with a highly trusted informant.

5. The following points of similarity are noted between the modus operandi reported in your correspondence and the attached newspaper translation:

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

a. Low level agents are processed as refugees or as in the case of the 1950 report are smuggled into Hungarian immigrant camps. The 1952 report states agents are inquiring and reporting on questions asked

CLEARED  
TOTAL INVENTORY  
DATE MAR 27 1959 INITIALS

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 323  
6 OF 6

2 NOV 01

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

ABR/ABR/SAS/CI/ABR/CI/CI

Ops Rr/ A Reading &amp; File/ ID Reading &amp; File/ CI

~~SECRET~~

350.09 (ABr/S&amp;S/CI)

SUBJ: Hungarian Intelligence Service

11 February 1953

refugees, while the 1950 report claims agents keep watch on politically important figures.

b. Higher level agents in both reports received training in BUDAPEST and were transported to VIENNA in Soviet vehicles.

6. These reports as well as others on Hungarian intelligence activities, plus the fact that no Hungarian agent has been convicted in the US Zone of Germany since July 1950 suggest the possibility that the Hungarians are in fact successfully conducting high-level intelligence operations in Western Germany and Austria. The present situation in the US Zone of Germany in which the major portion of the US counter-espionage effort is spent on neutralizing extremely low-level Czech and Soviet agents could be the result of a carefully designed joint Soviet-satellite program to achieve just that. While extensive investigative facilities are tied up with the pursuit of the numerous low-level informants known to be operated by the CSR and an apparent success is achieved in the form of numerous convictions, a higher level organization may be directing well-trained, well-secured nets or individuals completely undetected. Any additional information on this subject which may be developed by your Headquarters would be appreciated.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

1 Incl:

CIC ltr, dtd 13 Jul 50 w/incl  
JV/al/Heid M11 8203

Lt Col GS  
Chief, S&S Section

EUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

M/r: Self-explanatory. File info above from CIC ltr D-219152, same subj, 29 Jan 53.

Coord: Miss [ ] Maj [ ]

EUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

324

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

2 NOV 01

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS

GROUP

GID 13-3274

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS ~~DETACHMENT~~  
UNITED STATES ~~EUROPEAN COMMAND~~ ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

D-219152

29 JAN 1953

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, U. S. Army  
ATTN: Collection Section, Major [REDACTED]

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

CLEARED  
TOTAL INVENTORY  
DATE 6/5/53 INITIALS [REDACTED]

1. Reference is made to your letter, file 350.09(ABr/3&S/CI), dated 12 January 1953, subject as above.

2. A Central Registry check, this headquarters, revealed no information concerning names mentioned in the attached agent reports other than the fact that all regions of this command have been alerted to be on the watch for alias [REDACTED] alias [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] suspected HIS agents reported to have crossed into Germany. This information was reported to this headquarters by TWX from CIC, SALZBURG, Austria, on 26 November 1952. To date no information has been received from the regions on the two (2) listed individuals.

3. As to the plausibility of the information contained in the attached agent reports, your attention is invited to letter, this headquarters, copy of which was forwarded your organization, file D-219512, dated 13 July 1950, subject: Hungarian Intelligence Organization. A further check of the files reveals that a memorandum published by Region IV, Rosenheim Sub-Region, CIC, APO 205, dated 26 September 1946, reported that BUDAPEST is the center of an organization similar to the Comintern. Agents were to receive their assignments in BUDAPEST and be sent to other countries through the Political Police. The transfer point to other places in Europe was VIENNA, Austria, and SALZBURG, Austria is the transfer point for news and organization to the American Zone of Germany. MUNICH is the projected functioning point in the American Zone. Several cells working at various places in Germany such as BAD AIBLING, PLATTLING, and BOCKING, can be, according to information, assumed as existent. Others in NURNBURG, FRANKFURT, MANNHEIM, and STUTTGART are in probable existence. The facts mentioned are the exact story given by the informant, who is one of our most trusted

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

CIC 100  
JAN 31 1953

325  
~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~  
GENERAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

2 Nov 51

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

D-219152

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service

informants. There is no information on file at this headquarters concerning the aforementioned informant, but he was described in the report as a most trusted source. The institution of our present control of informants was not in effect at the time of this report.

4. Your attention is invited to the following similarities between the modus operandi in the attached agent reports and the newspaper translation which was forwarded on 13 July 1950:

a. Low level agents are processed as refugees or as in the case of the 1950 report are smuggled into Hungarian Immigrant Camps. The 1952 report says agents are inquiring and reporting on questions asked refugees, while the 1950 report had the agents keeping watch on politically important figures.

b. Higher level agents in both reports received training in BUDAPEST and were transported to VIENNA, Austria in Soviet vehicles.

5. No further distribution of this information is being made by this headquarters.

2 Incls:

1-A/R dtd 6 Nov 52, file

S-15458, subj as above

2-A/R dtd 10 Nov 52, file

S-15550, subj as above

*Capt*  
Colonel Artillery  
Commanding

USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

JPR/rs/hmm/Stgt 9342-283  
OPS

~~GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

326

2

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

GID 122-0419

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence

350.09 (ABr/S&S/CI)

APD 403

12 January 1953

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army

1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of a letter from USFA, together with two 430th CIC reports concerning Hungarian agents.

2. Your comments are requested on the plausibility of this information. Any current information which would tend to confirm the inclosures is desired. Central Registry check is requested on the names mentioned.

3. It is requested that the two agent reports be returned to this office with your reply. The USFA cover letter is to be retained in Central Registry.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

5050 552 (F) (7) (C)

3 Incls: a/s  
JV/al/Heid Mil 8203

Lt Col GS  
Chief, S&S Section

327

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

2 Nov 61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

xxx  
168

OLD 122-0419

Ref CI/1989/52

DEC - 1 1952

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service

TO: Director of Intelligence  
Headquarters, USAREUR  
APO 403, U. S. Army

1. Forwarded for your information are: A/R S-15458, dated 6 Nov 52, and A/R S-15550 dated 10 Nov 52, both Subject as above.

2. The following is information on persons mentioned on Page four, A/R S-15458, dated 6 Nov 52:

a.

Born: \_\_\_\_\_  
Occupation: Electrician  
Member of Hungarian Communist Party for 2 years  
and Communist Youth Leader in Budapest City Section  
IV.

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

\_\_\_\_\_ was detained for interrogation on 4 Oct 52 and held until 31 Oct 52 during which period he was subjected to numerous questionings. He told conflicting stories but did not incriminate himself and upon his release went to Innsbruck, Austria.

b.

Born: \_\_\_\_\_  
Father: \_\_\_\_\_  
Member Communist Party, Secretary, Communist Party  
Youth (DISs).

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

During interrogations \_\_\_\_\_ voluntarily admitted being an AVH agent currently on a mission in Austria. However, she

328

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 Nov 51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ref CI/1989/

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service

told many conflicting stories and admitted that she had lied.

c. ✓

Born: \_\_\_\_\_  
Father: \_\_\_\_\_ Mother: \_\_\_\_\_  
Member Communist Party Youth (DISs), Budapest.

He is currently under investigation.

d. ✓

Born: \_\_\_\_\_  
Father: \_\_\_\_\_ Mother: \_\_\_\_\_

He is currently under investigation.

e. ✓

Born: \_\_\_\_\_  
Father: \_\_\_\_\_ Mother: \_\_\_\_\_  
Formerly member of city police of Budapest.

He is currently under investigation.

f. ✓

Born: \_\_\_\_\_

Information evaluated F-6 identified \_\_\_\_\_ as an  
AVH agent currently on a mission in Austria. He has reportedly  
left Austria, but his activities are being investigated.

g. ✓

No record.

3. In connection with contents of A/R S-15550 dated  
10 Nov 52, the following person who evinced an unusual interest  
in the operations and personnel of Radio Free Europe is current-  
ly under investigation:

Born: \_\_\_\_\_

Father: \_\_\_\_\_ Mother: \_\_\_\_\_

Occupation: Student

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Languages: English, French, Italian, Slovenian,  
Hungarian, and Croatian.

4. It is requested that this office be furnished con-  
firmation of any information contained in the inclosed Agent

2 Nov 01

-2-

328

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ref CI/1989/52

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service

Reports.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

2 Incls:

#1 A/R 8-1550, dtd

10 Nov 52

#2 A/R 8-15158, dtd

6 Nov 52

( Lt Col, IRI  
Chief, Control Branch

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

2 NOV 01

330

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OID 122-0419

## 1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Hungarian Intelligence Service  
(Recruiting, Training and Deploying  
of Agents)

## 2. DATE SUBMITTED

6 November 1952

## 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

CIC Salzburg

Ref. No. S-15458 TDK/jn

## 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

The following information was submitted voluntarily by Informant 3848, an \_\_\_\_\_ who refuses to name his sub-Source. The information is an English translation of a written report which had been submitted by Informant in the German language:

(b)(7)(D)

EUSC 652 (b) (1)

"It has been learned that the AVH (Allamvedelmi Hatosag - State Security Authority) in cooperation with the Military Political Section of the Hungarian Army General Staff, trains agents for permanent employment in Western European nations. These agents are brought to the West via Vienna after their training. The following can be regarded as the main mission of these agents:

1. Gathering of Military information
2. Exploring the activities of Hungarian emigrants, especially the military and other emigrant organizations, and to cause distrust between the emigrant groups and Western nations through various methods of provocation.

The training of the above agents is split into different groups. These groups are as follows:

1. Agents who are forced to such service through their relatives. This group of persons consists mainly of arrested illegal border crossers (refugees) or of persons who are not Communists but rather opponents of Communism. With both groups the situation is similar because their relatives are either under permanent AVH control or in AVH custody. This fact is being used against such forced agents. The training of these agents usually takes place at the Military Political Section of the Hungarian General Staff. The training period is usually very short. Upon completion of this training period they are brought to the border from where they proceed to Austria as refugees. Their first mission is to report the questions asked them by Allied screening missions. These reports are generally forwarded to Hungary through an in-between person, who usually has been in Austria for a long period of time and who is a closer member of the AVH staff. Also these agents are required to make regular situation reports concerning their surroundings. These reports are submitted to an appointed confidant.

331

## 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

S/A CIC  
430th CIC Sub-Det "A" (Salzburg)

## 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

/s/

~~Confidential~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

Hungarian Intelligence Service  
(Recruiting, Training and Deploying  
of Agents)

4 November 1952

GIC Salzburg  
Ref. No. S-15458 TDK/jm

2. Agents who undergo a longer period of training conducted by AVH specialists. Their training takes place at the Budapest AVH Center, Andrássy Utea 60. The training of this group is limited specifically to the future surveillance of emigrants. They are to submit reports concerning the morals and attitude of Hungarian emigrants and special attention is paid to reporting the names of known anti-Communists. This group of agents submit their reports to Budapest through a chain of confidants.

3. The third group of agents is composed only of reliable active Communist Party members. This group is the most dangerous of the three because it consists of specially selected persons who have been prepared for their mission in training courses which last several months. Persons in this group are selected from the Communist Party Youth organizations and from the Freedom Fighter's movement. Prior to being submitted to these special courses, which are conducted by specialists in the field of espionage and military counter intelligence, they must undergo numerous examinations. The training is conducted in small groups of six to eight persons. Persons within the groups are separated and cannot contact each other. Each trainee is interned in a room which the others cannot enter. Also, trainees are completely isolated from the outside world during the period of training. Upon completion of these special courses they have to accomplish special missions within Hungary. Depending upon the manner in which they accomplish the above mission, it is determined whether or not they are capable of being sent on a mission abroad. If one is capable of a foreign mission he is transported to Vienna by a Soviet Army vehicle. Each of these agents has a special field in which he or she has been trained. One of their missions is to surveil Hungarian business firms. For such a mission they are usually attached in some capacity to one of their agencies. Others are attached to diplomatic missions and some receive special training in the field of economics.

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

-2-

S/A GIC  
430th GIC Sub-Det "A" (Salzburg)

332

/s/ (

RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED  
NOV 21  
BY USARMC/AFOLTA  
ALL PAGES 4-102 1-33 5233.1R

~~Confidential~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~Confidential~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

Hungarian Intelligence Service  
(Recruiting, Training and Deploying  
of Agents)

4 November 1952

CIC Salzburg  
Ref. No. S-15458 TDK/jn

Through the above groups, the Hungarian Government receives steady reports concerning Hungarian emigrants in the West and the activities of their own trading agencies operating in the West. This information is gathered and submitted by well-trained agents. In addition to the above, the Hungarian Government has been trying for the past one and one half years to prepare special courses for athletes traveling abroad in order to prepare them for special espionage activities. The Hungarian Olympic Team of 1952 had been trained in such a special course which began during October 1951.

The following persons are or were active agents, who were trained in the above manner, and who are currently operating in Western Austria:

born

born

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

born

The field of their mission is or was in Linz and Salzburg. They have not been seen in the area for sometime. It is believed that they received a mission elsewhere."

(Agent's Note: Even though Informant refused to disclose his sub-Source, it is felt that the above information is of definite value, especially the recruitment and training of the third group of agents described above. In conjunction with the above report, several young Hungarians have recently appeared in the Salzburg area and their activities definitely appear to be of a suspicious nature. These persons are

Reports have been submitted on the above persons and it is felt that the future activities of all the above persons require some attention.)

(C-6)

AGENTS NOTES:

On 21 October 1952 the files of this Sub-Detachment were checked and contained no information concerning the personalities mentioned in an Agent Report concerning the above Subject. However, the files contain information describing HIS activities, including recruiting, training and deploying of agents.

~~Confidential~~

333  
-3-

S/A CIC

430th CIC Sub-Det "A" (Salzburg)

SECURITY INFORMATION

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

AGENT REPORT

GID 122-0419

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Hungarian Intelligence Service  
(Recruiting, Training and Deploying of Agents)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 November 1952

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

3-15550 TDK:mr

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

The following information was received in a typewritten report form during October 1952 from Informant 3848, an Austrian State Police official, who in turn obtained the information from the MHEK (Magyar Harcosok Baratsagi Koossege - Hungarian Warriors Comradeship Federation). (Agent's Note: The name of Informant's Source within the MHEK is not mentioned.)

A warning has been received by the Austrian police from the MHEK and its counter intelligence organization that all refugees coming from the People's Democracy countries into Western Austria should be checked very carefully. The reason for the above is the fact that during February 1952 information was received from the Counter Intelligence Branch of the MHEK as well as from certain Yugoslav Intelligence Agencies that Hungary has initiated a long range program to send specially trained agents to Western Austria.

The schooling of these agents took place mainly at Jankaquarda and Csepel, Hungary. (Agent's Note: Informant's report which was typewritten, stated Jankaquarda as a training site but it is believed that the location is Jankavarda). The principal task of these agents upon completion of training and deployment is to explore all military organizations of the Hungarian refugees, watch their communications and the territory of their activities and their duties. In addition their task includes the observation of all Hungarian refugees. It was reported that most of these agents are under the command of the AVH (Allamvedelmi Hatosag - State Security Authority) and some are under a special section of the Hungarian Army General Staff.

It is of special interest that women have also been recruited by the HIS (Hungarian Intelligence Service) and are being trained for the above mentioned tasks. On 2 April 1952 approximately sixty women and girls were preparing to leave Budapest for travel and assignment to Western Austria and Western Germany. These female agents originate from good families, are well educated and are taught a foreign language prior to assignment. The main duty of these female agents is to make contact with members of the Western Occupation Powers and thereby obtain any and all information possible which they in turn are directed to report to special agents located in Vienna, Austria and Zurich, Switzerland. These female agents were sent to Austria and Germany in small groups and at well spaced intervals of time. Also one group operates without the knowledge or assistance of other groups. Their instructions are to return to Hungary via Vienna upon completion of their mission. According to Informant, the Source of the above information is the MHEK. (Agent's Note: Attention is invited to Agent Report, 3-15458, dated 6 November 1952, Subject as above, information for which was also submitted by the above-mentioned Informant. It appears that information for

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

430th CIC Sub-Det "A" (Salzburg)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

/s/

5USC 552 (b) (2) (C)

334

WD-60 FORM 1 JUN 47

341

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

28 NOV 80

122-0419

5200 IR

~~Confidential~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

Hungarian Intelligence Service  
(Recruiting, Training and Deploying of Agents)

10 November 1952

S-15550

both reports may have originated from the same sub-Source who may be a  
MIHK operative.) (C-F-6)

AGENT'S NOTES:

On 3 November 1952 the files of this Sub-Detachment were checked and found to contain numerous reports identifying the MIHK as a Hungarian refugee organization composed of former Hungarian military personnel throughout the Western World with headquarters near Innsbruck (French Zone), Austria.

Q Nov 01

335

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

S/A CIG  
430th CIG Sub-Det "A" (Salzburg)

~~Confidential~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIC  
CENTRAL FILE

(S)(X)(D)

AA374

RE: 1

IV-19564; XII-498.31 Recruitment of Hungarian Agents by Hungarian Intelligence  
Service Through Correspondence and Advertisement 20 June 1951

POSSIBLE HUNGARIAN COMM. AGENTS

64-137828

1. CIC See 20 June 1. Attached Agent Report concerning SUBJECT is  
Reg Dist 1951 forwarded for your information.  
XII

2. After a period of ten (10) months correspondence without significant result, it seems unprofitable to devote further investigative effort to this case, especially in view of SUBJECT's waning interest in the matter.

3. In the absence of instructions to the contrary, no further action is contemplated by this region.

4. It is to be noted that although [ ] is not captioned as the Subject of this report or previous reports, he has been designated by the word "SUBJECT" in all. In order to avoid confusion he has also been so designated in this report. It is believed that increased clarity would result from the transposition of the "Subject" and "RE" lines of all reports pertaining to [ ] it is recommended that this change be accomplished.

5. Agent "A" is S/A [ ] Region IV. 5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

[ ]  
Major, Arty  
Commanding

5 Incl:

1. A/R
2. Exh "I": Letter from [ ] to SUBJ
3. Exh "II": Letter from [ ] to SUBJ
4. Exh "III": Letter from SUBJ's ex-wife to SUBJ dtd 13 May 51
5. Exh "IV": Letter SUBJ had intended to send [ ] dtd [ ]

Capt [ ] Ia/Augsburg Mil 93-651

DISTRIBUTION:

- (2) Hq 66th CIC Det (Lt [ ] (w/cyps ea Incl)
- (1) CIC Central File (w/cyps ea Incl)
- (1) Region IV (w/1 Incl #1)
- (1) Region V (w/1 Incl #1)
- (1) Region VIII (w/1 Incl #1)
- (1) File

CCICF DOC NO  
137295

2 Nov 51

336

CIC LOG  
30918

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recruitment of Hungarian Agents by Hungarian  
Intelligence Service Through Correspondence and  
Advertisement

20 June 1951

RE: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(7)(C)

IV-19564

XII-498.31

1. Reference is made to Communication, Region IV, Reference No. F-1340, dated 20 April 1951, wherein SUBJECT revealed that he was residing in DILLINGER (M49/TOO), and had telephoned Region IV reporting that he had received a letter of CI interest.

2. SYNOPSIS OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATION: Reference is made to Agent Report, Region IV, subject as above, file: IV-19564, dated 12 March 1951.

a. SUBJECT

\_\_\_\_\_, which was signed by one \_\_\_\_\_ In this letter \_\_\_\_\_ proposed that SUBJECT furnish intelligence information to the Hungarians, and in turn \_\_\_\_\_ would make life easier for SUBJECT's mother, ex-wife and child, all of whom reside in Hungary. The letter from \_\_\_\_\_ also contained a personal letter from SUBJECT's ex-wife. In a letter mailed \_\_\_\_\_ to his ex-wife in BUDAPEST, SUBJECT agreed to the proposition and asked for further instructions.

b. On 12 February 1951 SUBJECT notified Region IV by telephone that he had received another communication from BERLIN. In this letter \_\_\_\_\_ referred to SUBJECT as \_\_\_\_\_ the alias which he had given SUBJECT in his last letter. \_\_\_\_\_ further mentioned SUBJECT's financial difficulties in securing a livelihood for his mother and son in Hungary, and attempted to force SUBJECT to work for him. \_\_\_\_\_ also asked SUBJECT when he could meet him in BERLIN so that further negotiations could be made in connection with SUBJECT's recruitment.

c. On 26 February 1951 SUBJECT answered \_\_\_\_\_ letter and stated that he was willing to meet \_\_\_\_\_ but would like to have it arranged so that SUBJECT would not have to make a long trip. SUBJECT was then instructed by Region IV to report any subsequent development immediately to CIC.

3. PRESENT INVESTIGATION: Background data concerning SUBJECT has been previously forwarded.

4. SUBJECT, presently employed with the IRO Security Office in AUGSBURG (M49/I37), was contacted by the undersigned agent on 31 May 1951. He stated that he had received his third letter from \_\_\_\_\_ on approximately 23 April 1951 (postmarked 16 April 1951), and that he immediately telephoned Region IV to this effect. When SUBJECT did not receive any further instructions from Region IV, he sent a post card to his mother in Hungary approximately two (2) weeks later. After the personal contents to his mother, SUBJECT wrote a post script informing his mother that if a Kr \_\_\_\_\_ appeared at her home, she should tell him that \_\_\_\_\_ had acted as \_\_\_\_\_ wished, but could not understand the last letter which \_\_\_\_\_ had sent him. (F-3)

5. On 22 May 1951 SUBJECT received his fourth letter from \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_ and went immediately to CIC MUNICH (M49/YB5) where he spoke to Agent "A". Agent "A" instructed SUBJECT to return to AUGSBURG and told him that he would be contacted by an agent from the AUGSBURG CIC office within a few days. (F-2)

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

337

66th CIC Detachment

Region XII

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIC Region XII 20 June 1951 Subject: Recruitment of Hungarian Agents by  
Hungarian Intelligence Service Through Correspondence and Advertisement

RE: [redacted] File No: XII-498.31 Continued

6. SUBJECT's third letter from [redacted], undated, postmarked BERLIN,  
(see Exhibit "I"), translated from Hungarian, is as follows:

"Dear Mr. [redacted] : (b)(7)(D)

"Regards

[redacted] (b)(7)(D)

(P-3)

7. SUBJECT's fourth letter from [redacted], undated, postmarked BERLIN,  
(see Exhibit "II"), translated from Hungarian, is as follows:

338

2 NOV 01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5052 (b)(7)(D)

5052 (b)(7)(D)

5052 (b)(7)(D)

(b)(7)(D)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIC Region XII 20 June 1951 Subject: Recruitment of Hungarian Agents by  
Hungarian Intelligence Service Through Correspondence and Adversairement  
RE: File No: XII-498.31 Continued

"I thank you beforehand,

"regards:

a. Enclosed within the same envelope with [redacted] fourth letter to SUBJECT was the following letter to SUBJECT from his ex-wife dated [redacted] (see Exhibit "III"), translated from Hungarian:

"I am here sending a picture of [redacted] which I recently promised you. I hope you will receive it and will enjoy yourself. He is very serious and his aunt wrote that he would not smile. However the picture is good and I am happy too. He is a big boy already. I don't know exactly where you are now; your mother mentioned that you are moving somewhere again. I hope you will have better conditions than you have had until now. We are all quite well, working and living moderately. The worst is past and people should forget it. The only important thing is to be honest and conscientious. I have not seen your mother for a long time and she wrote that she is a little upset because she does not feel well with Blanc. I am in a hurry to send you this letter.

"Many kisses, with love, [redacted]

8. When SUBJECT appeared at this office on [redacted], he had already composed the following letter to send back to Hungary to [redacted], however, he was instructed not to send it. (See Exhibit "IV"):

"Dear [redacted]

"I received your letter which is without a date but you posted it on [redacted] with a letter from my wife. I couldn't understand the logical connection among your letters and I can't see your intentions and I don't know if our correspondence has a reason. I do not wish to break our connections if you are ready to agree to my conditions.

"1. If you wish an answer from me, I beg you to give me another address because I shall leave out the correspondence of my family.

"2. Please don't ask for anything which will cause me an expense as you know I am living under very hard conditions. I think I should only have the possibility of travelling to PARIS.

339

2 NOV 01

(b)(7)(D) SUC 552 (b)(7)(C)

SUC 552 (b)(7)(C)

SUC 552 (b)(7)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIC Region XII 20 June 1951 Subject: Recruitment of Hungarian Agents by  
Hungarian Intelligence Service Through Correspondence and Advertisement  
Re: File No: XII-498.31 Continued

"3. Please think it over, during the past two (2) years I have lived very secluded and the largest part of my personal connections do not exist anymore. I am afraid that your hopes concerning the possibilities of my person have been exaggerated.

"4. And I also ask you to consider the fact that I might emigrate within the next four (4) weeks."

a. SUBJECT stated that he had intended to enclose this letter in the same envelope in which he was sending a letter to his mother in Hungary. He intended to seal this letter so that his mother could not read it and had typed the following sentence on the cover: "I ask you to give this paper to"

If he appears for it. In case he does not appear within one week, I ask you to burn this note without opening it."

(F-6)

9. Technical assistance on SUBJECT revealed that he received a postcard dated [redacted] postmarked [redacted] from one [redacted] written in Hungarian and German. Translation follows:

"Dear [redacted]"

"Dr [redacted] asked me in his letter to find out where you are and how things are with you. He wrote an important letter to you in February but received no answer.

"Dr [redacted] address:

Dr. [redacted]  
CIC BONEGILLA, Block 10  
Victoria, Australia

"Hearty greetings, [redacted]"

"P.S. If Mr [redacted] is not there anymore, please have some other Hungarian write an answer. The [redacted] are well."

a. SUBJECT mentioned Dr [redacted] to the undersigned during his interview and also showed the present address of [redacted] in Australia, which he had written in his address book. SUBJECT also stated that the letters "CIC" in [redacted] address are probably the abbreviation for "Civilian Immigration Consul." After detailed questions in reference to SUBJECT's former acquaintances, he revealed that [redacted] is a former Hungarian officer, volksdeutsch, who had served under him during WW II. When SUBJECT was asked who he might believe was the man sending him the letters from Hungary via BERLIN, he stated that it might be

340

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 NOV 51

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

(b)(7)(D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIC Region XII 20 June 1951 Subject: Recruitment of Hungarian Agents by Hungarian Intelligence Service Through Correspondence and Advertisement  
RE: File No: XII-498.31 Continued

a former 1st Lieutenant, demolition expert, who had served under him during WW II. came to Germany with SUBJECT in but returned illegally to Hungary approximately six (6) months later after he had received a letter from his brother in Hungary who was the police chief in KECZKEMET. At the end of 1944 resided at Fehervari Street in BUDAPEST. SUBJECT has not seen him since 1945 and could give only the following personal data: 5'8", 145 lbs, grey eyes, black hair, slender build, married, Hungarian nationality, 38-40 years old, curly hair. SUBJECT recalls that when served under him, he used to sign his name with the same diagonal slant used by (F-6)

10. Further questioning of SUBJECT on revealed that he claims to have no further interest in keeping up the "useless correspondence" with because nothing has been gained or accomplished during the entire ten (10) months of its duration.

11. UNDEVELOPED LEADS AND FUTURE ACTION: The designated instructed SUBJECT to report any further letters which he may receive to this office. He was also told not to continue correspondence with unless he receives further instructions from CIC.

12. AGENT'S NOTES:

- a. Background Information: None.
- b. Comments and Opinions: None.
- c. Recommendations: Recommend case be closed in this area.

APPROVED:

Special Agent, CIC  
CE Team Commander

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

DISTRIBUTION:

(4)	Hq 66th CIC Det	(w/1 cpy ea Exh)
(1)	CIC Central File	(w/1 cpy ea Exh)
(1)	Region IV	(w/o Exh)
(1)	Region V	(w/o Exh)
(1)	Region VIII	(w/o Exh)
(1)	File	

EXHIBITS:

Exhibit "I": Letter from to SUBJECT dated:  
Exhibit "II": Letter from to SUBJECT dated:  
Exhibit "III": Letter from SUBJECT's ex-wife to SUBJECT dated 3 May 1951.  
Exhibit "IV": Letter SUBJECT had intended to send to dated

341

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 NOV 01

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(D)

(b)(7)(D)

Kedves            ur!

Páradozást előre is köszönöm.


(b)(7)(D)

5 USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(D)

5 USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT I



Huldin Gien njon meijut  
 fimglipit, nemin, meylapod,  
 si enin naki. - Houdy raga,  
 meit amit Houdle ija, nra  
 rone hylendi meylapod, meyl  
 rone illidoda - de jo hji,  
 si si nji enilil naki. - Hagg  
 fji nra ! - Hra hndon  
 portan, nra nra, Hra  
 enilil, hji meyl hilleo-  
 rone nalamon - nra, jett  
 hmitmings hji hndon, nra

Május 24.

Igen tisztelt  Ur!

Keltesse nélkül, Berlinben a hó 19-én feladott a a volt feleségem levélével együtt küldött irását nyújtáam. Bár az egyes írásai közötti lorikai összefüggéseket a az alapvető szándékot nem látom világosan a nem világos levélváltásunk értelmé nem, a választ kívánságát azért mégis elküldöm a a kapcsolatot nem szakítom meg, mennyiben megvárakozom az általi feltételeimet lesz szíves figyelembe venni a a jövőben betartani.

1. Ha tölem választ kívánna, úgy nagyon kérem, adjon meg valamilyen konkrét címet, de feltétlenül hagyjuk ki a hozzártózáimmal folytatott levelezésem a mi köztünk levélváltásából.

2. Semmit ne kívánjon tőlem, ami pénzbe kerül, mert igen nehéz anyagi viszonyok között élek. Honnét tudnám egy párizsi ut költségeit előlevezni?

3. Kérem megfontolni, hogy én az utolsó két esztendőben igen visszavonultan éltam a személyes kapcsolataim szinte megszűntek. Attól tartok, hogy személyemmel kapcsolatosan túlsózt eredményeket táplál.

4. Ugyancsak kérem megfontolni, hogy én Európát már valószínűleg 4 héten belül elhagyom.

Szívveljesen üdvözlé

F. H. D. T. IV

345

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

346



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 April 1949

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Smuggling of Propaganda Material from Hungary to the Countries of Western Europe

Source, an anti-Communist, who is employed as relief-driver with the below mentioned firm supplied the following information concerning the smuggling of propaganda material: The NEFORT Co., an export-import and forwarding firm in BUDAPEST, makes shipments once or twice a month by trucks with trailers to Belgium and the Netherlands via VIENNA (C 49/K 49), LINZ (N 49/V 88), SALZBURG (N 49/Z 92) and MUNICH (M 49/Y 85). Accessories for radio sets are included in these shipments. Propaganda material and radio sets are also shipped. According to source, the trucks stop at small places where people announce themselves with passwords and tokens. They are given packages by the drivers.

Comment:

Source promised to supply further information. Details concerning the stopping-places were requested.

7821st Composite Group (TIB) reports

346

REGRADED

2/1/59

(Date or Event)

*Col J. Carter*  
*Rym*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 26 JUL 2002  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
HEADQUARTERS

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER  
REGION V - REGENSBURG  
APO 225

TOP SECRET  
By auth of AC of SG-2, USFET  
Initials: *[initials]*  
Date: 19 Sept 1946

NAS/dl  
19 September 1946

D-1378

4348

SUBJECT: Hungarian Political Police Activities

TO : Commanding Officer  
970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment  
Hq., USFET, APO 757, U. S. Army  
Attn:  Lt. Col.) ~~5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)~~

1. Forwarded herewith is LANDSHUT Sub-Regional report on subject (reference ltr, Hq., USFET, subject as above, (D-11 712) 350.09 (CIC/S-3/PG) dtd 31 July 1946; letters, this hq., subject as above, dtd 14 and 29 August 1946, and Weekly Progress Reports on Operation BINGO, this hq., dated 28 August 1946).

2. PASSAU Sub-Region has been instructed to investigate the illegal border crossing point (see paragraph 3 enclosed report) and to verify the contents of paragraph 6 concerning meetings in PRIENBACH every two weeks on Friday evenings.

3. Investigation continues and a further report will be forthcoming.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Tel: REGENSBURG 2282

Encl: 2 cc Landshut Rpt

Special Investigator  
CIC Region V

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Page 1 of 1 page  
Copy 1 of 3 copies

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL BY AUTHORITY OF  
COL. *[initials]* BY *[initials]*  
1ST LT, HQ 66TH CIC DET, 14 JULY 1950

UNCLASSIFIED  
R NOV 01  
BY *[initials]*  
REASON: *[illegible]*

347

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

685 25/9/46  
104348

~~TOP SECRET~~  
HEADQUARTERS  
SUB-REGION LANDSHUT  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION V  
APO 225 US Army

TOP SECRET

16 September 1946

By Auth. AC of S. G-2

Initials: *Jm*

Date: 16 September 1946

SUBJECT: Hungarian Communist Underground Movement

TO : Commanding Officer, CIC Region V, Regensburg,  
APO 225, U.S. Army

1. The following information pertaining to Communist Hungarian Underground Spy Organization submitted to the Eggenfelden Branch Office, (Z7190), by former police major, Ganthey, of Oberdientstfurt, Kreis Eggenfelden. A-1

2. A Dr. ( ) received a letter from his mother in Hungary about two months ago. Contents warned against his return to Hungarian territory, as he is wanted as a war criminal. ( ) collaborated with the Nazis, serving in the capacity of Landrat (exact location unknown). Reportedly persecuted Jews in Hungary. C-3

3. North of Passau, Weghschei, is the site through which persons desiring admittance into or exit from Russian Zone travel. Reported by ( ) of Mittich, Kreis Griesbach. C-3

4. One, ( ) previously served as interpreter for ( ) in Prienbach, Kreis Eggenfelden (Z7190). Departed from Prienbach inferring return to Hungary. At present he is in Eibsee near Garmisch, employed as interpreter by the Americans. Involved in underground activity and has knowledge of ( ) past dealings with Communist agents. C-3

5. Major General ( ) no longer travels to Passau with adjutant, Lt. Col. ( ) of Prienbach to hold secret meetings with Lt. ( ). Instead, ( ) journeys alone, once every two weeks. C-3

6. Meetings are held in Prienbach every two weeks on Friday evenings. ( ) and Lt. Col. ( ) supervise. Kreis Eggenfelden is divided into seven Hungarian station commands; officials placed in charge attend Prienbach meetings. Transfer information to Hungarian outposts in various station commands. (Names of all Hungarian officials under administration will be submitted upon receipt of information.) C-3

Telephone: LANDSHUT Military 2144  
Teletype: Station DTST, REGENSBURG (UFSET-TUSA network)  
Mes Ctr: c/o MG Det G-245

348

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL BY AUTHORITY OF  
1ST LT. HQ 66TH CIC DET 14 JULY 1960

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C104348

~~TOP SECRET~~  
HEADQUARTERS  
SUB-REGION LANDSHUT  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION V  
APO 225 USA Army

19

7. Dr. [redacted], Budapest Stadtrat (counselor) and Nyarady, Secretary of State's aide, Hungarian delegation from Budapest, are at present in Frankfurt, reportedly conferring with the American officials. They have proper authorization to enter the American zone. Left word with [redacted] that they are attempting to receive official permit to have Bürgerwald Camp vehicles (Eggenfelden) returned to Hungary. C-3

8. [redacted] sent one, [redacted] to Hungary, May 1946, with papers containing names of all Hungarians who remain in Kreis Eggenfelden, occupations, and reasons for not returning to Hungary. C-3

9. [redacted] received two letters several weeks ago from son in Hungary, reportedly serving in Russian army. Mail routed from Hungary to Austria (through Dr. [redacted] Hungarian Consulate in Salzburg), forwarded by German post to the American Zone. C-3

Dist.

- 1 - File
- 1 - CIC Region V
- 2 - Pro Grp Frkft

Special Agent, CIC  
Commanding.

copy of 4

phone: LANDSHUT Military 2144  
type: Station DTST, REGENSBURG (UFSET-TUSA network)  
ctr: c/o MG Det G-345

349

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

04348

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. 2F400214W

As of 17 MAY 79 all material  
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

(Signature)

17 MAY 79  
(Date Signed)

(Printed Name)

7  
(Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION  
UP AR 38  
VIEWER

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

546G

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

U-1084-72

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: HUNGARY	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 5525 72 (5004-09)
2. SUBJECT: (C) BUDAPEST (CT56) Secret Service Information	9. DATE OF REPORT: 29 June 1972
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 5 DIRM: 687
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: January 1972	11. REFERENCES:
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany 22 March 1972	12. ORIGINATOR: [Redacted] APO NY 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	13. PREPARED BY: [Redacted]
7. SOURCE: [Redacted]	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [Redacted] COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (Leave Blank)

(C) [Redacted Summary]

76

546G (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D)

REPORT
1. (C) [Redacted]
2. (C) [Redacted]

202100-HU  
202300-HU


16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1-DIA 3-USAREUR 1-EUCOM w/o encl 1-USAFE w/o encl 1-USASAE w/o encl 1-V Corps w/o encl 1-VII Corps w/o encl 1-EEIC w/o encl 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det w/o encl 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det w/o encl 1-SF Det (Abn) Eur w/o encl (Cont in Block 17)	CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11 X FROM GDS OF EO 11652 X CATEGORY 1 DECLASSIFY ON: CANNOT BE DETERMINED 1-CINCPACFLT w/o encl 1-OSI w/o encl 1-PSY OPS w/o encl	1 Encl (C) 546G (b)(7)(D) ENCL 1 HAS NOT BEEN REPRODUCED REQUEST ENCL FROM DS-4A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

351

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.




Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):


~~BUSC 552 (b) (1)~~ ~~(b)(7)(D)~~

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 352-355

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

522A

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: HUNGARY  
2. SUBJECT: (C) BUDAPEST (4729N-1905E) (CT5561), State Security Service Contact  
3. ISC NUMBER:  
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: January 1972  
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany 6 March 1972  
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6  
7. SOURCE: [Redacted]  
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 2298 72 (5005-01)  
9. DATE OF REPORT: 5 April 1972  
10. NO. OF PAGES: 7  
11. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF-24745 DIRM: 7A6; 1C2  
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO New York 09488  
13. PREPARED BY: [Redacted] Intg  
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [Redacted] COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (C) Information in this report pertains to the contact Source had

~~(S)(7)(D)~~

USC 552 (b) (1)

## REPORT

1. (C) Source

USC 552 (b) (1)

## 16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA 1-OSI  
3-USAREUR 5  
1-EUCOM 3-CCFFA  
1-USAFE 10  
1-USASAE 1  
1-V Corps  
1-VII Corps  
1-EEIC  
1-ACSI  
1-State Dept  
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det  
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det  
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur  
1-USASPD  
1-CINCPAC

## 17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP  
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

## 18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

None

EXCLUDED FROM  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

356

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30 MAY 1972

RECD DS-4C2

(Leave Blank)

241144-HH  
241344-HH

USC 552 (b) (1)

~~(S)(7)(D)~~



CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 2298 12  
 PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES  
 ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group  
 APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)

James report is based on personal observation.  
 Source defected to the W because of a constant dream of travelling to the US. and living there.

2. ~~(C)~~ Recruiting by the Ministry of the Interior

## a. First Contact

Source was first contacted (

nicknamed (

invited Source into his office, and asked informal background questions about him and his family; how well he liked his job, and about his future plans. Source was then asked (

nationality, sex, age group; income bracket, profession (stressed); character references and behavior; anything unusual that may have happened; did everyone remain with the group at all times; did anyone make any phone calls (

were there any unauthorized pictures taken; did anyone make or say any derogatory statements against the State. Source stated that the interview was friendly, but the atmosphere was bad, (

and had a hard time presenting himself as someone he wasn't. (

terminated the meeting and complimented Source for a good job, and said he would see him again soon.

## b. Second Contact

Source could not remember date of second meeting,

At this conference, he was given a standard four page, pre-printed questionnaire, averaging four to five questions on each page, with sufficient space between questions to allow for answers.

and contained the following information: (

Source believed that most of the verbal questions asked at the first meeting were part of the form, (

The final page was dated and signed by source upon completion. Source filled out at least six of these questionnaires prior to his second personal meeting with (

## c. Third Contact

The third conference (

At this time the questionnaire was filled out and Source was questioned by ( in his office. (

Source was told to report all actions: (

357

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

(b)(7)(D)

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

SUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 2298 72  
 PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES  
 ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group  
 APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)

## d. Fourth Contact

The fourth contact occurred ( )  
 Source was

Source became very friendly with

they requested source's help ( )

During the three to four hours of debriefing. Source con-  
 cluded ( )

Source felt that they were planning

Neither agreed to take the message for fear it was some kind of trickery. Source again approached one of the two ladies, and verbally gave them his message hoping that they would deliver it. Source believed that the message was delivered. ( )

## e. First Meeting

He was praised for his good work, and ques-  
 tioned on his personal background and desires. Source was then informed

The armed policeman at the entrance had  
 already been told of Source's arrival, and after a short phone call, ( )

In the room there was one desk,  
 telephone, typist chair, and two large easy chairs. ( )

Because of his posture and language, source believed that he was a military man in civilian clothes. ( )

, during which time, Source did very little talking. He was asked many questions, but never completed an answer. He was constantly interrupted by the official, who rapidly changed to different subjects. ( )

Source was told that he was doing a very good job for his country, and that he would be generously repaid for all his efforts. ( )

His call would set up a meeting time and place. ( )

5USC 552 (b) (1)  
 5USC 552 (b) (7)(C)

(b)(7)(D)

5USC 552 (b) (1)  
 5USC 552 (b) (7)(C)

(b)(7)(D)

358

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 2298 72  
PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES  
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group  
APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)

GENERAL  
CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

USC 552 (b) (1)

USC 552 (b) (7)(C)

(S)(M)

This would be an important step for him, because it would not only be useful for his country, but also Source's education and monetary welfare.

f. Second Meeting

The policeman again was [redacted] him and made his phone call.

He was 165 cm tall, weighed about 70 kg, was very intelligent and presented a very distinguished and sympathetic personality.

He praised Source for his good duty to date, and told him that he would shortly be earning quite a bit of money. Source was informed that his application for a passport would be approved.

He was to use that name, as well as sign all his reports with the name.

They could always get information they wanted.

Source did call prior to his original departure date, but due to unforeseen personal complications, he left a week later, and did not call at that time.

COMMENTS

Source was of average intelligence and very cooperative during the interrogation.

359

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)


CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 2298 72  
PAGE 5 OF 7 PAGES  
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group  
APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)



EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Figure 1 (c) BUDAPEST (4729N-1905E)(CT5561), Second Floor of IBUSZ Bldg,  
Tanacs Krt 2-4

360

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 2298 12  
PAGE 6 OF 7  
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group  
APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)

~~GENERAL  
COMMUNICATION SCHEDULE~~

Legend to Figure 1

1. Large working desks for customers
2. Exchange bank windows
3. ( )
4. Stairs to first floor
5. ( )
6. Passport control official
7. Large steel safe for storage of passports
8. 6 x 7 m office
9. Aluminum roof to first floor
10. Corridor
11. E-Block country tour secretary
12. ( )
13. 6 x 7 m office
14. Individual tour secretary
15. Empty office
16. ( ) Office was occupied by a ( ) of the time,  
but the real director was at ( )
17. ( )
18. Doors to U/I offices
19. U/I office
20. Small, about 2 x 3 m room, rear wall was filled top to bottom with U/I electronic equipment.

USC 552 (b) (1)

(b)(7)(D)

USC 552 (b) (7)(C)

361

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 2298 72  
PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES  
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group  
APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)

NYILATKOZAT

En ( ) úgy döntöttem, hogy hazafias kotelessegtudatomtel vezérelve segítoni fogom az allambiztonsági szervek munkáját. Feladatomat legjobb tudasom szerint latom el, elvtarsaimat soha el nem arulom, eree eskuszom Magam es elvtarsaim biztonsaga erdekeben a ( ) nevet veszem fel es ezentul jeleteseimet ezzel a nevel fogom alairdni.

datum ( ) ... ( )

SUSC 552 (b) (1)

(b)(7)(D)

DECLARATION

I ( ) have decided with knowledge of my patriotic obligation that I will assist the work of the national security authorities. I will carry out my mission with the best intentions and swear that I will not divulge my comrades. For my and my comrades safety interest I adopt the name of ( ) and will from now on sign my reports with this name.

date ( )

SUSC 552 (b) (1)

(b)(7)(D)

EXEMPTED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Figure 2 (u) Confidential Declaration Signed by Source prior to (u)

362

(b)(7)(D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT  
(Classification and Control Markings)

528G  
This report contains unprocessed information.  
Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.  
MZ-1705-71

1. COUNTRY: HUNGARY  
2. SUBJECT: (U) BUDAPEST (4731N-1907E) (CI5761) Hungarian State Security Service Staff Member and Modus Operandi  
3. ISC NUMBER:  
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: December 1970  
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Mainz, Germany 29 November 1971  
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION  
7. SOURCE: (S)(D)  
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 219 1837 71 (5004-06)  
9. DATE OF REPORT: 16 December 1971  
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1  
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 7A6; 6B7; 6A2  
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108  
13. PREPARED BY: [Signature]  
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY:  
1. (U) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT ( ))  
2. (U) This information was furnished ( ) The NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT ( ) marking is necessary to prevent the release of this information to a third country without the permission of the originator.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  
1-DIA  
3-USAREUR  
1-EUCOM w/o encl  
1-USASAE w/o encl  
1-V Corps w/o encl  
1-VII Corps w/o encl  
1-ACSI w/o encl  
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID w/o encl  
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID w/o encl  
1-CINCLAVEUR w/o encl  
1-OSI w/o encl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:  
GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION  
363

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:  
1 Enclosure:  
(S)(D)  
SUSC 552 (b) (1)

SUSC 552 (b) (1)(C)

(S)(D)  
SUSC 552 (b) (1)

201120 } 44  
201130 }  
201300 }

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

~~5~~USC 552 (b) (1) ~~(S)~~(7)(D)

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

364-369



NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

6920

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

LS-200-70

1. COUNTRY: HUNGARY

8. REPORT NUMBER:

2 212 5460 70

(5102-11)

2. SUBJECT: (U) Clandestine Listening Devices.

9. DATE OF REPORT:

9 December 1970

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES:

1

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 687a

ZB 511951

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 5 December 1970

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

MUNICH, FRG

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: 7 December 1970

13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE:

(S)(7)(D)

L, MI

Commanding

EO SC 552 (b) (1)

15. SUMMARY: (S) (C)

(Leave Blank)

(S)(7)(D)  
EO SC 552 (b) (1)

(S)(7)(D)  
EO SC 552 (b) (1)

(C/NFD)

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA  
2-USAREUR  
1-ACSI  
1-USAIRR  
1-EUCOM  
1-V CORPS  
1-VII CORPS  
1-USASAC  
1-OSI  
1-66TH MI GP-ABUTMI-CA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

370

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

371-413

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

414-421

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

422-432

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

Report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

COUNTRY: HUNGARY

22 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2213594064

SUBJECT: (U) Hungarian Intelligence  
Attempt to Recruit  
Hungarian Legal Traveler  
to Yugoslavia

9. DATE OF REPORT: 30 Oct 64

10. NO. OF PAGES: 32

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7a, 6B6

DATE OF INFORMATION: August 1961

12. ORIGINATOR: C2D Bn, 513th INTC Group

PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Oberursel, Germany  
1 October 1964

13. PREPARED BY:

EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

SOURCE:

Major, AIS  
Operations Officer

SUMMARY:

(Leave Blank)

(C) This report contains information on an attempt

The recruitment attempt appears to have been for the one time - casual Source type mission. It appears to have been a low security approach, with the approached not required to sign a statement of agreement or secrecy. Only reference to security of the approach was an oral admonishment to keep quiet about the contact.

REPORT

1. (C) General

1-DIA (DIAA-3)  
3-DCSI, USAREUR  
1-USARMA, Hungary

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

2-USEUCOM, J2  
2-USA/SPD  
2-10th Spec Forces Gp(Abn)  
2-AF Ln O w/C2D Bn  
4-S3, 513th INTC Gp  
1-C/R, 513th INTC Gp  
1-S3, 513th INTC Gp  
ATTN: ORBN

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 22 YEAR INTERVALS  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR 3200.10

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

NONE

EXCLUDED FROM  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

433

USC 552 (b) (1)

(b)(7)(D)

USC 552 (b) (7)(C)

(b)(7)(D)  
USC 552 (b) (1)

(b)(7)(D)  
USC 552 (b) (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

Source's father was notified in Jun 61, that his passport was ready to be picked up. On picking up his passport at the Police Headquarters, Source's father was advised that his son, Source, would have to appear also at Police Hqs. to pick up his passport.

2. (C) Recruitment Attempt

In early Aug 61, Source appeared at Police Headquarters during the morning, and told the Policeman on guard in the entrance that he was told to pick up his passport. The Policeman made a phone call to an unknown office within the building, and repeated Source's story including his name. Following the completion of the call, the Policeman directed Source to stand near the glass doors on the ground floor of the building and wait.

After five minute wait, Source was approached by an individual who did not give his name but inquired about Source's name. On being told Source's name, he asked Source to accompany him. Source was led by the individual to the third floor of the building, and taken into an office, furnished with one table and two chairs.

On arrival in the room both Source and his guide sat on the chairs, and Source was interviewed regarding the purpose of his visit to Yugoslavia. Source stated that the purpose of his travel to Yugoslavia was to visit his grandparents, and was then asked about other relatives.

Source mentioned that he had an unknown number of aunts and uncles and, as far as he knew, three cousins. He was then asked if any of the cousins was in the Yugoslav Army, to which Source replied that as far as he knew they were not in the Yugoslav Army.

Source was then asked about the political convictions of the cousins, and their occupations as well as their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with living in Yugoslavia although they were Hungarians.

Source was also asked if he was going to visit other places in Yugoslavia to which he replied that he was planning to visit the Adriatic coast.

Source was then advised to keep his eyes open, and make note of the location of Yugoslav military installation, to keep notes on the activities that he observed near the installation, including uniforms of the troops, number and types of vehicles within the installations and also to establish the morale of the civilian population.

Source was advised to be careful in his activities, since the Yugoslav authorities undoubtedly were watching foreign visitors and to be careful in his speech since the Yugoslavs were probably interested in the location of Hungarian military installations. The individual then advised Source to report to him upon Source's return from the trip. Source was further cautioned not to mention this conversation to anyone. The individual then, reached in his pocket and gave Source his passport.

3. (C) Identification of the Recruiter

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Although the recruiter never identified himself, the Policeman-Receptionist, after completing the phone call, told Source to stand near the glass doors and wait for Lt ( ) (fnu). Source believes this to have been a slip

4. (C) Miscellaneous

434

Source was not asked for his cooperation. During the entire conversation

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Nov 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

EUSC 552 (b)(1)(C)  
(b)(7)(D)

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

(Leave Blank)

that lasted approximately one half an hour, Lt. [redacted] did all of the talking, in a manner that indicated Source that [redacted] expected Source to comply with the instructions. Source was not asked to sign anything, nor was he given specific targets to observe.

EUSC 552 (b) (1) (b) (7) (D)

Upon his return from the trip, [redacted] has he ever had any contact with [redacted] again.

Through a personal contact who is employed at the Police Hqs as a Clerk, Source later found out that [redacted] was no longer at the Police Hqs. The manner of the reply indicated to Source that [redacted] probably left under unfavorable conditions.

Source has never seen the [redacted] person before or after the contact described in this report.

## 5. (u) Personalities

See Biographic Data Forms on [redacted] (fnu), forwarded under separate cover.

## COMMENTS

## 1. (u) Source

He defected on [redacted] while on a legal tourist passport to the RFG, allegedly in order to evade possible persecution because of his family's close Roman Catholic Connections. He was found to be of above average education and intelligence with a good memory. He was cooperative during the interrogation.

## 2. (U) Remarks

This Interrogation was conducted by Mr. [redacted]

## COMMENTS OF APPROVING OFFICER:

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

THIS IS RAW/UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

To avoid false confirmation, it is requested that agencies reprinting a part or the whole of this report, include the C&D Bn NUMBER OF THIS REPORT, the DATE OF THIS REPORT, and MENTION OF THE SOURCE IN THE EXACT TERMS AS GIVEN IN THIS REPORT. Doing so will also make it possible for C&D Bn to answer inquiries based on material reprinted by other agencies from C&D Bn reports.

435

CONFIDENTIAL

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (D)

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

436-537





**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND**  
**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE**  
**FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995**

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

AUG 03 2007

Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young  
CRYPTOME  
251 West 89<sup>th</sup> Street, Suite 6E  
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act facsimile of March 29, 2001, for records regarding Hungary Intelligence Services MO, ZF400214W. This correspondence was received in this office on April 16, 2001.
- b. Our letter of October 11, 2002, requesting payment for various dossiers.
- c. Our letter of December 13, 2005, acknowledging receipt of payment.
- d. Our letter of December 22, 2005, informing you that additional time was needed to review and coordinate the records you requested and we were unable to comply with the statutory 20-day time limit in processing your request.
- e. Our letters of March 22, 2006, September 5, 2006 and January 8, 2007, stating that we were still reviewing the records you requested and would respond to you when our review has been completed.
- f. Our letter of May 22, 2007, informing you coordination had been completed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and partially releasing information to you in FOIA case #251F-06.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that 91 pages are denied in their entirety as the information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a total denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Review Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Mr. Scott Koch, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA F-2007-01419 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

If you have any questions concerning this action, please feel free to contact this office at (301) 677-4742. Please refer to case #516F-07.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Susan J. Butterfield". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Susan" and last name "Butterfield" clearly distinguishable.

Susan J. Butterfield  
Director  
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office  
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b)(1) + (b)(3)

PER CIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

443 - 533

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 538-539

66-000427

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

X

DA

CO 66TH MI GP BAD CANNSTATT GER


LN O, DAD, STUTTGART  
CO 513TH MI GP, OBERURSEL  
CO 163RD MI BN, VERONA, ITALY  
CO FIELD STATION I, ZUFFENHAUSEN  
CO FIELD STATION VI, MUEHNBERG  
CO FIELD STATION XI, WURZBURG  
CO FIELD STATION XII, KAISERSLAUTERN

~~SECRET~~ - ~~SECRET~~ 7 0783 Opr from AEUC-OCE(B)

1. (u) (c) SUBJ is Hungarian Intelligence Service Re MO,

EE-567323/d.

2. (c) This Op in receipt fol info which is to be disseminated on strict need to know basis only: No FORN



EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

3. (U) Request addressess having info which would confirm

AEUC-OCE(B), EE-567323/d

JOHN E. McDONALD, CWO-2, USA

8365

1

2

538

ROBERT L. FRAZIER, LT COL, ARTY, CHIEF,  
CE & COLLECTION DIVISION

9 FEB. 196

~~SECRET~~

Copy 4 of 5 Copies

66-00042  
~~SECRET~~

CO 66TH MI GP BAD CANNSTATT GER

para 2 above, fwd this Group as expeditiously as possible.

-----  
MR: JEM/elr/s/9 Feb 61. Source Sta IV reports

[REDACTED] (X) (b)(7)(D)  
Above forwards info to all USI agencies, including, Field Stations and requests info which would confirm.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

539

AEUC-OCB(B), EB-567323/d

2 2

~~SECRET~~

JE

Copy 4 of 5 Copies

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 540-541

~~SECRET~~

08/1742-Z

66-000416

PRIORITY

X DA


CO 66TH MI GP BAD CANNSTATT GER

~~SECRET~~ DCSI, USAREUR, HEIDELBERG

~~SECRET~~ 7-0754 Opr for AEAGB-IP fm AEUC-OCE(B)

1. (U)(C) SUBJ is HIS in Aust re MO, EE-567323/d.

2. (U)(C) Source 13011 rept



3. (U)(C) As protection of 13011 req above info not rpt not be released to fgn natls and that [redacted] not be ident with above

8 FEB. 1961

AEUC-OCE(B), EE-567323/d

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

JOHN E. McDONALD, CWO-2, USA

8365

1

540

2

ROBERT L. FRAZIER, LT COL, ARTY, CHIEF,  
CE & COLLECTION DIVISION

~~SECRET~~

Copy 2 of 3 Copies



~~SECRET~~

CO 66TH MI GP BAD CANNSTATT GER

66-000416

information.

4. <sup>u</sup>~~(S)~~ Info being disseminated to DAD, 513th, 163rd, and  
Fld Stas this Group.

-----  
MR: JEM/s/8 Feb 61. Source Sta IV reported

  
Abv informs DCSI of info.

(b)(7)(D)  
(b)(7)(C)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

541

AEUC-OCE(B)

Copy 2 of 3 Copies

~~SECRET~~

JEP

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

542-543

GFB 03

PP UUFWZ

DE UUFWZHB 02S

P 080820Z

FM CO FLD STA IV 66TH MI GP MUNICH GER

TO CO 66TH MI GP BAD CANNSTATT GER

DA GRNC

BT

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

66-000404

//S E R E T// B-0235 OPR FOR AEUC-OCE(B) FR AEUC-OCE  
INFO AEUC-O AND AEUC-OCC(AUST SEC)

1. (C) SUBJ IS HIS IN AUST RE MO EE-567323/D.
2. (S) SOURCE 13011 REPT


CFN B-0235 EE-567323/D 13011 2 61 28 61 V-7-M

~~SECRET~~

542

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

1875 70 2 1971  
Copy 7 of 4 Copies



SECRET

66-000404

3. ~~10~~

4BT

CFN 13011 13011 13011

08/0835Z

13011 13011 13011  
835Z  
Chipp. In. 2. dissem. to DAD, 5/17/68.  
and 100 by 100 Gp.

NNNN

RECD 08 FEB 61/UUFWZ/0857Z

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

SECRET

543

22  
13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS FIELD STATION IV  
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 108 US Forces

13 SEP 1960

AEUC-OCE(B)  
EE-567323/d

SUBJECT: Hungarian Intelligence Service  
Re: Modus Operandi (C)(U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
ATTN: AEUC-OCE(B)  
66th MI Group  
APO 154, US Forces

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date SEP 22 1960 493

1. (U) REFERENCE: Annex "F", Operational Plan 1-60.
2. (U) FORWARDED: Agent Report, Field Station IV, subject and file as above, dated 12 September 1960, with one Exhibit.
3. (U) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source of information is as indicated in the attached report.
4. (C) REMARKS: a. In late July 1960, ( ) representative of the ( ) informed Field Station IV that while interviewing ( ) West German citizen, concerning ( ) emigration to Canada, ( ) revealed that he recently had been coerced into accepting an offer of employment from the Hungarian Intelligence Service (HIS) while he was visiting the parents of his fiancée in Budapest, Hungary. Upon his return to West Germany, ( ) did not inform West German authorities of his contact with the HIS. ( ) passed the information concerning ( ) Since part of the general KRI furnished ( ) by the HIS was directed against USAREUR. ( )

b. No further action concerning ( ) is contemplated by Field Station IV.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

544

1 Incl  
(u) (C) AR dtd 12 Sep 60  
w/Exh "I"

Lt Col, AI (Arty)  
Commanding

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

Yemcc/McG M 8456  
5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 380-320-10)

**1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT**

Hungarian Intelligence Service  
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

**2. DATE SUBMITTED**

12 September 1960

**3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER**

EE-567323/d

**4. REPORT OF FINDINGS**

(S) (D)  
EUSC 552 (b) (7) (D)

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

545

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

**5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT**

( ), 66th MI Group

**6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

~~(b)(7)(D)~~ ~~EUSC 552~~ (b) (1)

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

546-547

MC-02:102---

(b)(7)(D)

5090 532 (b) (1).

# AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

159718

HUNGARIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

#### 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

GB 11-0983

548

**USC 852 (b) (1)**

66th MI Group

DA FORM 1 APR 52

1 APR 52

~~DOWNGRADE AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS.~~

341 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
 Page DOD DIR 9200107 pages

Page DOD DIR 6300101 pages

Copy 1 of 2 copies

C1/641 - 89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



MC-02102--

# AGENT REPORT

NSR 380.320-10)

[illegible]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

Page

5USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

Copy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

77) (a) 299 5509  
(b) 7709

IT) (a) 299 0500  
(b)(1)(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MC-02102--

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

(b)(7)(D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

(b)(7)(D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

(b)(7)(D)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

C 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DA FORM 341 1 APR 62

Page 2 of 11 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

Copy 1 of 2 copies

550

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MC-02102--

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 380.320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

(U)

(U)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group 551

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

5 USC 552 (b) (1) (C)

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 62

Page 1 of 1

Copy 1 of 2 copies

5 USC 552 (b) (1) (C)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MC-02102---

**AGENT REPORT**

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

[Empty report area with horizontal lines]

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

6th MI Group  
SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

Page 5 of 13 pages

Copy 1 of 2 copies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

552

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02102--2

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

553  
5050 502 (b)(7)(C)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-02102--2

**AGENT REPORT**

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

[Empty report area]

(b)(7)(D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1) (A)

(b)(7)(D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1) (A)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group  
5 USC 552 (b) (1) (A)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 62

Page 7 of 14 pages  
Copy 1 of 2 copies

5 USC 552 (b) (1) (A)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(S)(7)(D)  
EUSC 552 (b) (1)

(S)(7)(D)  
EUSC 552 (b) (1)

555

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 62

Page 8 of 14 pages

Copy 1 of 2 copies

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MC-02102---

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

[Empty report area with horizontal lines]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

556

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[Signature]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

5 USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MC-02102-3

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 380-10-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(b)(7)(D)  
5 USC 552 (b) (7)

(b)(7)(D)  
5 USC 552 (b) (7)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 62

Page 1 of 14 pages

Copy 1 of 2 copies

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100 02102 - -

AGENT REPORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

6USC 552 (b) (7) (F)  
(b)(7)(D)

6USC 552 (b) (7) (F)  
(b)(7)(D)

558

MA - INTENTIONAL

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

Page 1 of 1

6USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Copy 1 of 2 copies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MC-02102--

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(S)(7)(D)  
5USC 552 (b) (1)

(S)(7)(D)  
5USC 552 (b) (1)

5. NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

559

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

Page 1 of 1 pages

Copy 1 of 2 copies

5USC 552 (b) (Z) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MC-02102---

**AGENT REPORT**

(SP 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

[Empty report area with horizontal lines]

EUSC 552 (b) (1)  
(U)

EUSC 552 (b) (1)  
(U)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

560

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

Page 1 of 1 pages  
Copy 1 of 2 copies

EUSC 552 (b) (1)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MC-02102---

AGENT REPORT

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 July 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
(S) (X) (D)

561

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

Page 1 of 1 pages

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

20 October 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(S)(X)(D)  
EIT (D) 552 (D) ITI  
SUSC 552 (D) ITI

(S)(X)(D)  
EIT (D) 552 (D) ITI  
SUSC 552 (D) ITI

(S)(X)(D)  
EIT (D) 552 (D) ITI  
SUSC 552 (D) ITI

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 62

562

SUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

441/583  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 980-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

20 October 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

[Empty report area with horizontal lines and handwritten markings]

5USC 552 (b) (7) (D)  
(S)(7)(D)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (D)  
(S)(7)(D)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

563

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 62

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2500

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 980-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

20 October 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

564 552 (b)(7)(C)  
(b)(7)(D)

564

564 552 (b)(7)(C)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10000

**AGENT REPORT**

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

13,066 (U)


2. DATE SUBMITTED

20 October 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

HE-039810

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS



(b)(7)(D)  
EUSC 552 (b)(7)(D)

565

EUSC 552 (b)(7)(C)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(WHEN FILLED IN)

OPNL DATA

ENTRY-  
EXIT  
PERM

USAREUR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

ATTN Intel Div BRANCH Production SECTION \_\_\_\_\_

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJECT NUMBER	SOURCE NR. & EVAL	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
"P"	IR-IV-83-60 (R)			13083 "C"	130860	130860 150860	06

9. SUBJECT Border Information (Hungary)

10. FORWARDED BY [ ]

11. TELEPHONE 8455

12. INCLOSURES: None

USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

13. REPORT: (Remarks)

Source, who visited the Hungarian capitol during the period 20 July - 8 August 1960, reports the following changes pertaining to legal traveling in and out of Hungary.

According to Source, a recent change has been made regarding entry and exit permits. Hence forth, all legal travelers can enter and exit at any legal border crossing point he so desires. Moreover, it is not necessary to obtain an entry and exit permit as has been the ruling previously. Source entered and departed Hungary at the Austro-Hungarian border crossing point at HEGESHALOM, and encountered no difficulty while so doing. Source described the border inspection as merely routine and was not required to open his luggage nor was he given a body search. Source states his passport was out of his possession for about 10 minutes and he is relatively sure that no phone calls were made during this time to determine if his visa was authentic.

This is by-product information being submitted for operational planning.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Nov 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

566

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(WHEN FILLED IN)

AGL (I) 12-59-24M-74952

FORM  
AE 20 NOV 59 3197

REPLACES AE FORMS 519 AND 519A, 2095, 2262, AND 2263 AND 2263-1, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

IV-83-60-R-M

**CONFIDENTIAL** (when filled in)**USAREUR INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION**

(ITEMS 1-8 FILLED IN BY UNIT)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJ NR	SOURCE NUMBER	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
(1)	(2-9)	(10-29)	(30-32)	(33-36)	(37-41)	(42-46)	(47-48)
3	H-302	REF: I-11-55 (40)	1a6	13083	130860	230860	06

(ITEMS 9-15 FILLED IN BY ANALYST)

9	10	11	12				13					14				15
DATE REPORT RECEIVED	DATE OF EVALUATION	BRANCH/SECTION	USABILITY				VALIDITY					FULFILLS RQMT				WRITTEN EVALUATION
			OUTSTANDING	CONTRIBUTIVE	MARGINAL	NOT USABLE	CONFIRMED	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	PROBABLY FALSE	CAN'T BE JUDGED	COMPLETE	PARTIAL	SLIGHT	NO REQUIREMENT	
(49-53)	(54-58)	(59-60)	(61)				(62)					(63)				(64)
26-0860	200860	AO	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	use

COMMENTS/GUIDANCE

Information is of general interest, but there is no requirement for it from an OB standpoint. Information would be of primary interest to personnel planning collection ~~missions~~ missions.

**BEST COPY AVAILABLE**

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

567

**EUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)**

DIST: CYS 1, 2, & 3 COLLECTORS  
CY 4 CONTROL G 2 USAREUR

ANALYST

**CONFIDENTIAL** (when fill)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Report Number: H-21-61

Source: 12712 (c)

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

5. (c) Operational Information, Hungary: Source who traveled by POV to Hungary during the period [redacted] furnished the following:

a. Customs control entry: Source arrived at [redacted]

Source underwent a routine border crossing. His passport was taken by one of the uniformed soldiers on duty and was returned to him approximately 20 minutes later. During the interim, customs officials required source to complete a customs declaration on which he declared two cameras, a radio, a record player and several bottles of cognac. Source was further required to declare the currency in his possession. The vehicle registration papers were checked and a cursory inspection was made of the vehicle and luggage. All personnel were uniformed and armed with revolvers. They were alert, courteous and attentive to duty. The entire crossing procedure lasted only 30 minutes and was completed without incident. Source furnished a copy of a sketch of the border area, drawn from memory. A copy of that sketch is attached to this report as Inclosure #1. Source crossed at this border check point in 1960 and noted that since 1960 an additional barbed wire fence has been constructed. The new fence is located approximately 200 feet from the highway and is topped with a double apron. Adjacent to this fence is a ploughed strip approximately 30 feet wide. The new fence is patrolled by a uniformed sentry armed with a rifle and accompanied by a dog. Source observed that there were high towers situated throughout the border area. The towers did not appear to be manned at the time of observation.

b. Customs control exit: On his return journey source arrived at the [redacted] He was required to turn in the triptique and customs declaration. Passport was stamped and returned. Only a cursory inspection was made of the vehicle and luggage. Source departed the check point without incident.

c. Internal controls: At [redacted] source arrived in Budapest (CT5561) and registered at the [redacted] Source was required to surrender his passport to hotel officials upon arrival. The passport was returned to source on the morning of 25 May 1961. While in Hungary, Source had complete freedom of movement and at no time was he surveilled or hindered in his movements.

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)


568

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Incl 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

SKETCH OF BORDER AREA -

*Incl #1*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(S)(7)(D)

EURO 552 (D) (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(WHEN FILLED IN)

351/2 IV

File

USAREUR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

3-2-3

ATTN AO Branch BRANCH H-195 SECTION 2/1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJECT NUMBER	SOURCE NR. & EVAL	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
<b>F</b>	<u>H-195</u>	<u>ICM: I-1-59</u>	<u>1a6</u>	<u>13186 "F"</u>	<u>010560</u>	<u>260560</u>	<u>06</u>

9. SUBJECT BORDER CONTROLS, HEGYESHALOM, Hungary (IP 610092)

10. FORWARDED BY CGLOVEL 11. TELEPHONE SW 8469

12. INCLOSURES: [ ] A/H-64 USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

13. REPORT: (Remarks)

Source 13.186 received the following information from a friend.  
(DPOB: Unknown) residing at  
employed as

Firm dispatched a truck delivering furniture from VIENNA, Austria to BUDAPEST, Hungary, date unknown, for an unidentified Hungarian Embassy employee. During the travel from VIENNA to BUDAPEST, the truck was not halted between Border and destination. During the trip between BUDAPEST and VIENNA, after delivering the furniture, the truck was stopped approximately 25 kilometers from the Austro-Hungarian border on the route to HEGYESHALOM (IP 610092). The check was made by Soviet soldiers from the nearby Soviet Installation (note: "nearby Soviet installation" are truck-driver's words). The empty truck was again stopped at a check point approximately 10 kilometers from the Austro-Hungarian border by Hungarian officials and given a thorough search. The truck was detained for about one (1) hour before it was permitted to continue. The reason for such a long delay was explained by Hungarian officials as that the truck lacked an exit Visa. This event occurred on or about 1 May 1960. No further information available.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

570

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(WHEN FILLED IN)

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

# USAREUR INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION

3518

(ITEMS 1-8 FILLED IN BY UNIT)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJ NR	SOURCE NUMBER	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
(1)	(2-9)	(10-29)	(30-32)	(33-34)	(37-41)	(42-46)	(47-48)
	1-105	OV, 1-11-59 (AO)	146	15286	010560	260560	06

(ITEMS 9-15 FILLED IN BY ANALYST)

9	10	11	12				13					14				15
DATE REPORT RECEIVED	DATE OF EVALUATION	BRANCH/SECTION	USABILITY				VALIDITY					FULFILLS REQMT				WRITTEN EVALUATION
			OUTSTANDING	CONTRIBUTIVE	MARGINAL	NOT USABLE	CONFIRMED	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	PROBABLY FALSE	CAN'T BE JUDGED	COMPLETE	PARTIAL	SLIGHT	NO REQUIREMENT	
(49-53)	(54-58)	(59-60)	(61)				(62)					(63)				(64)
07-11-59	07-11-59	10	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	1

## COMMENTS/GUIDANCE

The above received reports from other sources regarding the unusually heavy border guard and check-point controls along Route 1 during the first half of May. This is the first indication that Soviet soldiers were in that report of marginal usability since the information is sketchy and makes a very small contribution to our holdings and knowledge of the situation in Hungary.

571

EO 1.2 (b)(7)(C)

DIST: CYS 1, 2, & 3 COLLECTORS  
CY 4 CONTROL G 2 USAREUR

ANALYST (Signature)

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

FORM 2728 EDITION OF 1 APR 58 IS OBSOLETE  
AE 3 JUN 59

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 Nov 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 572-575



FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

572-575

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 576-577

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154 US Forces

AEUC-OCC 274/48

1 APR 60

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Documents (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
US Army Special Publications Detachment  
APO 757, US Forces

1. (C) In compliance with ICM C-9-58 (Coll), Project lh(4),  
forwarded herewith are the following documents:

<u>Report No.</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Documents</u>	<u>Country</u>
	[REDACTED] Pvt-2 US Army, RA 1081 3049, [REDACTED]	26 Agfastat <u>Negative</u> photocopy prints of Passport [REDACTED] 26 Agfastat <u>Positive</u> photocopy prints of same passport. One 4x5 Negative pg 45 of same passport. One 8x10 enlargement of pg 45 of same pass- port. One 8x10 viewgraph transparency of pg 43/ 44 of same passport.	Hungary

(b)(1)  
(b)(7)(D)

2. (C) Source obtained the above documents in the following  
manner:

a. Passport was issued to [REDACTED] nee [REDACTED] born  
[REDACTED] on [REDACTED] to allow  
her to visit Source, who is her son-in-law, presently assigned to  
[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(7)(D)

b. Source borrowed the passport, without his mother-in-law's  
knowledge and brought it to Resident Agency Heidelberg, 66th MI Group.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

This Document Has Been  
Classified By C/R Section  
Date 7 APR 1980 Init KK2

576

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

for  
and file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEUC-OCC 274/48

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Documents (U)

R/A Heidelberg had the passport photographed by personnel of the Classified Photo Laboratory, 4th Signal Group, Headquarters, USAREUR, APO 403, US Forces, on 17 March 1960. The passport was returned to Source who returned it to his mother-in-law on 18 March 1960.

3. <sup>4</sup>~~(S)~~ Further physical description of the passport, not obtainable through the photographs cited above, is as follows:

Color of outside cover:	Maroon
Outside cover material:	Artificial leather, hard substance, with embossed printing and shield design.
Color of inside pages:	Pink
Color of stamps on inside of back cover:	Green on yellow background
Color of print, "MAGYAR NRPKCZTARSASAG" printed around shield design on inside page:	White

4. (U) Documents need not be returned to this Headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 Incl ~~(S)~~

(b)(1)  
(b)(7)(D)

1. 26 Agfastat Neg photocopy prints of ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~
2. 26 Agfastat Pos photocopy prints of same passport.
3. One 4x5 Neg pg 45 of same passport.
4. One 8x10 enlargement of pg 45 of same passport.
5. One 8x10 viewgraph transparency of pg 43/44 of same passport.

BEN C. McCOMAS JR  
Major, AI (Inf)  
Adjutant

GCF/aew/Stgt Mil 8291

577

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL

2 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 23 March 1960

### PREPARING OFFICE

Resident Agency, Heidelberg, Fld Sta #1, APO 403, US Forces

### SUBJECT

Collection of New SZEMELYI  
IGAZOLVANY (C)(u)  
Re: Hungarian Passport

### CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

### SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 17 March 1960, the Hungarian passport (Utlevel) [redacted]

[redacted] (aka: [redacted]), born [redacted] in Budapest, citizenship Hungarian, occupation housewife, [redacted] was collected during an interview with [redacted] son-in-law, identified as [redacted] born [redacted] Pvt-2, US Army, RA 10813049, Co. "B", 3rd Medium Tank Bn, 35th Armored Division, Sullivan Barracks, Mannheim/Kaefertal (MV 6485), West Germany. [redacted] passport was photographed discreetly by personnel of the Classified Photo Laboratory, 4th Signal Group, USAREUR Hq, APO 403, US Forces on 17 March 1960 and returned to her through [redacted] on 18 March 1960.

Having arrived in West Germany by train from Budapest to Karlsruhe (MV 5728), West Germany, on 15 March 1960, [redacted] is presently visiting [redacted] his wife, [redacted] born [redacted], and their small children [redacted]

[redacted] for a duration of at least three months. Although [redacted] permit to reside in West Germany is valid for only three months, until June 1960, and her Hungarian passport is valid only until 23 December 1960, she has the intention of not returning to Hungary, but emigrating to the USA with [redacted] and his family when he rotates to CONUS, if such a move is possible. Still residing at [redacted] Budapest address are her husband, [redacted] born approximately 1902, place of birth unknown, who is a retired mechanic and partially paralyzed, one of her four daughters, [redacted] born approximately 1938, place of birth unknown, and Eva's husband, [redacted] born approximately 1938, place of birth unknown.

Attached to the original only of this report as EXHIBITS I, II, III, IV, and V, respectively, are the following photographic reproductions of [redacted] passport:

I.) Twenty-six (26) Agfastat negative photocopy prints, constituting a one-to-one size reproduction of the entire, document, including outside and inside covers and the forty-eight numbered pages of contents.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

578

II.) Twenty-six (26) Agfastat positive photocopy prints, constituting a one-to-one size reproduction of the entire document, including outside and inside covers and the forty-eight numbered pages of contents.

This [redacted]

DISTRIBUTION Cy to Hqs, 66th MI Gp  
Cy to Fld Sta #1  
File

Guarded by C/R Section

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1P

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23 March 1960

Resident Agency, Heidelberg, Fld Sta #1, APO 403, US Forces  
SUBJECT: Collection of New SZEMELYI IGAZOLVANY (C)(U)  
Re: Hungarian Passport

III) One 4 x 5" negative of page 45 of the document, taken to illustrate the watermark which appears on every page of the passport.

IV) One 8 x 10" enlargement (print) of the preceding negative.

V) One 8 x 10" viewgraph transparency of page 43/44 of the document, taken to illustrate the watermark which appears on every page of the passport.

Limitations of available laboratory facilities prohibited both the use of 35mm film and the introduction of a ruler into each photograph of the document to indicate graphically the size of the document and its pages.

Further physical description of the passport, not obtainable through the photographs cited above, is as follows:

Color of outside cover:	Maroon.
Outside cover material:	Artificial leather, hard substance, with embossed printing and shield design
Color of inside pages:	Pink
Color of stamps on inside of back cover:	Green on yellow background
Color of print on inside pages:	Black
Color of print, "MAGYAR NEPKOZTARSASAG," printed around shield design on inside pages:	White

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

This document has been  
Carded by G/R Section  
Date 7 APR 1960 Init G/R

Cy to Hqs, 66th MI Gp  
Cy to Fld Sta #1  
File

579

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Forces

AEUC-ONU(G)

SUBJECT: Special Report (U)

TO: See Distribution

EE-567323/d  
HUNGARIAN INTER. SEC.  
RE: modes of suicide

1. (U) The inclosed Special Report, representing a G2, USAREUR, study prepared for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C., is forwarded for your information.
2. (U) Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified inclosure.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:  
Special Rept (1 cy)

(Major, AI (Inf)  
Adjutant

USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

Telephone: Stgt Nil 8365  
RLF/JEM/pt

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 cy: Sta I  
IV  
VI  
XI  
XII

1 cy to Research  
1 cy to Security Div

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals  
Except: None  
By authority of  
Major, Arty, 66th MI Group

USC 552 (b)(7)(C)

MR: JEM/pt/8 Feb 60. Adv fws to all Field Stas a cy of Special Rept on the possible attempt by HIS to penetrate the US Army via the Alien Enlistee Program prepared by G2, USAREUR for ACSI.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 2 NOV 01  
BY USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

580

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

FEB 11 1960

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

581-592



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EE-567323/d

20 Aug 58

SPECIAL REPORT

Possible Attempt by Hungarian Intelligence to Penetrate  
The US Army Via the Alien Enlistee Program (S) (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ Introduction:

On 16 October 1958, a CIC agent attached to the US Army Alien Enlistee Screening Team in Frankfurt, West Germany, observed that an Alien Enlistee applicant had initialed a personal history statement (PHS) with initials which failed to correspond with his name. As a result, the applicant was withdrawn from regular processing due to the fact that he was attempting to enlist under an assumed name (██████████) and that he had unwittingly used the initials of his true name (██████████). This was followed by an immediate confession that he (██████████) was an Hungarian State Security Service (AVH) lieutenant and that he had the mission of penetrating the US Army. He further stated he was controlled by one ██████████ whose real name was ██████████, who, like ██████████, was also an Alien Enlistee applicant. In addition, ██████████ claimed to have overheard from other Hungarian refugees in Aversa, Italy, that another Alien Enlistee applicant, ██████████, was a former AVH lieutenant. As a consequence, ██████████, ██████████, and ██████████ were placed in custody of the 66th CIC Group and subjected to a complete interrogation. This resulted in a considerable amount of new information about the principals, much of which contradicted their personal history statements. CIC also succeeded in obtaining a confession from ██████████ that he was a Hungarian intelligence agent along with ██████████. ██████████ denied having contacts with any hostile intelligence service, but did admit his divorce papers were forgeries which made him ineligible to enlist. Found among his personal possessions was a Hungarian repatriation certificate issued to another Alien Enlistee, ██████████; although this was somewhat suspicious, nothing conclusively could be proved.

The above comprises in essence the extent of success enjoyed by CIC in its interrogation of the three principals. It was not possible to gain insight as to specifically what their missions were, particularly in regard to the US Army. The principals have not supplied any concrete leads which have to date produced information on Hungarian intelligence personalities operating in the West or who are in the US Army, although there are still several leads to be investigated in CONUS. Existing confusion in the case is partly due to ability of the three principals to manufacture a new "cover" story when confronted by obvious contradictions in earlier statements.

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE B~~

581

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 26 JUL 2002  
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

As a consequence of investigative difficulties encountered, this Office has been forced to collate the various cover stories each of the principals has supplied, with impressions of their interrogators, and the results of extensive polygraph examinations to produce a possible account of their past activities. The results of this effort have not been completely satisfactory, as there are still many questions unanswered which prevents drawing definite conclusions about the entire complex.

2. (C) Background of Principals Prior to Defection from Hungary:

(b)(7)(C)

Interrogation produced the following pertinent information concerning [REDACTED] life in Hungary prior to his defection: He was born [REDACTED], of working class parents. He claims to have attended eight years elementary school and also to have been enrolled in a machine mining school. In 1952, he was arrested for distributing anti-regime pamphlets, and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The term was shortened by a general amnesty and he was freed in 1954. Shortly thereafter, he was inducted into the Hungarian Army and assigned to a Labor Service Unit. He was discharged in December 1955, and returned to the home of his parents in Szombathely, Hungary. He worked for approximately one month as an unskilled laborer for a state-owned store. Dissatisfied with his job and conditions in general, [REDACTED] fled to the West, arriving in Austria in January 1956. This background information corresponds in part with the interrogator's impression of [REDACTED]; that he appears to have had only an elementary education, is inclined to be an opportunist, and is of above average intelligence.

(b)(7)(C)

Background information concerning the second personality of this complex, [REDACTED], aka [REDACTED], aka [REDACTED]

EXCLUDED FROM [REDACTED]  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

2 582

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

aka [REDACTED], who [REDACTED] claims recruited him for the Hungarian Intelligence Services (HIS), has been obtained primarily through interrogation. As can be seen from the series of names he has used, [REDACTED] either has an extremely fertile imagination or an unusually varied background, or both. His date of birth varies from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]; place of birth on one occasion was [REDACTED]; on another occasion, [REDACTED]. In still another account, he related that he was born and raised in Budapest. He first alleged his father was an engineer who worked in Turkey; at the same time was in the employ of Soviet Intelligence. For the latter activity, he was executed by the Turks in 1944. Later, [REDACTED] said this was his step-father. Lacking schooling, [REDACTED] claims to have received his elementary and secondary education in Budapest. [REDACTED] also alleges to have attended an intelligence school in the Soviet Union for four years (1950-1953); however, he later repudiated this statement.

In 1954, according to [REDACTED], he enrolled in the Kossuth Military Academy in Budapest as an artillery cadet. The course was to last four years; however, his training was shortened by the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution. [REDACTED] claims the school initially sided with the revolutionaries and that he ([REDACTED]) actually fought against Soviet troops. On 4 November 1956, the Commandant of the school, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, surrendered to the Soviets along with most of the cadets, including [REDACTED]. The newly established Kadar regime immediately transferred the more loyal students to the security police; [REDACTED] being among this group. [REDACTED] remained with a security police element for approximately two weeks and was then allegedly transferred to a Hungarian intelligence school in Budapest where he was to receive a six weeks course. The curriculum consisted of courses in conspiratorial behaviour, security, capabilities of hostile (i.e. Western) intelligence services, a basic code, etc. After completion of the course, [REDACTED] was given the mission to enlist in the US Army. To do this, he was to go to Austria and attempt to immigrate to the United States. If successful, he was to go to West Germany from Austria and enlist in the US Army there, and a second alternative entailed entry to Italy from Austria, with attempted enlistment in Italy. He was to use his own judgment as to what course of action he was to pursue. In accordance with his assignment, he was dispatched to Austria and crossed the border on 13 February 1957, posing as a refugee. [REDACTED] From the preceding account, which is both confusing and contradictory, it is difficult to formulate a clear picture of [REDACTED] actual background. According to his interrogators, [REDACTED] is a rather exceptional individual. He is extremely intelligent, has excellent manners, and is well educated, being especially well informed in the fields of mathematics and physics. He also has a working knowledge of French, English, German, and Russian, in addition to his native Hungarian. It also appears he has had some training as an artillery officer, and he is also knowledgeable of rudimentary intelligence

583

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 26 JUL 2002  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(7)(C)

techniques. In [REDACTED] various accounts, he has provided possible answers as to where he acquired the broad, extensive, and in some respects rather unusual education. But, he has never pinpointed the location where he received this education nor specifically identified his sponsors.

The third principal is [REDACTED], allegedly born [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. As mentioned earlier, [REDACTED] claimed to have overheard a remark from another Hungarian refugee that [REDACTED] had been an AVH lieutenant. [REDACTED] has steadfastly denied any connection with any Soviet Bloc intelligence service; however, an expired Hungarian repatriation certificate made out to [REDACTED] (US Army alias enlisted) found in [REDACTED] luggage points to a suspicion that [REDACTED] may have intended using it for blackmail purposes, possibly in connection with an intelligence mission.

There is nothing particularly unusual in [REDACTED] life in Hungary in the story he has related to his interrogators. He claims to be the son of working class parents, to have attended eight years elementary school, and that in 1943, he enlisted in the Hungarian Air Force. (Interrogators pointed out this was extremely young to be enlisting; he has, nevertheless, refused to retract either his stated date of birth or date of enlistment. It may be that [REDACTED] simply lied about his birth date to make himself more attractive to the US Army by giving the impression that he is younger than he really is.) In January 1945, he claims transfer to Germany and in April the same year was captured by the US Army. He remained in Germany as a POW until February 1946 and was then returned to Hungary.

He immediately went to work as a roofer for a state-owned firm in the area of Kispeszt and worked at this job until 1950, when he was drafted into the Hungarian Army. Nothing of particular importance occurred during his tour of duty during which he attended an artillery observers school. He was discharged in 1952 with the rank of Pfc.

He resumed his former occupation of roofer with a state-owned firm in Budapest. In October 1953, he was transferred to Bokosaba, Hungary, a rural area. Here he became acquainted with one [REDACTED] whom he married in July 1954. According to [REDACTED], this was not a happy marriage due to his wife's infidelity, which eventually led him to doubt the paternity of the child born the following year in May. But [REDACTED] was plagued with more than domestic difficulties. In May 1956, he was tried for negligence resulting in injury to a fellow worker. He was found guilty and sentenced to ten months imprisonment.

In October 1956, he was freed by Hungarian revolutionaries and participated in actual combat against the Soviet Army. With the collapse of the revolutionary forces, [REDACTED] fled to Austria, crossing the border on the 25th of November 1956.

584

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. (C) Activities of the Three Principals in Austria:

[REDACTED] was processed after arrival in Austria by local refugee authorities and given a job on a farm near the Austro-Hungarian border. In April 1956, he was transferred to Graz and from there to a refugee camp in Salzburg. In September 1956, he was interviewed by one [REDACTED] of an unidentified US intelligence agency. On 26 October, [REDACTED] claims to have returned to his home in Szombathely and to have actively participated in the Hungarian Revolution. With the collapse of the uprising, he fled again to Austria, arriving on 1 December 1956. He was allegedly accompanied by his brother-in-law, [REDACTED] who has since immigrated to the USA.

A check of the 66th UIC Central Registry revealed that one [REDACTED] had been in contact with the 171st MIP on 26 October 1956 and had been turned over to the Bavarian Border Police. A liaison visit with OSI representatives in Munich area revealed that this organization had been in contact with [REDACTED] but that he had been dropped in 1957 and he was no longer of operational interest. [REDACTED] has admitted visiting the 171st MIP for purposes of debriefing which apparently was a standard procedure for Hungarian refugees in the Salzburg area; however, he reported no other intelligence contacts except those with [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] returned the second time to Salzburg on 22 December 1956. He immediately became involved in an affair with one [REDACTED], a Hungarian refugee residing with her family in the camp in Salzburg. This romance ended rather unpleasantly for [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] had not attained the legal age of consent. He was tried and convicted for statutory rape and sentenced to a seven months imprisonment. He served the full term and was discharged on 18 September 1957. As a result of this conviction, [REDACTED] was not allowed to emigrate to any country except Venezuela.

[REDACTED] returned to the refugee camp in Salzburg the third time. He soon made the acquaintance of one [REDACTED]. They quickly became good friends, due to [REDACTED] generosity in loaning [REDACTED] money, which [REDACTED] had in ample amounts in contrast to most of the refugees.

In December 1957, [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] to approach another Hungarian refugee, one [REDACTED], and ask him to work in behalf of US intelligence. [REDACTED] complied with this request, and [REDACTED] tentatively accepted. [REDACTED] then instructed [REDACTED] to tell Lakatos that the offer had been withdrawn, which Gerencsars did. [REDACTED] account of this incident is somewhat different (see page 7). [REDACTED] has supplied no plausible reason for this unusual request on the part of [REDACTED].

585

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

REVIEWED UNCLASSIFIED  
30 JUL 2002  
EXCLUDED FROM FOIPA  
ACT 5814-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Shortly after this incident, [REDACTED] proposed to [REDACTED] they flee to Italy through Yugoslavia. Upon arrival in Italy, they would report to appropriate authorities under assumed names complete with cover stories regarding their backgrounds in case they should be interrogated. [REDACTED] readily agreed to this proposal as this would enable him to immigrate to the country of his choice providing he could successfully change his identity. [REDACTED] did not know what [REDACTED] reasons were for this move. On 27 February 1958, they put their plan into effect. They departed Austria in the area of the city of Villach, crossed Yugoslavia and then into Italy where they were taken into custody by the Italian Border Police.

In his final account of the events in Austria, [REDACTED] told a story which supplies the motives for fleeing Austria under an assumed name. He has, however, studiously played down the espionage aspect. He admits performing a mission for [REDACTED], but says nothing about being a Hungarian intelligence agent or being recruited by [REDACTED] for the HHS. This is a reversal to earlier statements that he was an AVH lieutenant and that he was controlled by [REDACTED].

After arriving in Austria, [REDACTED] claims to have been processed through regular refugee channels and on 8 March 1957 was assigned to the Rothschild Refugee Camp in Vienna. Shortly after his arrival in this camp, he was contacted by his Hungarian handling agent in Vienna. He was given the mission of collecting background data on Hungarian Refugees with military, political, engineering, and professional backgrounds. He was to pass this data to his handling agent on the occasion of their next meeting which was tentatively scheduled to take place in July 1957. [REDACTED] carried out this mission by cultivating the categories of individuals described in the previous paragraph by buying them drinks, cigarettes and other personal items. On the occasion of his second meeting with his handling agent, which took place as scheduled, he supplied him with background data on 10 or 50 refugees in the Rothschild Camp. He was given no further mission except to contact his handling agent in the fall of 1957. It was during this period [REDACTED] claims to have begun corresponding with a [REDACTED], residing at [REDACTED] whose name appears on sponsor's certificate found in [REDACTED] possession.

On 16 August 1957, [REDACTED] traveled to Salzburg and then to Berchtesgaden under the auspices of an unidentified US intelligence agency. The arrangements had been made beforehand in Vienna and apparently were part of a standard procedure to debrief knowledgeable Hungarian refugees. This is corroborated by a 66th CIC records check. According to information card submitted by the 171st MIP, one [REDACTED], former cadet at the Kossuth Military Academy, Budapest, was debriefed and supplied information on several Hungarian military installations. Card also contained information that [REDACTED] allegedly fled to Austria from Hungary on 19 February 1957. This date coincides with the date [REDACTED] claims to have left Hungary in his interrogation by CIC.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 26 JUL 2002  
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

586

6

EXCLUDED FROM GENT  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 19 November, [redacted] was transferred from Vienna to a refugee camp in Salzburg. Shortly thereafter, in the latter part of November 1957, he was contacted by his Hungarian handling agent for the third time in Salzburg. [redacted] was given thirty US dollars and instructed to establish himself in West Germany in order to enlist in the US Army under the Alien Exemption quota. This required illegal entry into West Germany. [redacted] made some preliminary reconnaissance on the Austro-German border and also discussed the possibility of illegal entry with other Hungarian refugees who had attempted to cross the West German border illegally. [redacted] decided that the chances of success were extremely limited. This left only one alternative open if he was to successfully satisfy the requirement of enlisting in the US Army; to enter Italy illegally and enter into US Army Alien Exemption channels in that country. (Note: Due to Austria's neutrality, Alien Exemption Teams are not allowed to operate in that country.) This decision required considerable advance planning as the Italian Government was apparently turning back Hungarian refugees attempting to enter via Austria. This necessitated fleeing from Austria to Yugoslavia and from there into Italy, and posed the unpleasant possibility of detection by Yugoslavian security forces. In order to reduce this risk to a minimum, [redacted] chose the Austrian border city of Villach, which is adjacent to both Italy and Yugoslavia. By crossing into Yugoslavia at this point, the time and distance factors were reduced to a minimum. However, the terrain is extremely mountainous and dangerous for one person to travel alone. For this reason, [redacted] claims he persuaded Geronsser to join him because the latter reportedly had some experience in mountaineering as a result of training by US intelligence in Berchtesgaden area.

Somewhat aside from plans for Italy, but related to [redacted] alleged US intelligence contacts, [redacted] tells the following story: [redacted] told him he had performed several missions for US intelligence and that \$6800 had been deposited in a bank under his name, but due to [redacted] refusal to perform additional missions, he could not collect the money. Also another Hungarian refugee, one [redacted], had asked [redacted] to put him in contact with US intelligence. [redacted] refused due to [redacted] lack of native intelligence. (This is somewhat different than [redacted] account, see page 5.)

In order to preclude the Italians from checking with Austrian authorities, both [redacted] and [redacted] decided it would be necessary to go under assumed names. To further insure the success of their plan, they fabricated cover stories to support their assumed identities. They also succeeded in obtaining two tattered Hungarian military uniforms, boots, and belts. After memorizing the cover stories down to minute details, they packed the uniforms in a suitcase and departed secretly from the camp in Salzburg on 26 February 1958 and traveled by train to Villach. From Villach they traveled on foot over the Austro-Yugoslavian border. Upon reaching an uninhabited area, they changed into their Hungarian Army uniform and destroyed their civilian

587 7

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

clothes and identity papers. With the aid of a map and compass, following a mountain trail, they finally arrived in Italy on 3 March 1958. There they were picked up by the Italian border police and after a short interrogation, were transferred to a refugee transient camp in Cremona.

The third principal, [REDACTED], was in Austria only two days (25-26 September 1956) and was transferred to Italy.

4. (C) Activities of the Three Principals in Italy:

A considerable amount of data has been obtained concerning the activities of all three individuals during their stay in Italy; however, it consists largely of insinuations against one another. According to [REDACTED], immediately after arrival in Cremona, he established mail contact with his family in Hungary and his sister, [REDACTED] nee [REDACTED], Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. During their stay in Cremona, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had several quarrels, and on one occasion they had an actual fight. According to [REDACTED], the last altercation occurred because [REDACTED] had caught him in the act of reading his [REDACTED] mail. In July 1958, they were transferred to a refugee camp near San Antonio, located in southern Italy. While there, they came in contact with an Alien Enlistee Team and decided to enlist. Immediately after informing the Alien Enlistee authorities of their intentions, they were transferred to Aversa, Italy, arriving there on 19 August 1958. Here they were given initial processing, which included a polygraph exam. [REDACTED] passed the exam under his assumed name, allegedly with the aid of pills supplied by [REDACTED]. On 10 October 1958, [REDACTED] was flown to Frankfurt, Germany, to finish his processing for enlistment. Prior to departure, he was given instructions by [REDACTED] to determine the names of US officers affiliated with the US Army Alien Enlistee Team in Frankfurt, the total number of personnel, the number of alien enlistees and details on the enlistment procedures.

While undergoing further processing, [REDACTED] came to the attention of 66th CIC Group in the manner described in the first page of this report.

[REDACTED] story of the events which transpired in Italy corroborates [REDACTED] account to some extent. After arriving in Italy, they were subjected to cursory interrogation by the Italian Border Police and were then transferred to a refugee camp near Cremona, arriving at their destination on 11 March 1958. [REDACTED] states he was told by Italian authorities he would soon be transferred to another camp and for this reason delayed notifying Hungarian intelligence of his new location. However, when the scheduled move did not take place as soon as it was expected, he reported his location to his headquarters in Budapest. He received an answer that he would be contacted in July in front of the Post Office in Cremona. The meeting took place as

EXCLUDED FROM CONFIDENTIAL  
DECLASSIFIED ON SCHEDULE

588

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

scheduled. The handling agent was not known to [REDACTED]. He was given 30,000 lira and instructed to transfer to a Hungarian refugee camp slated to be visited by a US Army Alien Enlistee Team. [REDACTED] complied with these order and on 1 August 1958 was transferred to a refugee camp near San Antonio, Italy; he was accompanied by [REDACTED].

He immediately notified Hungarian intelligence in Budapest of his new address. Shortly thereafter, he received instructions to travel to Rome for a meeting with a handling agent. The meeting was to take place on 3 September 1958.

However, before the scheduled meeting took place, the Alien Enlistee Team visited the camp where [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were staying, both volunteered. On 16 August 1958, they were transferred to Aversa, Italy, for initial processing, which included a polygraph examination. Prior to the test, both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] reviewed their cover stories in order to forestall any complications. Both passed, according to [REDACTED], without any difficulty. [REDACTED] makes no mention of supplying pills in order to enable him to pass the polygraph test (see [REDACTED] account, page 8).

[REDACTED] kept his scheduled appointment in Rome and met his handling agent as instructed. [REDACTED] informed his handling agent of his plans regarding enlistment in the US Army and supplied him with the names of 26 Alien Enlistees. He ([REDACTED]) was not given any further instructions.

This ends [REDACTED] account of his activities in Italy, except that one group of Alien Enlistees departed from Aversa on 10 October 1958, and that he left 30 October 1958. He was withdrawn from Alien Enlistee processing channels on arrival in Frankfurt, for reasons mentioned in the first paragraph of this report.

The third principal, [REDACTED], spent considerably more time in Italy than the others due to his immediate transfer to that country after arrival in Austria. He was immediately assigned to a refugee camp located near Marina di Ravenna. While in this camp, he applied for immigration to Canada. His application was rejected because he was not divorced, even though he told the authorities that his wife was still in Hungary and had no intention of joining him. In June 1957, he was transferred to a camp located near Lido di Ledroba (Frente), and then was immediately transferred to a third camp near Bologna. Here [REDACTED] applied for immigration to Australia. He was again rejected because he was not divorced. This camp was closed in December 1957, and he was transferred to a refugee camp near Rome. It was there that he cultivated the acquaintance of one [REDACTED], who assisted him in preparing forged divorce papers. With this document, [REDACTED] applied again for immigration to Australia. While waiting for the papers to be processed, he came in contact with representative of the US Army Alien Enlistee Program and decided to enlist. He withdrew his application to Australia and began

589

EXCLUDED FROM [REDACTED]  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

preliminary processing as an Alien Enlistee. He was accordingly transferred to Aversa for the second phase of processing. There he met [REDACTED], whom he had known earlier in another camp in Italy. He also made the acquaintance of [REDACTED] ( [REDACTED] ) and [REDACTED] ( [REDACTED] ).

Initially [REDACTED] stated both had made good impressions; later, he stated he suspected that [REDACTED] had provided names of Alien Enlistees to a hostile intelligence service. Horvath also reported that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had had a fight on one occasion, but that he did not know the reasons behind this altercation.

[REDACTED] successfully passed all the Alien Enlistee examinations including the polygraph test, despite the fact he had withheld information about his marital status. He was flown to Frankfurt for final processing as an Alien Enlistee on 30 October 1958. As the result of [REDACTED] allegations, he was withdrawn from regular processing channels along with [REDACTED] and turned over to 66th CIC Group for interrogation.

Among [REDACTED] possessions at the time of arrival in Frankfurt was a Hungarian repatriation certificate made out to one [REDACTED]. This certificate had expired as of December 1957. [REDACTED] disclaimed any knowledge of its existence. According to his story, having the only suitcase among several of his refugee friends in Aversa, Italy, including [REDACTED], he was prevailed upon to take some of their belongings with him. Among the items he was given was a package from [REDACTED], which contained the certificate, the contents of which were unknown to [REDACTED].

5 (U) Comments and Conclusions:

There are three outstanding issues which have not been resolved in the investigation to date: Are the principals bona fide Hungarian or Soviet Bloc intelligence agents? If so, what type of agents are they, i.e., low, medium, or high level? Again, assuming that they are bona fide agents, what were their missions?

In the case of [REDACTED], the only evidence available concerning his clandestine activities was furnished by [REDACTED] (based on hearsay) and the repatriation certificate found among his personal possessions. [REDACTED] oft demonstrated penchant of straying from the truth tends to reduce the validity of his accusation which even he admits was based on conversation between other Hungarian refugees in Austria. As for the repatriation certificate, [REDACTED] has provided a plausible story as to how it came to be in his possession. Interrogation of Szuros, whose name appears on the certificate, might shed some light as to the truth of [REDACTED] statements. Assuming [REDACTED] obtained the certificate in an illegal manner, he must have done so with a purpose. One possibility is that it may have been intended for blackmail. If the certificate had been shown to US Army security authorities in CONUS, it could, perhaps, have caused Szuros some discomfiture. Assuming it was intended for blackmail, it is

590  
10  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

conceivable that the pressure was to be applied in connection with hostile intelligence activity. However, it is the opinion of this Office, based on the tenuousness of the allegation and lack of other evidence, that [REDACTED] is not a Hungarian intelligence agent. In this connection, it should be remembered that [REDACTED] although he has been exposed to intensive interrogation, has never wavered from his original statement of having no contact with a hostile intelligence service.

[REDACTED] has confessed being a Hungarian intelligence agent. However, [REDACTED] has in the course of many interrogations continually minimized his espionage role. There appears to be no logical reason, or short of insanity, why [REDACTED] would admit he was an agent if he were not, and this Office believes he was, recruited for espionage. His accounts of being a sub-source of [REDACTED] are probably close to the truth. His general educational level, conversation, and appearance, according to his interrogators, almost preclude the possibility of his being an AVH staffer or experienced agent. It is further felt that his only contact with Hungarian intelligence was through [REDACTED] and that consequently he is a low-level agent. It would also seem, judging from the stories told by both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], that the primary reason for recruitment was to aid [REDACTED] in crossing extremely dangerous terrain, which would have been doubly dangerous had [REDACTED] attempted to go alone.

[REDACTED], like [REDACTED], has confessed being a hostile intelligence agent, and this Office presumes he is. [REDACTED] educational background, conversation, appearance, and leadership qualities indicate that he would be above [REDACTED] level as an agent. As previously implied, it is also believed that [REDACTED] alone was in direct contact with Hungarian intelligence. This still does not put [REDACTED] very high on the scale insofar as his level of competency as an agent is concerned. The knowledge [REDACTED] displayed concerning general clandestine techniques has been comparatively limited. It is definitely much less than what would be expected from a man who claims to have four years of intelligence training, or for that matter, six weeks training. His level of training seems comparable to that of the neophyte agent who has been given rudimentary instruction in conspiratorial behavior by his handling agent in the course of several clandestine meetings. The possibility exists, however, that [REDACTED] may be feigning lack of knowledge. But, in the final analysis, based on available facts, it would appear that [REDACTED] is a low-level agent. However, had he succeeded in enlisting in the US Army, he could well have become a valuable source asset of Hungarian intelligence. His native intelligence and background could well have compensated for his lack of training and by virtue of his enlistment, he would have had at least some access to targets of interest to Hungarian intelligence.

The final question to be resolved concerns the missions of the principals. Obviously, [REDACTED] case is too vague to draw any valid conclusions. The situation is somewhat better from an analytical standpoint in regard to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], as in all

591 11

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

probability, they are hostile agents of some type, and have made a few generalized statements concerning their mission. In their final accounts, both [redacted] and [redacted] claimed they were to penetrate the US Army via the Alien Enlistee Program. They did not qualify this statement by indicating whether they were directed against positive intelligence targets, counterintelligence targets, or targets of opportunity. Their refusal (or inability) to reduce the scope of their basic mission to even these broad fields precludes determining their specific objectives. Initially, [redacted] claimed to have received training in signal communications and radar, the purpose of which was to prepare him for a sabotage mission against the NATO radar system. However, in subsequent interrogations, he repudiated this statement. It does not necessarily follow that [redacted] and [redacted] were withholding information concerning details of their alleged basic mission of enlisting in the US Army. Several KGB have been uncovered directing East German intelligence agents to enlist in the West German Army; this was the extent of specific instructions. It may well be the policy of Soviet Bloc intelligence in their penetration operations against the NATO forces to allow the agent to enlist, and then not renew contact until he has succeeded in obtaining a fairly permanent assignment within a specific branch or arm. Such a procedure would have considerable merit from the standpoint of intelligence and security of the agent.

There also exists the possibility that [redacted] and [redacted] may have had a counterintelligence mission with a limited objective. If this were the case, the motive for [redacted] quick confession becomes more obvious. For the result of such a disclosure would almost insure that they would be brought in contact with US Army security and that they would be exposed to a hostile type interrogation. As a result, [redacted] and [redacted] would be able to report on a considerable amount of US Army counterintelligence real estate, personalities, methods of operation (especially interrogation techniques) and capability of the US Army to uncover actual agents within the Alien Enlistee stream. They would also be able to report the extent of CIC knowledge concerning Hungarian intelligence. Whether this was the planned objective of the operation or not, it could well be the final result. The US Army rejection will probably result in barring the principals from emigrating to the US, Canada and Australia. This obviously will reduce their chances of ever leaving the European Continent. This might force the principals to return to their native land. If this happens, it would be logical to assume that they will be debriefed by Hungarian counterintelligence along the lines described in the first part of this paragraph.

6. In conclusion, based on information at hand, it appears that [redacted] (is not a hostile agent) that [redacted] was instructed by Hungarian Intelligence to penetrate the US Army via the Alien Enlistee Program and [redacted] later reported [redacted] on his own. Hungarian Intelligence probably did not give [redacted] any specific objectives, but intended to do so once he was established in the US Army. It is conceivable that hostile intelligence planned to have [redacted] and [redacted] apprehended and interrogated to accomplish a counterintelligence mission against CIC, but this idea is based almost entirely on conjecture. The probable hostile objective has been thwarted, but it appears that eventually [redacted] and [redacted] will furnish the HHS information of counterintelligence value.

592 12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Evaluation of Report on Hungarian Border Zone Dated 18  
February 1960

The subject Report on the Hungarian Border Zones, obtained from ( ) has been reviewed and studied with interest. The section's describing the three different zones and the control regulations and practices that apply to them present good confirmative information and also new details on the subject.

(b)(7)(D)

(17) (1) 255 0505

Information available to us does raise questions as to certain of the statements in the report with respect use of the border zone permit. In practice at least, it is not always necessary that a visitor turn in his identity document during his stay in the border zone. Sources debriefed by this unit have related that on many occasions they did not even report back to the authorities before leaving and subsequently picking up their identity documents.

The descriptive information relative to the new Hungarian identity documents (SZELELYI IGAZOLVANY) is essentially correct. The statements on the issuance of the document and its validity period, however, does not agree with our own information.

To our knowledge issue of the new documents began as early as 1958 but the issuance did not involve a mass exchange for "The Hungarian Population". Only expiring documents were replaced and those which were lost, mutilated, or incorrect because of change of name through marriage or otherwise.

The change in the validity period of the Hungarian Sz.I. pre-dates the October 1956 revolution. In mid-1956 a new regulation changed the uniform 5-year validity period to a sliding scale depending on the age of the bearer. Documents issued to those under 30 years of age have a validity of 5 years, 30 to 50 years - 10 years, and documents issued to those over 50 years have indefinite validity.

In other respects we find the report interesting and valuable.

593

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Evaluation of Report on Hungarian Border Zone Dated 18  
February 1960

The subject Report on the Hungarian Border Zones, obtained from [REDACTED] has been reviewed and studied with interest. The section's describing the three different zones and the control regulations and practices that apply to them present good confirmative information and also new details on the subject. (b)(7)(D)

Information available to us does raise questions as to certain of the statements in the report with respect use of the border zone permit. In practice at least, it is not always necessary that a visitor turn in his identity document during his stay in the border zone. Sources debriefed by this unit have related that on many occasions they did not even report back to the authorities before leaving and subsequently picking up their identity documents.

The descriptive information relative to the new Hungarian identity documents (SZELELYI IGAZOLVANY) is essentially correct. The statements on the issuance of the document and its validity period, however, does not agree with our own information.

To our knowledge issue of the new documents began as early as 1958 but the issuance did not involve a mass exchange for "The Hungarian Population". Only expiring documents were replaced and those which were lost, mutilated, or incorrect because of change of name through marriage or otherwise.

The change in the validity period of the Hungarian Sz.I. pre-dates the October 1956 revolution. In mid-1956 a new regulation changed the uniform 5-year validity period to a sliding scale depending on the age of the bearer. Documents issued to those under 30 years of age have a validity of 5 years, 30 to 50 years - 10 years, and documents issued to those over 50 years have indefinite validity.

In other respects we find the report interesting and valuable.

593

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

---

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 594-618

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154 US Forces

AEUC-OCB(B)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

TO: See Distribution

1. (S) Forwarded for your information and retention is a translation [REDACTED] (S)

2. [REDACTED] (S)

594

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEUC-OCB(B)  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

In other respects we find the report interesting and valuable."

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[REDACTED]

*B. C. McComas Jr.*  
BEN C. McCOMAS JR.  
Major, AI (Inf)  
Adjutant

AHA/Stgt Mil 8469

DISTRIBUTION

FS I - 2 cys  
FS IV - 2 cys  
FS VI - 2 cys  
FS XI - 2 cys  
FS XII - 2 cys  
OCE(B) - 1 cy  
Rsch - 1 cy  
OCC(AUS) - 1 cy  
OCB(B) - File cy


595

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET


Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)


It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

596-618